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Dept. of Revenue of KY v. Davis
(06-666)
Ruling Below: (Dept. of Revenue of KY v. Davis, 197 S.W. 3d 557 (Ky. 2006), cert granted,
127 S.Ct. 2451, 75 U.S.L.W. 3621, 75 U.S.L.W. 3617).
The state of Kentucky taxes municipal bonds from outside the state, while providing tax
exemption for municipal bonds from within the state. Municipal bond holders George and
Catherine Davis sued, claiming that the disparate treatment of in-state versus out-of-state bonds
was a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Questions Presented: Whether a state violates the dormant Commerce Clause by providing an
exemption from its income tax for interest income derived from bonds issued by the state and its
political subdivisions, while treating interest income realized from bonds issued by other states
and their political subdivisions as taxable to the same extent, and in the same manner, as interest
earned on bonds issued by commercial entities, whether domestic or foreign.
George W. DAVIS and Catherine V. Davis,
Appellants
V.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, Commonwealth of Kentucky (Formerly Commonwealth of Kentucky, Revenue
Cabinet) and Commonwealth of Kentucky Finance and Administration Cabinet,
Appellees
Court of Appeals of Kentucky
Decided January 6, 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
Judge MINTON delivered the opinion of the
court:
I. INTRODUCTION
George and Catherine Davis appeal from the
Jefferson Circuit Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Department of
Revenue of the Finance and Administration
Cabinet for the Commonwealth of Kentucky
("the Department"). Because we find that
Kentucky's tax on the income derived from
bonds issued outside Kentucky violates the
Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, we vacate and remand.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Although the legal theories involved are
quite complex, the pertinent facts of this
case are simple. Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 141.020 governs individual state
income taxes. Similar provisions exist for
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the Commonwealth to tax estates, trusts, and
fiduciaries, as well as corporations. KRS
141.020 requires an individual to pay state
taxes upon a percentage of that person's net
income. For individuals, net income is
determined by making certain deductions
from the individual's adjusted gross income.
In turn, an individual's adjusted gross
income is derived by making certain
deductions from a person's gross income "as
defined in Section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code." In arriving at its definition
of gross income, the Internal Revenue Code
specifically exempts interest earned on any
state or local bond. But Kentucky law
requires that "interest income derived from
obligations of sister states and political
subdivisions thereof' is to be included in a
person's adjusted gross income. The
cumulative impact of those various statutes
is that Kentucky exempts from taxation
interest income derived from bonds issued
by the Commonwealth of Kentucky or its
subdivisions but requires taxes to be paid on
interest income derived from bonds issued
by a sister state or its subdivisions.
In April 2003, the Davises filed a class
action declaratory judgment complaint
alleging that Kentucky's decision to tax the
income earned on out-of-state bonds in this
manner violates the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution. To attempt to demonstrate
standing, the Davises alleged in their
complaint that they were residents of
Jefferson County who had paid Kentucky
income tax on the income they earned from
out-of-state bonds.
In July 2003. before the Davises had filed a
motion for class certification, the
Department filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that the tax system in
issue was constitutional and that,
furthermore, the Davises lacked standing to
challenge the tax provisions applicable to
corporations, estates, and trusts. In August
2004, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted the
Department's motion for summary judgment
on both the constitutionality of the bond
taxation system and the question of the
Davises' standing. The Davises filed this
appeal.
III. ANALYSIS
The Davises' appeal presents two issues.
First, did the trial court correctly grant
summary judgment to the Department on the
Davises' claim that Kentucky's system of
taxing only out-of-state bonds is
unconstitutional? Second, did the trial court
correctly find that the Davises lacked
standing to assert claims on behalf of
corporations, trusts, estates, and all other
non-individual plaintiffs? Following a
recitation of the applicable standards of
review, each question will be addressed
separately.
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the
Department showed that the Davises "could
not prevail under any circumstances." In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Davises. An appellate court
reviewing a grant of summary judgment
must determine whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine
issues of material fact. As findings of fact
are not at issue, the trial court's decision is
entitled to no deference.
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B. Constitutionality of Kentucky's Taxation
System
"The test of the constitutionality of a statute
is whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary." A
statute is constitutionally valid "if a
reasonable, legitimate public purpose for it
exists, whether or not we agree with its
'wisdom or expediency."' The Davises'
burden is heavy as "[a] strong presumption
exists in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute."
Bearing those principles in mind, we now
turn our attention to the Davises' contention
that Kentucky's system of taxing only
extraterritorial bonds violates the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
This issue is a matter of first impression in
Kentucky.
The Commerce Clause simply provides that
Congress has the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States[.]" But despite the fact
that the Commerce Clause "is phrased
merely as a grant of authority to Congress to
'regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States,' Art. I, § 8. cl. 3, it is well established
that the Clause also embodies a negative
command forbidding the States to
discriminate against interstate trade." This
"negative" or dormant aspect of the
Commerce clause "prohibits economic
protectionism-that is, regulatory measures
designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors." Thus, the "fundamental
command" of the Commerce Clause is that
"a State may not tax a transaction or incident
more heavily when it crosses state lines than
when it occurs entirely within the State." As
a result. "[s]tate laws discriminating against
interstate commerce on their face are
'virtually per se invalid."'
Clearly, Kentucky's bond taxation system is
facially unconstitutional as it obviously
affords more favorable taxation treatment to
in-state bonds than it does to
extraterritorially issued bonds. Thus,
Kentucky's bond taxation system may be
found to be constitutionally valid only if it
falls within an exception to the normal rule
requiring laws that violate the Commerce
Clause on their face to be stricken. So we
must evaluate the Department's three main
arguments in support of Kentucky's taxation
system to determine if the Department has
met its burden to show that the taxation
system in question is constitutionally
permissible.
First, one of the Department's main
arguments in favor of Kentucky's taxation
system is the fact that a similar system has
been held to be constitutionally permissible
in Ohio. In fact, despite the discriminatory
bond taxing system's widespread use and
obvious Commerce Clause implications,
apparently, only the Ohio courts have been
presented with a case challenging it on
Commerce Clause grounds. The Ohio Court
of Appeals ultimately concluded in Shaper
that the bond taxation system was
constitutionally permissible. But that court
failed fully to analyze the issue. Shaper,
though containing a well-written preliminary
analysis of the Commerce Clause
implications of this discriminatory bond
taxing system. "made no attempt to explain
why . . . a tax exemption that discriminates
against income earned from out-of-state
bonds . . . is permissible under the
Commerce Clause." Rather, the Shaper
court "tersely stat[ed], in effect, that 'we
looked and did not find anything so
therefore it must be constitutional."' Logic
dictates, however, that a potentially
problematic and constitutionally infirm
statute does not become permissible simply
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because it has not been previously found to
be unconstitutional. Rather, a court faced
with a direct constitutional challenge to a
statute must engage in a searching inquiry to
determine whether a challenged statute can
pass constitutional muster. Thus, Shaper,
though instructive in certain areas, is, in and
of itself, insufficient to support the
Department's position, meaning that we
must examine the Department's other two
main arguments.
The Department next argues that the bond
taxation system must be found to be
constitutional under the Supreme Court's
holding in Bonaparte v. Tax Court. In
Bonaparte, a taxpayer contended that her
state of residence was required by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution to exempt out-of-state bonds
from taxation because the issuing state
exempted them. The Supreme Court rejected
the taxpayer's argument, holding that "no
provision of the Constitution of the United
States prohibit[ed] such taxation."
However, Bonaparte is ultimately of little
value to the case at hand because the
Commerce Clause played no role in the
Bonaparte court's decision. As the case at
hand involves a direct challenge under the
dormant Commerce Clause and has nothing
to do with the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
it logically follows that Bonaparte is neither
on point nor controlling.
Finally. the Department relies upon the
market participant doctrine to save
Kentucky's bond taxation system. The
market participant theory -recognizes that
when a sovereign acts as a consumer or
vendor in commerce. its actions as a market
participant are distinct from its actions as a
market regulator. The Commerce Clause is
directed at the state s actions as a market
regulator; therefore. [a State's] actions as a
market participant are exempted from
Commerce Clause analysis." Stated
differently, the market participant theory
"differentiates between a State's acting in its
distinctive governmental capacity. and a
Statees acting in the more general capacity
of a market participant; only the former is
subject to the limitations of the negative
Commerce Clause. Thus, for example, when
a State chooses to manufacture and sell
cement. its business methods, including
those that favor its residents, are of no
greater constitutional concern than those of a
private business."
The Department's market participant
argument is unavailing, however. No one
could seriously argue against the principle
that Kentucky acts as a market participant
when it issues bonds. But Kentucky's
issuance of bonds is not the issue. Rather,
the sole issue is Kentucky's decision to tax
only extraterritorial bonds. Thus, the market
participant theory is inapplicable as a State's
"assessment and computation of taxes' is.
clearly, "a primeval governmental activity."
Accordingly, "when a state chooses to tax its
citizens, it is acting as a market regulator[.]"
not as a market participant. Therefore, the
Department's market participant argument is
without merit.
Having found that the Department's
arguments are unavailing, we are left with a
situation in which Kentucky's bond taxation
scheme is faciali unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause; and none of the
arguments in favor of its constitutionality
offered by the Department or relied upon by
the trial court are sufficient to save it. But
under the facts presented in this case. we
have no choice but to find that Kentucky's
system of taxing only extraterritorial bonds
runs afoul of the Commerce Clause. Thus,
the trial court's decision to grant summary
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judgment to the Department was erroneous.
B. Standing
The trial court found that the Davises lacked
standing to assert claims on behalf of all
non-individual claimants (i.e., corporations,
trusts, estates, etc.) because they had not
shown that they had been forced to pay any
taxes on extraterritorial bonds on behalf of
those types of entities. On appeal, the
Davises contend that the trial court confused
the concept of standing with the somewhat
related issues involved in class certification.
We agree.
Class actions in Kentucky are governed by
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 23.01-23.04.
The Davises' complaint sets forth their
intention to prosecute their claims as a class
action on behalf of all individuals,
corporations, trusts, estates, etc. CR 23.03(1)
provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after
the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained."
Thus, "[i]n a class action a plaintiff
generally files a motion seeking certification
of the class even though this is not expressly
required by statute or rule." In the case at
hand, the Davises had not filed a motion for
class certification before the Department
filed its motion for summary judgment. So
any issues regarding the propriety of class
certification were not before the trial court.
Rather, the only issues before the trial court
were whether the bond taxation system in
question was constitutional and whether the
Davises had basic standing to file the action.
The question of standing only goes to
whether an individual is entitled to have his
or her claims resolved by a court. Thus,
although standing is a threshold issue and a
prerequisite for all actions, in order to
demonstrate standing, a party need only
show that a case or controversy exists
between that party and the defendant. Only
after a plaintiff has established personal
standing in a putative class action may a
court consider the separate issue of whether
the plaintiff will be able to represent the
proposed class adequately under the
guidelines of CR 23.01-23.04.
In the case at hand, the trial court found that
the Davises had personal standing to assert
claims regarding the bond taxation issue.
Thus, the Davises have standing. The
question of whether the Davises may
properly represent corporations, trusts, and
estates comes into play only when the issue
of class action certification is presented.
Thus, the portion of the trial court's opinion
finding that the Davises lack standing is
vacated. Upon remand, the Davises will,
presumably, quickly move for class
certification, at which time, the trial court
may determine all of the issues involved in
resolving such a matter, including whether
the Davises can properly represent any
corporations, trusts or estates.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson
Circuit Court's order granting summary
judgment to the Department of Revenue is
VACATED; and this case is REMANDED
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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"Supreme Court to Address State
Tax Breaks for Bonds"
The New York Times
May 22, 2007
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON, May 21-In a case with the
potential to rattle, if not reshape, the market
for state and municipal bonds, the Supreme
Court agreed on Monday to decide whether
states can continue to exempt interest on their
own bonds from their residents' taxable
income, while taxing the interest on bonds
issued by other states.
The preferential tax treatment for in-state
bonds is longstanding and very common,
offered by nearly all the states that have an
income tax. State and local governments
issued more than $350 billion worth of bonds
a year from 2002 to 2006.
The practice was, in fact, largely taken for
granted until it was declared "facially
unconstitutional" in January 2006 by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals. That state court,
ruling in a case brought by a Kentucky
couple, George and Catherine Davis. who
own bonds issued by other states, said the
preferential tax treatment erected a barrier
against interstate commerce in violation of the
Constitution's commerce clause.
In the only previous decision on the subject,
an Ohio state appeals court upheld that state's
preferential treatment of bond interest, in a
1994 decision that the Supreme Court
declined to review. The fact that two state
courts now disagree on such a fundamental
question probably led the justices to conclude
that the issue required their attention.
The National Association of State Treasurers.
without taking a bottom-line position, urged
the justices to accept Kentucky's appeal.
"Only this court can resolve the uncertainty,"
the state treasurers said, adding: "Regardless
of the merits of the question presented, the
federal Constitution should apply uniformly
to all 50 states."
The tax-exempt status of state and municipal
bonds permits issuers to borrow money at a
lower interest rate because investors are
willing to accept lower returns in exchange
for not having to pay taxes on the interest they
receive. The tax-exempt feature is very
appealing to investors, as reflected in the
popularity of mutual funds that offer baskets
of a single state's public debt. Kentucky filed
its Supreme Court appeal, Department of
Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, No. 06-666,
in November. Rather than act immediately,
the justices held the case while they were
considering how to decide another case about
the permissibility of state preferences under
the commerce clause.
On April 30, the court decided that case,
United Haulers Association v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,
No. 05-1345. By 6 to 3, the court rejected a
commerce clause challenge to a program in
two upstate New York counties that required
private haulers to deliver all solid waste to a
single publicly owned landfill. It did not
violate the commerce clause for the
government to prefer itself over private-sector
competitors. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
wrote for the majority.
Ordinarily, once the court has decided a case,
it sends back to the lower court any related
case that it has been holding, so that the lower
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court can reconsider its ruling in light of the
new Supreme Court decision. But in this
instance, the justices evidently concluded that
the solid-waste decision did not shed much
light on what the commerce clause might
have to say about preferential taxation of
bond interest.
In recent years, the court has been fairly
aggressive about reining in state policies that
could be described as protectionist. Two years
ago, for example, the justices invoked the
commerce clause to overturn laws in New
York and Michigan that gave preferential
treatment to in-state wineries.
But the court is hardly of one mind, either on
basic principles or their application. Two
justices, Clarence Thomas and Antonin
Scalia, do not accept the premise that the
commerce clause, which in the constitutional
structure is a grant of authority to Congress,
imposes any limitation on activity by the
states. On the other hand, the newest justice,
Samuel A. Alito Jr., dissented last month
from the solid-waste decision, writing that
"the public-private distinction drawn by the
court is both illusory and without precedent."
In the latest case, Kentucky is raising an
argument based on state sovereignty,
objecting that the state court's analysis of the
commerce clause "commandeers Kentucky's
tax laws to subsidize other states' public debt
if it wishes to exempt its own debt from
taxation."
In fact, the Kentucky Court of Appeals did
not dictate a remedy for the constitutional
violation it found. If the decision is upheld,
the state will have the choice of exempting
every state's bond interest, or none.
The case will be argued in the fall, with a
decision unlikely before next spring. That
means that the municipal bond market could
be unsettled for months, said Alan D. Viard, a
resident scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute and a former Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas economist....
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"Ky. Ruling Would Lift Tax on
Out-of-State Bonds"
The Bond Buyer
January 10, 2006
Tedra DeSue
ATLANTA-The Kentucky Court of Appeals
on Friday ruled it was unconstitutional for the
state to tax interest received by its residents
from municipal bonds issued outside its
borders. [The case, Department of Revenue
of Kentucky v. Davis, was later granted
certiorari by the Supreme Court.]
While there is agreement that the state will
likely appeal the decision to the state Supreme
Court, observers say that if the case is not
appealed and the ruling is left to stand, it
could raise borrowing costs for issuers in
Kentucky. It could also encourage similar
challenges to taxation by other states of bonds
sold by out-of-state issuers.
A spokesperson for the Department of
Revenue said department officials had no
comment on potential effects of the ruling or
whether the decision would be appealed,
because they had not had time to review it.
In the case, first brought in 2003 against the
department by George W. Davis and
Catherine V. Davis, the appeals court found
that it was clear that Kentucky's taxation
system for bonds is unconstitutional because
it "obviously" affords more favorable tax
treatment to in-state bonds than it does to
"extraterritorially issued bonds."
In coming to its ruling, the appeals court
acknowledged other cases in which similar
systems of taxation were challenged,
including a case in Ohio. There, the state
Court of Appeals ruled the bond taxation
system was constitutional, but
Court of Appeals found that the
fully analyze the issue.
the Kentucky
court failed to
The Kentucky ruling also provides that the
plaintiffs would be within their rights to seek
class action certification for their court
challenge. That would mean the state could be
on the hook for refunding taxes not only to
the Davises but also others who joined the
lawsuit, if it is ultimately successful.
Municipal bonds issued for "public purposes"
are exempt from federal income tax. Most
states with an income tax do not tax
municipal bonds sold by issuers within the
state, but do tax interest on bonds issued out
of state but owned by state residents. State tax
exemption for in-state bonds and taxation of
out-of-state issues motivates investors,
especially in high income tax states, to buy
bonds sold by local issuers.
Kentucky's income tax rate ranges from 2%
to 6%.
State officials could not comment on how
much money in lost revenue the state would
experience if it could no longer tax the
income from out-of-state municipal bonds
and/or had to grant refunds. Ronald
Dieckman, a senior vice president and
director at underwriter and financial adviser
J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons Inc. in Louisville,
said the ruling was the most significant
development he'd seen in his 30 years in the
business related to municipal bonds in
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Kentucky. "It's pretty earth shattering."
He said the firm was taking a wait-and-see
approach on the issue. "We have clients that
have moved here from other states and who
have bonds in those states, and they want to
know what they should do," he said. "We are
waiting to see how the courts will finally
resolve the issue."
If the tax on out-of-state bonds is found
ultimately to be unconstitutional, it would
likely lead to the state's bonds trading more
cheaply. "They could trade cheaper to other
bonds in the market because Kentucky would
no longer be considered a specialty state,"
Dieckman said. "It could also open the door
for all states for similar types of challenges."
Standard & Poor's assigns an issuer credit
rating of AA-minus with a stable outlook to
Kentucky. Moody's Investors Service assigns
an issuer rating of Aa2 with a negative
outlook. Fitch Ratings does not have an issuer
rating for the state, but it rates Kentucky's
appropriation-backed debt AA-minus.
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"Tax Report: Kentucky Suffers Setback
in Muni-Bond Tax Case"
The Wall Street Journal
September 6, 2006
Tom Herman
A Kentucky couple recently won a courtroom
battle in a case that is stirring widespread
interest among municipal-bond investors and
state government officials. The couple
challenged a state law taxing them on interest
from most non-Kentucky municipal bonds
while exempting interest on bonds issued
within Kentucky. Most other states with a
state income tax have a similar rule: They
typically tax interest on most out-of-state
municipal bonds but don't tax interest on
bonds issued within their own state.
Kentucky's Supreme Court has declined to
review an appeals-court ruling saying it's
unconstitutional for the state to tax only out-
of-state bonds. John Wylie, a lawyer in
Chicago for George W. Davis and Catherine
V. Davis, says he is handling similar cases for
taxpayers in Arizona and North Carolina.
The Davis case could embolden investors in
other states to bring similar challenges,
lawyers say. "This Kentucky case certainly
has the potential for disrupting the landscape"
of the S2.3 trillion municipal-bond market,
says Len Weiser-Varon, a lawyer in Boston at
the law firm Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky and Popeo P.C.
The Davises may have won the latest round,
but the case isn't over. The Kentucky Finance
and Administration Cabinet, which includes
the Department of Revenue, said yesterday it
will ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review the
case. The move reflects the "far-reaching
effect of this decision, not only to Kentucky.
but for the many other states that treat out-of-
state municipal bonds in a similar manner,"
said a Kentucky statement.
John Farris, Kentucky's Finance and
Administration Cabinet secretary, added:
"From Kentucky's perspective, this issue isn't
so much about lost revenue, but rather market
access for our schools, state and local
governments and the potential for increased
cost to our municipal issuers and those across
the nation."
Whether the U.S. Supreme Court will agree to
review the case remains unknown. But
Kentucky "should be able to make a
compelling case for the U.S. Supreme Court
to grant certiorari and rule on the
constitutional question," says Mr. Weiser-
Varon of Mintz Levin.
For upper-income investors, municipal bonds
long have been a very popular investment.
Nearly 4.4 million federal income-tax returns
reported tax-exempt interest income for 2004,
according to the Internal Revenue Service.
The total amount of tax-exempt interest
income these investors reported came to
nearly $50 billion.
Single-state municipal-bond funds have
grown enormously popular. According to
Morningstar Inc., there now are more than
530 single-state muni-bond funds available
for investors.
Many investors prefer to buy municipal bonds
issued within their home state-or shares of
single-state municipal-bond funds. That's
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especially true of investors in high-tax areas,
such as New York City. California and New
Jersey. "Most municipal-bond investors don't
want to pay any taxes on any munis," says
Robert Lamb, a professor at New York
University's Stern School of Business. That's
one of the reasons the Davis case could be so
significant, Prof. Lamb says.
For example, many New York City residents
buy bonds issued within New York State in
order to get "triple tax exemption." That
means they don't owe federal. state or local
tax on the interest from their bonds. If,
however, a New Yorker buys Connecticut
bonds, the interest would be tax free at the
federal level but subject to New York State
and New York City taxes.
In the [Department of Revenue v.] Davis
case, Kentucky s Court of Appeals decided
earlier this year that Kentucky's system of
taxing only out-of-state bonds "runs afoul" of
the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause.
which gives Congress the power to regulate
commerce with other nations and among the
states.
In a court document. Kentucky said the
appeals court opinion, if it isn't overturned,
"will have an adverse impact" on the abilit-y
of the state and its political subdivisions to
raise money by borrowing. The state said the
advantage of an exemption from taxation for
interest on in-state bonds is that "it provides
an inducement" for Kentucky investors to buy
Kentucky bonds while at the same time
enabling the state and its political
subdivisions "to pay less interest on those
bonds."
So far, "the bond market has shrugged it off
as a nonevent, says Tom Metzold, a vice
president and portfolio manager at Eaton
Vance Management in Boston, which
manages over $13 billion in municipal
securities. He says the main reason for the
lack of reaction earlier this year probably was
a recognition among investors of "the
significant amount of time that this would
take to play out in the courts."
Jill Midkiff, a spokesman for Kentucky's
revenue department, said yesterday it would
be "difficult right now" to estimate how much
it might cost Kentucky if the state eventually
has to exempt interest on out-of-state bonds as
well as in-state issues.
As for Mr. and Mrs. Davis, they "really prefer
not to have any comment" on the case, a
family spokeswoman says.
Reaction to the Davis case is beginning to
heat up among tax-law professors. Several
law professors have weighed in with different
views on a popular blog, "TaxProf Blog,"
(http://taxprof.typepad.com
[http://taxprof.typepad.com]). run by Paul
Caron, a law professor at the University of
Cincinnati College of Law. Richard Pomp, of
the University of Connecticut School of Law.
agrees with the ruling, saying Kentucky's
exemption of out-of-state bonds
"discriminates against the interstate flow of
capital."
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"Treasurers' Group Urges Supreme Court
to Hear Kentucky Case"
The Bond Buyer
January 23, 2007
Andrew Ackerman
WASHINGTON-The National Association
of State Treasurers filed an amicus brief
with the U.S. Supreme Court last week that
urges the court to review a high-profile
Kentucky tax-exempt interest dispute that
has captured the attention of the municipal
market.
The brief urges the case's immediate review
by the court without taking a position on the
case, which challenges the constitutionality
of taxing interest earned on out-of-state
issued bonds while exempting the interest
earned on intrastate debt.
"In view of the vital importance of
municipal bonds to state and local
government, and the centrality of their tax-
exempt status, this is an important question
that should be decided promptly by this
court," said the brief, written by Robert A.
Long, a partner at Covington & Burling LLP
here.
It comes three months after the state asked
the court to consider the dispute, which was
first tried in 2003 when maried Kentucky
residents George W. Davis and Catherine V.
Davis argued that the state's taxation
policies violated the so-called "dormant"
commerce clause of the Constitution by
discriminating "on its face"' against the
holders of bonds issued by "sister states
and/or their political subdivisions."
Review by the court is important for the
muni market because it could prevent
Kentucky and 41 other states from taxing
the interest on out-of-state bonds owned by
state residents. The case is Department of
Revenue of the Finance and
Administration Cabinet, Commonwealth of
Kentucky v. George W. Davis.
When first tried in 2003, a state circuit court
ruled that the Davis' lacked -standing to
challenge the tax code and upheld that
taxing out-of-state bonds served a
"reasonable, legitimate public purpose"
because the state has an interest in attracting
local funds for local public works projects.
But on appeal last January, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals ruled in the Davis' favor
and rejected all three of the state's
arguments. The Kentucky Supreme Court
declined to hear the case in August, paving
the way for the request for review by the
nation's highest court.
Though much of the NAST brief reads like a
tutorial on the muni bond market, the crux
of its argument says that the Supreme Court
will eventually have to step in to resolve the
issue at stake-the legality of preferential
tax treatment for in-state bonds-and that it
ought to do so now rather than wait for
additional challenges.
"The issue is squarely presented by this
case, and the prior decisions of this court
provide an adequate basis for deciding it,"
the brief said. "Moreover, municipal bond
markets will function most efficiently if the
legal uncertainty created by the Kentucky
court's decision is resolved promptly."
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In its petition filed in November, Kentucky
argues that only the high court can resolve
confusion between the appeals court ruling
and a conflicting 1994 Ohio appellate court
ruling. In that case, Shaper v. Tracy, which
also involved bonds, the Ohio court
recognized that the "commerce clause was
simply never intended to apply to acts of a
sovereign on behalf of itself where the end
result is to provide the taxing state with a
competitive advantage over another
sovereign." The state also argues that the
Kentucky appeals court ignored Supreme
Court precedent going back to the 1880s that
affirms the legality of taxing out-of-state
bonds.
But in a separate petition that also was filed
last week, attorneys for the Davis family
urged the court not to hear the case, arguing
among other things that the Shaper decision
was decided prior to the court's further
development of the dormant Commerce
Clause law in a handful of subsequent cases.
Included on that list of cases is a 2005
decision, Granholi v. Heald, in which the
court struck down laws in New York and
Michigan that permitted in-state wineries to
ship wine directly to customers, but
prohibited out-of-state wineries from doing
the same.
"When a state statute directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce,
or when the effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state
interests, we have generally struck down the
statute without further inquiry," the Davis'
response brief said, citing Granholm.
The Davis' brief is further dismissive of the
Kentucky argument, noting that a court
decision the state cites from 1881,
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, is "equally
unpersuasive" because it was not challenged
on Commerce Clause grounds, nor did it
revolve around the same type of
"discriminatory" tax at issue in the
Kentucky case.
That case dealt only with the question of
whether one state could tax interest earned
by its own residents on the debt of another
state, the Davis' brief said.
"The question here is not whether Kentucky
can tax its residents income from other
states' municipal bonds, but rather whether
it can do so while at the same time
exempting from taxation income derived
from its own bonds," the brief said. "The
Bonaparte court was not faced with the
latter issue, and its holding is irrelevant to its
resolution." The court is expected to
announce if it will hear the Kentucky case in
the coming weeks.
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"Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause
After United Haulers"
Tax Notes
June 11, 2007
Ethan Yale and Brian Galle
I. Introduction
Do states violate the dormant commerce
clause when they exempt from tax their own
bonds but not bonds from other states? The
Supreme Court will resolve that question next
term in Davis v. Kentucky. The Court granted
certiorari to review a decision of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, which held
unconstitutional the portion of the Kentucky
income tax code that grants an exclusion for
in-state, but not out-of-state, municipal bond
interest. The Kentucky decision conflicts with
Sharper v. Tracy, a decision by the Ohio
intermediate appeals court that discriminatory
taxation of out-of-state municipal bonds was
constitutionally permissible.
Predicting how the Court will resolve this
issue is complicated, more so now in the wake
of the Court's recent decision in United
Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Management Authority. In
United Haulers the Court held that a
municipal trash flow control ordinance didn't
violate the dormant commerce clause
because, although it granted a monopoly to a
local trash processing facility to the exclusion
of private trash processing facilities in other
states, the ordinance wasn't "discriminatory."
The Court found that the private trash
processing facilities with which the Oneida-
Herkimer municipal trash facility would
compete absent the challenged law weren't
"similarly situated." In particular, the Court
held, publicly owned facilities are not
similarly situated with those that are privately
held.
One could read United Haulers to establish a
new exception to the dormant commerce
clause whereby states and their political
subdivisions are permitted to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state rivals as
long as the state or municipal government
owned some commercial operation in that
market. The new exception is potentially
broader than the existing "market
participation" exception in that it shields
regulatory rather than just participatory
market incursions; and it could shield states
from claims like the one in Davis.
II. The Nondiscrimination Principle
A basic rule that springs from contemporary
Supreme Court cases is that a state tax rule
discriminating in favor of in-state activities is
presumptively unconstitutional. A rule is
discriminatory if a taxpayer's effective tax
rate increases when the taxpayer conducts
economic activity out of state compared with
what the effective tax rate would have been
had the taxpayer engaged in the same activity
in-state.
The Court has applied that rule with a fair
degree of consistency; constitutionality has
generally not turned on the specific tax
mechanism that creates the bias against
interstate commerce. Exclusions, credits,
deductions, and special modifications to the
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rate of tax have all been found
unconstitutional. Indeed, since its landmark
Complete Auto decision in 1977, the Court
has never upheld a tax it deemed to be
discriminatory.
III. Defenses for Discriminatory Regulation
Against that backdrop, the case favoring
constitutionality for tax provisions favoring
in-state municipal bonds appears thin. There
are, however, at least two distinct arguments
that states could advance: (1) the market
participation exception to the dormant
commerce clause, and (2) an argument that
discrimination favoring state-run operations
(particularly those that can be classified as
"traditional") is subject to far less-exacting
constitutional scrutiny than discrimination
favoring instate business.
The first argument is weak. Until the Supreme
Court announced its decision in United
Haulers, the second argument also seemed
quite weak, based on the reasoning of the
Court's opinion in C&A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown. However, in the wake of
United Haulers, initial reports suggest it now
seems likely that Kentucky's statute, and
other state tax laws favoring in-state
municipal bonds, will survive constitutional
attack. We first explain why the market
participation doctrine won't shield state
income tax preferences for in-state municipal
bonds, and then assess the fledgling doctrine
that regulation (possibly including tax laws)
that favors state or local government is
effectively exempted from the dormant
commerce clause.
A. The Market Participation Doctrine
The Court has upheld blatant discrimination
by states in favor of in-state businesses when
the state buys printing services, sells cement,
purchases abandoned vehicles, or hires
workers. That rule, referred to as the market
participation doctrine, is an exception to the
normal rule of "virtual per se invalidity" for
facially discriminatory regulation. The
rationale underlying the rule is that states, just
like private merchants, should be free to
choose their trading partners.
Note, however, that this exception extends
only as far as the concept of a market
"participant" can take it. By its logic, the
market participation exception should permit
states to discriminate only to the extent that
they are acting as an "ordinary" participant in
the market would or could. . . . For instance,
purchasers . . . don't set prices. Therefore, a
state's decision to acquire, say, cement, would
not also empower it to regulate cement prices
in a way that contravened the dormant
commerce clause. Thus, the inherent
difficulty with that rule is determining when
the state is acting as market participant and
when it is acting as regulator.
There are difficult cases in which classifying
the government's activity as market
participation or regulation is ambiguous, but
Davis isn't one of them. Taxation is a
"regulatory" function, not one performed by
market participants. And although there might
be economically equivalent transactions that
would make the state a "direct" seller of
higher-rate bonds to its taxpayers, the form
states have chosen does not. Thus, the Court
couldn't plausibly conclude that exemption
for municipal bond interest was market
participation instead of regulation without
overruling or at least severely limiting New
Enein ..
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B. The Nascent State-Run Businesses
Exception
Until recently, then, the prospect that states
could constitutionally exempt only their own
bonds from taxation appeared quite dim. The
scene may have brightened considerably with
the Supreme Court's recent decision in United
Haulers. United Haulers appears to announce
a rule providing that state regulations in favor
of a government-run enterprise will be subject
only to mild scrutiny. That suggests, in turn,
that a state tax regime favoring bonds issued
by state and local government need clear only
a relatively low constitutional hurdle. As we
will explain, however, we believe that
ultimately United Haulers is distinguishable
from the municipal bond case and therefore
that it too will not provide shelter for
differential taxation of in-state and out-of-
state municipal bonds.
1. United Haulers.
United Haulers has fairly obvious
implications for Davis and other cases
presenting the same issue. Like the ordinance
granting the townships a monopoly in United
Haulers, state tax laws imposing tax only on
out-of-state municipal bonds are "laws
favoring local government." They therefore
should have to meet only the relatively
forgiving balancing test for "legitimate local
concerns with effects upon interstate
commerce that are only incidental."
Importantly, however, Chief Justice Roberts
was able to gather only three other votes for
the proposition that revenue generation can be
a proper purpose that might justify state
regulation with incidental effects on
commerce. . . . It is possible, therefore, that
revenue raising will also be an invalid
consideration in support of nondiscriminatory
laws having an incidental effect on interstate
commerce, such that states will have to point
to some reason other than revenue for denying
an exemption for out-of-state municipal
bonds.
2. Distinguishing Davis from United
Haulers.
Despite the similarities, we think that in the
end, United Haulers is distinguishable from
the case of differential taxation of in-state and
out-of-state municipal bonds. Most
significantly, while both Davis and United
Haulers involve "discrimination" (in the
nontechnical sense) in favor of a local
government project, the municipal bond
scenario discriminates against a different set
of actors. While the ordinance at issue in
United Haulers discriminated against all trash
haulers, whether local or out of state, the state
municipal bond provisions discriminate only
against out-of-state issuers of municipal
bonds, which are themselves public
entities. . . . Perhaps more importantly, the
absence of private in-state competitors issuing
municipal bonds suggests that there are only
minimal political checks on the state's
decision to distort the interstate market for
capital.
a. The Public-Private Distinction.
The outcome of United Haulers turns on the
"public" character of the project favored by
the monopoly right challenged there. . . .
[T]he Court relied on the fact that the trash
facility was government-owned to draw an
inference that the ordinance was not "simple
economic protectionism." Also, the fact that
the facility was public played a role in the
Court's formal doctrinal analysis. . . . It then
asserted, in essence, that public entities are
not substantially similar to private entities and
therefore that the ordinance at issue in United
Haulers did not "discriminate."
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If we take that syllogism at face value, the
taxation of municipal bonds would seem
clearly distinguishable from United Haulers.
State income tax provisions imposing tax on
municipal bonds issued by government
entities outside the taxing state benefit in-state
municipal bond issuers at the cost, not of
private entities, but rather of other
governments. . . . The state is interfering, not
in public vs. private competition, but in public
vs. public....
There are at least two
distinguish private-public
public-public competition.
good reasons to
competition from
preferences is the identity of the competitors
affected by the preference....
[W]e . . . think it is distinguishable from
the municipal bond scenario. . . . [T]he
disparate taxation of municipal bonds
straightforwardly enriches the taxing state at
the expense of sister states, which, by
definition, cannot be directly represented in
the political process. And, unlike the out-of-
state trash haulers in United Haulers, who
could rely on the efforts of local haulers, out-
of-state municipal bond issuers have no
concentrated, similarly burdened in-state
constituency to make their case for them.
** *
IV. Conclusion
First, we think state autonomy deserves little
regard when the state exercises it to
discriminate in favor of its own public entity
at the expense of other, rival public
entities ....
Second . . . the United Haulers Court
presumed that laws favoring local government
are likely to serve "legitimate goals," rather
than mere protectionism. In the case of laws
affecting public-public competition, however,
the inference that the law serves some public
good, other than entrenching the enacting
officials against outside competition, is rather
weaker. Therefore, again, the values of free
trade should assume a greater importance in
the Court's balancing....
b. Where are the competitors?
Another important difference between United
Haulers and in-state municipal bond
United Haulers is an important decision, with
many interesting implications for the law of
the dormant commerce clause. On balance,
however, we think Davis is distinguishable.
The ordinance upheld in United Haulers was
subject to powerful political checks from
concentrated local constituencies with a
strong motive to oppose the ordinance, checks
simply not present when states discriminate
against bonds issued by other states. And,
while United Haulers lifts the presumption of
unconstitutionality from laws favoring state-
run businesses in competition with private
business, it is doubtful that the Court would
turn such a favorable eye on laws shielding
state officials from the pressure of
competition with rival state-run enterprises.
Therefore, we predict that, if constitutional
law remains as it stands, state laws exempting
only in-state tax-exempt bonds will be found
to violate the dormant commerce clause.
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
(06-179)
Ruling Below: (Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S.Ct.
3000, 2007 WL 1802109 (U.S.), 75 U.S.L.W. 3065, 75 U.S.L.W. 3690, 75 U.S.L.W. 3694).
Plaintiff-appellant Charles Riegel underwent a percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty,
during which his surgeon used an Evergreen Balloon Catheter. Dr. Roccario ultimately inserted
the Catheter into Riegel's artery and inflated the device several times, up to a pressure of ten
atmospheres. The device label for the Evergreen Balloon Catheter specifies that it should not be
inflated beyond the "rated burst pressure" of eight atmospheres. On the final inflation, the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter burst, and Riegel began to rapidly deteriorate. He developed a
complete heart block, lost consciousness, was intubated and placed on advanced life support, and
was rushed to the operating room for emergency coronary bypass surgery. Riegel survived, but
according to his Complaint, he suffered "severe and permanent personal injuries and
disabilities." Riegel subsequently filed suit against Medtronic, alleging five state common law
causes of action: (1) negligence in the design, testing, inspection, manufacture, distribution,
labeling, marketing, and sale of the Evergreen Balloon Catheter; (2) strict liability; (3) breach of
express warranty; (4) breach of implied warranty; and (5) loss of consortium. In its amended
answer, Medtronic raised the affirmative defense of federal preemption by Section 360k(a) of the
1976 Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 360c-k, to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq, and subsequently moved for summary judgment on its preemption
defense.
Question Presented: Whether the express preemption provision of the Medical Device
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §360k(a), preempts state-law
claims seeking damages for injuries caused by medical devices that received pre-market approval
from the Food and Drug Administration.
Charles R. RIEGEL and Donna S. Riegel,
Plaintiffs, Appellants
V.
MEDTRONIC, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided May 16, 2006
[Excerpt: Footnotes and citations omitted.]
LATZMANN. Circuit Judge: This case calls upon us to determine, inter
alia, the scope of the preemption provision set
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forth in Section 360k(a) of the 1976 Medical
Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq.
Specifically. we must decide whether Section
360k(a) preempts common law tort claims
regarding medical devices that have entered
the market pursuant to the Food and Drug
Administration's ("FDA") rigorous premarket
approval ("PMA") process. The Supreme
Court left open this question in Medtronic v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 700 (1996), which held that tort claims
as to medical devices that have entered the
market pursuant to the far less intensive
premarket notification process (often referred
to as the "Section 510(k) process") are not
preempted by Section 360k(a). Since Lohr.
the majority of circuits addressing this
question have held that claims regarding
PMA-approved medical devices are, by
contrast, preempted....
We now join this growing consensus and hold
that tort claims that allege liability as to a
PMA-approved medical device,
notwithstanding that device's adherence to the
standards upon which it obtained premarket
approval from the FDA, are preempted by
Section 360k(a). We therefore affirm the
district court's (Kahn. J.) summary judgment
dismissal of the plaintiffs-appellants' strict
liability, breach of implied warranty, and
negligent design, testing. inspection,
distribution, labeling, marketing. and sale
claims as to the Evergreen Balloon Catheter, a
PMA-approved medical device. With regard
to the plaintiffs' remaining claim for
negligent manufacturing-which premised
liability on the theory that the particular
Evergreen Balloon Catheter deployed during
plaintiff-appellant Charles Riegel's
angioplasty had not been manufactured in
accordance with the PMA-approved
standards-xe agree with the district court
that this claim was not preempted, but that no
genuine issue of material fact existed, and
thus affirm the district court's summary
judgment dismissal of that claim as well.
We note that our preemption analysis is quite
limited in scope, affecting the small universe
of cases resting on claims alleging liability
despite a PMA-approved device's adherence
to the standards upon which it secured FDA
premarket approval. We take care to explain
that we do not hold that all state tort claims as
to PMA-approved devices are preempted.
Thus, tort claims that are based on a
manufacturer's departure from the standards
set forth in the device's approved PMA
application-such as the Riegels' negligent
manufacturing claim-are not preempted.
I.
A.
In a March 14, 2002 opinion, the district
court (Kahn, J.) ruled that the Riegels' strict
liability claim, breach of implied warranty
claim, and all of their negligence claims
except for the negligent manufacturing claim
were preempted by Section 360k(a), and
therefore dismissed all of these claims. The
court let stand the Riegels' breach of express
warranty claim. Thus, discovery continued on
the two remaining substantive claims: the
negligent manufacturing claim and the breach
of express warranty claim. Medtronic later
moved for summary judgment on these two
remaining claims, and on December 2, 2003,
the district court granted that motion. . . . The
Riegels proceeded to file the instant
appeal....
II.
. . . With regard to the March 14, 2002
dismissal of many of the Riegels' claims on
preemption grounds, there are no disputed
facts, and "our task is to determine whether
the district court correctly applied the law."
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Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438,
441 (2d Cir. 1995)(internal quotation marks
omitted). With regard to the December 2,
2003 dismissal of the Riegels' negligent
manufacturing claim, we must decide
whether, "construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and
drawing all reasonable inferences in its
favor," there are any genuine issues of
material fact. SCS Communications, Inc. v.
The Herrick Co., Inc., 360 F.3d 329, 338 (2d
Cir. 2004).
III.
A.
We begin with the preemption issue, for
which, at the outset, it is helpful to review the
overarching regulatory structure. In 1976,
Congress enacted the Medical Device
Amendments ("MDA") to the 1938 Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, in order to "provide
for the safety and effectiveness of medical
devices intended for human use." 90 Stat.
539. The MDA established a regulatory
structure pursuant to which the Department of
Health and Human Services, through the
FDA, would regulate medical devices.
Under the MDA, medical devices are
categorized into three classes, based on the
level of risk that they pose. 21 U.S.C. §
360c(a)(1). First, those devices that "present
minimal potential for harm to the user," such
as elastic bandages, are classified as "Class I"
devices; such devices can be marketed
without prior approval and are subject only to
"general controls" that cover all medical
devices. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A); see also
http://fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html (last
visited April 28, 2006); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477.
116 S.Ct. 2240. Second, devices that are
potentially more harmful, such as powered
wheelchairs and infusion pumps, are
classified as "Class II devices." These devices
can still be marketed without advance
approval, but in addition to being subject to
''general controls," they may also be subject
to "special controls," such as postmarket
surveillance, patient registries, and/or other
measures deemed necessary. 21 U.S.C. §
360c(a)(1)(B). Finally, those devices for
which "general controls" and "special
controls" are insufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness, and which either "present a
potential unreasonable risk of illness or
injury" or are "for a use in supporting or
sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing
impairment of human health" are classified as
Class III devices. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
It is undisputed that the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter-the device at issue in this
litigation-is a Class III device.
A Class III device is required to undergo
"premarket approval to provide reasonable
assurance of its safety and effectiveness"
before being marketed. 21 U.S.C. §
360c(a)(1)(C). The premarket approval, or
"PMA," process is lengthy and rigorous. . . .
The manufacturer must submit a detailed
PMA application that contains full reports of
all investigations of the safety and
effectiveness of the device; a full statement of
the components, ingredients, properties, and
principles of operation of the device; a full
description of the methods used in the
manufacture and processing of the device;
information about performance standards of
the device; samples of the device; specimens
of the proposed labeling for the device; and
any other relevant information. 21 U.S.C. §
360e(c).
Typically. the initial PMA application
must include data from clinical investigations
to establish the safety and effectiveness of the
device, 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(6)(ii); the
manufacturer cannot even conduct such a
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clinical investigation in the first place without
FDA permission. . . . The FDA then reviews
the submission to determine whether it is
sufficiently complete to enable a substantive
review; if not, the FDA will refuse to file it.
21 C.F.R. § 814.42. After having accepted the
PMA for filing, the FDA begins its review,
which may involve referring the PMA to an
advisory committee. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44.....
Once the FDA has concluded its review, it
decides whether or not to approve the device
for marketing. This choice is not binary; the
FDA has means to impose additional
requirements. . . . The FDA thus has quite
broad authority to approve, deny, and
effectuate modifications of an application
throughout the PMA process.
... Any changes that the applicant believes
could affect the safety or effectiveness of the
device must be submitted, via a "PMA
supplement," to the FDA for approval. 21
C.F.R. § 814.39(a)....
Additionally, the standard FDA "Conditions
of Approval" accompanying a PMA order
state that continued approval of the PMA "is
contingent on the submission of post-approval
reports required under 21 CFR 814.84 at
intervals of 1 year from the date of approval
of the original PMA." . . . The standard PMA
"Conditions of Approval" also require the
manufacturer to submit an "Adverse Reaction
Report" or "Device Defect Report" to the
FDA within ten days after it receives or has
knowledge of information concerning (1) "a
mixup of the device or its labeling with
another article"; (2) "any adverse reaction
attributable to the device that has not been
addressed by the device's labeling or is
occurring with unexpected severity or
frequency"; or (3) "any significant chemical,
or other change or deterioration in the device
or any failure of the device to meet the
specifications established in the PMA that
could not cause or contribute to death or
serious injury but are not correctable by
adjustments or other maintenance procedures
described in the approved labeling."
The vast majority of Class III medical
devices, however, reach the market without
ever going through the rigorous PMA process
described above. This is because the MDA
also includes a "grandfathering" provision
that "allows pre-1976 devices to remain on
the market without FDA approval until such
time as the FDA initiates and completes the
requisite PMA." Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478. And,
in order to "prevent manufacturers of
grandfathered devices from monopolizing the
market while new devices clear the PMA
hurdle, and to ensure that improvements to
existing devices can be rapidly introduced
into the market," the MIDA also allows new
devices that are "substantially equivalent" to
such pre-existing devices to enter the market
without going through the PMA process. Id.
This "substantial equivalence" route to the
market is known as the premarket
notification, or "§ 51 0(k)," process.
In its decision, the Lohr Court noted that the §
510(k) premarket notification process has
become the means by which most new
medical devices enter the market. Id. at
479....
As the contrasting terms "premarket
notification" and "premarket approval"
suggest, the § 51 0(k) process differs
dramatically from the PMA process. Unlike
the PMA process-which requires reasonable
assurance that the new device is itself safe
and effective, and ultimately results in the
FDA's "approval" of the device-the §
510(k) process simply requires the
manufacturer to show that the device is
substantially equivalent to, i.e., as safe and
effective as, a legally marketed device that
did not go through the PMA process. . . . To
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that end, "[t]he § 510(k) notification process
is by no means comparable to the PMA
process; in contrast to the 1.200 hours
necessary to complete a PMA review, the §
510(k) review is completed in an average of
only 20 hours." Id. at 478-79....
In fact, the FDA regulations
prohibit manufacturers of devices
reached the market through the
process from indicating that the
actually approved their device
merits....
explicitly
that have
§ 510(k)
FDA has
on the
Once a device has entered the market
pursuant to the § 510(k) process, its
manufacturer has broader latitude to make
changes on its own than does the
manufacturer of a PMA-approved
device....
Having summarized the PMA and § 510(k)
routes to market set forth by the MDA, we
now move to one final aspect of the MDA
that is crucial for purposes of this case. The
MDA also includes an express preemption
provision: Section 360k(a). In relevant part,
this provision states as follows:
[N]o State or political subdivision
of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any
requirement-
(1) which
addition
applicable
device, and
is different
to. any
under this
from, or in
requirement
Act to the
(2) which relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device
under this Act. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
The application of Section 360k(a)'s
preemption provision to medical devices that
have entered the market through the two
alternate routes described above-the PMA
process and the § 510(k) process-forms the
crux of this case.
B.
During the several decades following the
1976 enactment of the MDA, the circuit
courts grappled with how broadly to construe
Section 360k(a)'s preemption of state
"requirement[s]" that differed from or added
to "requirement[s] applicable under this Act."
Could a state requirement be created by state
common law, or only by state statutes and
other enactments? For that matter, did
approval under the PMA process-or,
alternatively, clearance under the § (k)
process or some other expedited process-
amount to a requirement under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act with which state law
could conflict?
This Court addressed some of these questions
in Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp, 66 F.3d
18 (2d Cir. 1995). There, we stated that state
common law claims that alleged product
defects as to a PMA-approved device,
notwithstanding that device's compliance
with the PMA process, would be preempted
by Section 360k(a). . . The Becker Court was
not, however, presented with the question of
whether common law claims as to § 510(k)-
cleared devices would be similarly
preempted.
It was this latter question that the Supreme
Court considered in Lohr, where the plaintiffs
brought various state tort law claims in regard
to the design, manufacturing, and labeling of
a pacemaker that had entered the market
pursuant to the § 5 10(k) process. In the course
of assessing whether these plaintiffs' tort law
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claims would-if successful-result in a state
law "requirement" that differed from, or
added to, a federal "requirement," a fractured
Court reached several conclusions.
All nine justices agreed that the § 510(k)
process set forth no federal requirements as to
the design of medical devices, and that
clearance through the § 510(k) process simply
reflected the FDA's conclusion that a new
device was substantially equivalent to a pre-
existing device. Thus, the justices
unanimously agreed that design defect claims
as to § 510(k)-cleared devices would not be
preempted by Section 360k(a) of the MDA
because there would be no federal
requirements with which such claims could
conflict.
. . . When the justices moved from a
consideration of the plaintiffs' design defect
claims to their manufacturing and labeling
claims, however, they fractured over two
issues regarding the interpretation of Section
360k(a)'s preemption of state "requirements"
that were "different from, or in addition to,
any requirement applicable under this Act."
First, the justices diverged over whether the
reference to "requirements applicable under
this Act" meant that only device-specific
requirements could give rise to preemption. or
instead meant that any FDA requirements
could give rise to preemption. Five of the
justices . . . concluded that only federal
device-specific requirements could give rise
to preemption. Id. at 497-500 (majority
opinion). These justices therefore agreed that
because the only FDA manufacturing and
labeling requirements that covered the
pacemaker at issue were general in nature
rather than device-specific, the plaintiffs'
manufacturing and labeling claims were not
preempted. By contrast. the remaining four
justices . .. concluded that even general FDA
requirements could give rise to preemption,
and therefore dissented, in part. on grounds
that the plaintiffs' manufacturing and labeling
tort claims as to the pacemaker were
preempted by the general FDA manufacturing
and labeling requirements.
In addition to their 5-4 split over whether the
applicable federal requirement needed to be
device-specific, the justices also divided-
again by a 5-4 margin-over whether a state
"requirement," as that term was used in
Section 360k(a). could derive from state
common law or only from state statutes and
regulations. Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg largely adopted the
view that only the latter category would
typically give rise to a state requirement for
purposes of the MDA, stating in Part IV of
the opinion that "when Congress enacted §
360k, it was primarily concerned with the
problem of specific, conflicting state statutes
and regulations rather than the general duties
enforced by common-law actions," id. at 489
(plurality opinion), and subsequently stating
in part VI of the opinion that "it is apparent
that few, if any, common-law duties have
been preempted by this statute. It will be rare
indeed for a court hearing a common-law
cause of action to issue a decree that has 'the
effect of establishing a substantive
requirement for a specific device,'" id. at 502-
03 (plurality opinion).
. . . In sum, therefore, five justices endorsed
the proposition that a state "requirement." for
purposes of the MDA, could stem from state
common-law actions as well as from state
statutes or regulations.
We thus interpret Lohr as setting forth two
main principles, each endorsed by five
justices, for determining whether a common
law tort action over a medical device is
preempted by the MDA. First, on the federal
side of the analysis, courts must consider
whether there are any device-specific federal
requirements with respect to the device at
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hand. If so, courts must then turn to the state
side to determine whether there would be a
conflict between that device-specific federal
requirement and "any of the liability-creating
premises of the plaintiffs' state-law tort suit."
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 508.
Since Lohr, the majority of circuits have
applied the above-described framework to
conclude that common law tort actions as to
PMA-approved devices, in contrast to § 510-
cleared devices, are preempted by the MDA.
These circuits have all concluded that (1)
approval through the PMA process, unlike the
§ 510(k) process, amounts to a federal device-
specific requirement, and (2) common law
tort actions that allege liability as to a PMA-
approved device, notwithstanding that
device's compliance with the PMA-approved
standards, would conflict with that federal
device-specific requirement.
C.
We now turn to the instant appeal of the
district court's March 14, 2002 order
dismissing many of the Riegels' claims on
preemption grounds. We note, initially, that
our Becker decision clearly indicated that tort
law claims as to a PMA-approved device
would be preempted by Section 360k(a) of the
MDA. See Becker, 66 F.3d at 20. Because the
Supreme Court subsequently spoke to the
issue of Section 360k(a)'s preemptive scope
in Lohr, however, we must revisit the issue to
determine whether Becker is still good law.
Thus, following the Lohr Court, our analysis
proceeds in two parts. First, we must consider
whether, when a device such as the Evergreen
Balloon Catheter obtains approval pursuant to
the PMA process, it is subject to a
"requirement applicable under this Act." i.e.,
a federal device-specific requirement. Second.
we must analyze the Riegels' tort claims to
determine whether there is a conflict between
that device-specific requirement and "any of
the liability-creating premises of the
[Riegels'] state-law tort suit."
1.
We agree with the majority of circuits that
have held that the relatively small subset of
PMA-approved devices-in contrast to the
much larger population of § 510(k)-cleared
devices-are subject to federal device-
specific requirements. In holding that §
510(k) clearance did not give rise to a federal
device-specific requirement, the Lohr Court
explicitly distinguished between the § 5 10(k)
process and the PMA process, stating that the
two processes were "by no means
comparable." Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478-79.
Indeed. the Lohr Court expressly emphasized
that (1) the § 510(k) process was focused on
equivalence rather than safety; (2) the FDA
itself stated that § 510(k) clearance did not
"denote official FDA approval"; (3) the §
510(k) exemption did not appear to have been
"intended to do anything other than maintain
the status quo with respect to the marketing of
existing medical devices and their substantial
equivalents"; and (4) § 510(k) clearance could
not be viewed as "requir[ing] [the device] to
take any particular form for any particular
reason." Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493-94.
The PMA process utterly diverges from the §
5 10(k) process in each of these respects. First,
although clearance through the § 510(k)
process simply means that a device is
substantially equivalent to a pre-existing
device-which may or may not be safe and
effective-approval through the PMA process
requires reasonable assurance of the device's
substantive safety and effectiveness. Second,
whereas § 510(k) clearance does not indicate
official FDA approval, the FDA has made
clear that approval through the PMA process
does denote such official approval. Indeed,
the FDA explains on its website that "PMA is
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the most stringent type of device marketing
application required by FDA. . . . PMA
approval is based on a determination by FDA
that the PMA contains sufficient valid
scientific evidence to assure that the device is
safe and effective for its intended use(s)."
Third, although the § 510(k) process
essentially froze the status quo with respect to
pre-1976 devices and their substantial
equivalents, the PMA process was created as
an entirely new regime for devices that were
not substantially equivalent to older devices.
Finally, whereas § 510(k) clearance does not
reflect the FDA's determination that the
device should "take any particular form for
any particular reason," Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493,
the PMA process expressly provides the FDA
with the power to require the device to take a
particular form in order to be approved as safe
and effective. As noted above, once the FDA
has concluded its review, it can issue an
"approvable letter" stating that the FDA
believes it can approve the application if
"specific conditions" are agreed to by the
applicant. Alternatively, if the FDA "believes
that the application may not be approved," it
can "send the applicant a not approvable letter
. . . [that] will describe the deficiencies in the
application . . and, where practical, will
identify measures required to place the PMA
in approvable form." 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(f).
Moreover, once a device has obtained PMA
approval, the manufacturer cannot make any
changes that might affect the safety and
effectiveness of the device without further
FDA approval. At that point, therefore, the
device is clearly subject to the federal, device-
specific requirement of adhering to the
standards contained in its individual, federally
approved PMA.
The Riegels have argued that manufacturers
of§ 510(k)-cleared devices are also precluded
from making changes without FDA approval,
and that this did not prevent the Lohr Court
from finding that § 510(k) clearance imposed
no device-specific requirements. But their
premise is not entirely accurate. As noted
above, manufacturers of § 510(k)-cleared
devices have broader latitude to make
changes without FDA approval than do
manufacturers of PMA-approved devices,
given that they must only obtain approval
when making significant changes....
For these reasons, we conclude that the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter, a PMA-approved
device, was subject to the federal device-
specific requirement of complying with the
particular standards set forth in its approved
PMA application. It is true that, as the dissent
states . . . here the FDA approved Medtronic's
PMA application for the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter without invoking its power to require
additional alterations. As such, the only
documents in the record from the FDA to
Medtronic are generic letters informing
Medtronic that the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter has obtained PMA approval and that
Medtronic must comply with the generally
applicable "Conditions of Approval"
governing all PMA devices. We believe,
however, that this is not relevant to the
analysis. . . . Apparently, . . . the FDA
concluded that the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter was safe and effective as currently
constituted. It would be illogical to hold that
because the FDA, after rigorous review,
deemed the PMA application for the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter acceptable in its
present form, the Evergreen Balloon Catheter
is less subject to a device-specific regulation
than are devices whose initial PMA
applications are inadequate and which obtain
PMA approval only after significant back-
and-forth with the FDA. Once the PMA
process is complete, all PMA-approved
devices are subject to the same federal device-
specific regulation: complying with the
standards set forth in their individual
approved PMA applications.
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The Riegels have also argued that with regard
to their failure-to-warn claim relating to the
labeling of the Evergreen Balloon Catheter,
there is no applicable federal device-specific
requirement because (1) the only federal
regulation governing the substa'nce of the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter's label was 21
C.F.R. § 801.109, the same general regulation
that the Lohr Court found not to be
sufficiently device-specific to warrant
preemption of the labeling claims as to the §
510(k)-cleared pacemaker device at issue; and
(2) under 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.39(d)(l)-(2),
manufacturers of PMA-approved devices can
make certain labeling changes without pre-
approval from the FDA, such as labeling
changes that add or strengthen a
contraindication, add or strengthen an
instruction, or delete misleading, false, or
unsupported information. The flaw in this
argument is that, unlike in Lohr, here the
FDA explicitly approved the labeling of the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter through the PMA
process. Indeed, when Medtronic wanted to
revise the Evergreen Balloon Catheter's label,
it submitted PMA supplements that requested
approval for those revisions, and the FDA
granted that approval. Thus, we need not
reach the question of whether, had Medtronic
subsequently changed the catheter's label
pursuant to the §§ 814.39(d) process that
permits certain changes without FDA
approval, failure-to-warn claims as to that
label would be preempted, because here there
is no evidence that Medtronic ever made
changes to the catheter's label other than
through the PMA process.
... As a court, we are constrained to observe,
however, that the FDA's level of success in
carrying out these responsibilities. rather than
bearing on the legal question of whether PMA
approval reflects a federal device-specific
requirement, is ultimately a policy matter for
Congress and the Executive to address.
2.
Having ruled that the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter was subject to the federal device-
specific requirement of complying with the
standards in its approved PMA application,
we now move to the question of whether the
Riegels' claims would, if successful, result in
state "requirements" that differed from or
added to those standards. We conclude that
they would.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of whether a preemption provision's reference
to state "requirements" encompasses state
common law tort suits, in addition to state
statute or other positive enactments, in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407
(1992). There, in the context of interpreting
the preemption provision contained in the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
15 U.S.C. § 1334(b), a majority of the Court
answered that question in the affirmative. See
id. at 521-22 ("The phrase 'no requirement or
prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and
common law; to the contrary, those words
easily encompass obligations that take the
form of common-law rules. . .. ")
... Since Lohr, the Supreme Court has held
firm to the view that state "requirements" can
be created by state common law
actions. ...
... We thus conclude that the Riegels' claims
for strict liability, breach of implied warranty,
and negligent design, testing, inspection,
distribution, labeling,. marketing, and sale
would, if successful, impose state
requirements that differed from, or added to,
the PMA-approved standards for the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter. These claims do
not rest on the premise that the particular
249
catheter used during Mr. Riegel's angioplasty
deviated from the standards contained in the
approved PMA application for the Evergreen
Balloon Catheter. Rather, the liability-
creating premise of all of these claims is that
the Evergreen Balloon Catheter itself, in its
present PMA-approved form, is in some way
defective and therefore requires modification.
The Riegels assert that a verdict in their favor
would simply stem from generally applicable
state common law duties, such as the duty to
use due care and the duty to inform users and
purchasers of about relevant risks. Therefore,
they argue, such a verdict could not possibly
create a state "requirement" that adds to, or
differs from, any federal device-specific
requirements for the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter. We disagree. The Supreme Court
made clear in Cipollone, Lohr, and Bates that
common law actions, which are premised on
the alleged violation of a legal duty, do
impose requirements. As Justice O'Connor
put it in Lohr. "state common-law damages
actions operate to require manufacturers to
comply with common-law duties." Lohr, 518
U.S. at 510. Indeed, a verdict in the Riegels'
favor on any of these claims would represent
a finding that the Evergreen Balloon Catheter
had not adhered to the various state common
law duties implicated by those claims, e.g.,
that its design did not comport with the duty
of due care, or that its labeling did not
comport with the duty to warn. Such a verdict
would clearly differ from the FDA's PMA
approval of the device (and its related
packaging. labeling, distribution, and so on)
as being reasonably safe and effective, and.
moreover, from the FDA's prohibition against
making any modifications affecting the
device's safety and effectiveness without first
obtaining FDA approval.
... In fact, it is unclear what a manufacturer
of a PMA-approved medical device would do
when faced with such a jury verdict on a
plaintiffs common law claims, given that the
manufacturer would nonetheless be unable to
make any modifications affecting the device's
safety and effectiveness without obtaining
further FDA approval. Moreover, it is
certainly conceivable that different juries
would reach conflicting verdicts about the
same medical devices, thus rendering it
almost impossible for a device to comply
simultaneously with its federal PMA (which,
after all, can only change after an extensive
process) and with the various verdicts issued
by different juries around the country. In this
regard, a finding of preemption is consistent
with another purpose evident in the MDA's
legislative history: its desire to ensure that
"innovations in medical device technology
are not stifled by unnecessary restrictions,"
and its corresponding recognition that "if a
substantial number of differing requirements
applicable to a medical device are imposed by
jurisdictions other than the Federal
government, interstate commerce would be
unduly burdened." H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at
12, 45.
As such, although we agree with the dissent's
recognition of a general presumption against
preemption, and with the dissent's comment
that the legislative history of the MDA is
silent as to the specific issue of preemption of
state tort liability . . . we believe that the
above-discussed Supreme Court precedent
makes clear that Section 360k(a)'s reference
to state "requirements" should be interpreted
to encompass state common law actions. ...
For these reasons, we adhere to the rationale
initially set forth by this Court in Becker, and
hold that the Riegels' strict liability, breach of
implied warranty, and negligent design,
testing, inspection, distribution, labeling,
marketing, and sale claims are preempted by
Section 360k(a) of the MDA. We thus affirm
the district court's March 14, 2002 order
granting summary judgment to Medtronic on
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these claims on preemption grounds.
By the same token, we agree with the district
court's conclusion that the Riegels' negligent
manufacturing claim was not preempted, to
the extent that it rested on the allegation that
the particular Evergreen Balloon Catheter that
was deployed during Mr. Riegel's angioplasty
had not been manufactured in accordance
with the PMA-approved standards. A jury
verdict in the Riegels' favor on this claim
would not have imposed state requirements
that differed from, or added to, the PMA-
approved standards for this device, but would
instead have simply sought recovery for
Medtronic's alleged deviation from those
standards....
. . . Finally, we note that our conclusion is
further supported by the FDA's recent
determination that preemption is warranted
with respect to this universe of cases, as
indicated by the content of the May 14, 2004
amicus curiae brief that the FDA submitted
upon request to the Third Circuit in
connection with the Horn case, which
implicated the same issue that we address
here.
IV.
We now turn to the December 2, 2003 order
that granted summary judgment to Medtronic
on the Riegels' non-preempted negligent
manufacturing claim.
The legal framework governing this claim is
undisputed. Because the Riegels do not have
the actual Evergreen Balloon Catheter that
was used during Mr. Riegel's angioplasty,
they can prevail only by proving by
circumstantial evidence that it must have been
defective. As the New York Court of Appeals
recently explained, "[i]n order to proceed in
the absence of evidence identifying a specific
flaw, a plaintiff must prove that the product
did not perform as intended and exclude all
other causes for the product's failure that are
not attributable to defendants." Speller v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 100 N.Y.2d 38, 41,
790 N.E.2d 252, 760 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y.
2003).
Medtronic, with reference to expert opinions,
has argued that the Evergreen Balloon
Catheter used during Mr. Riegel's angioplasty
burst not because it was negligently
manufactured, but rather because (1) it was
inflated to 10 atmospheres, even though the
label stated that it should not be inflated
more than 8 atmospheres; (2) it was inserted
into an artery that was "diffusely diseased"
and "heavily calcified," even though the label
stated that it should not be used in such
instances (because calcium spicules can
puncture the catheter); and/or (3) Dr.
Roccario used metal stents that could have
punctured the catheter....
. . . We agree with the district court that the
Riegels did not come forward with competent
evidence excluding Medtronic's proffered
causes as the origin of the rupture.
Although it may well be that inflating the
balloon catheter up to ten atmospheres was
the best decision under the circumstances. this
does not indicate that the inflation was not the
cause of the catheter's rupture.
The only affirmative evidence that the
Riegels have adduced in support of their
claim that the catheter must have had a
manufacturing defect is the report of their
expert, engineer Ted Milo, who offered the
view that based on the nature of Mr. Riegel's
injury, the catheter must have burst not
longitudinally. but radially. which-in his
view-apparently signified a manufacturing
defect. The district court found, however, that
Milo's conclusion that the catheter had burst
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radially was based on "sheer surmise and
conjecture rather than on any scientific basis,"
and therefore found it to be insufficiently
substantiated to be admissible as expert
testimony. We agree, and thus conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to admit this evidence. . . .
. . . We believe that the district court was well
within its discretion in concluding that Milo's
opinion was not an admissible expert opinion
and therefore could not serve as a basis for
demonstrating a manufacturing defect. An
expert opinion requires some explanation as
to how the expert came to his conclusion and
what methodologies or evidence substantiate
that conclusion. . . . In this case, Milo
essentially provided no explanation as to how
he had reached his conclusion that the rupture
must have been caused by a manufacturing
defect, and himself seems to have backed
away from this conclusion in his deposition. It
was therefore appropriate for the district court
to exclude his opinion.
As a result . . . [we] affirm the court's
December 2, 2003 dismissal of their negligent
manufacturing claim.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby
AFFIRM the district court's March 14, 2002
and December 2, 2003 orders that,
collectively, granted summary judgment to
Medtronic on all of the Riegels' claims.
POOLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
The majority today holds that when a device
has gone through the PMA process, all state
tort claims regarding the design or labeling of
that device are preempted. While the majority
opinion skillfully negotiates a complex and
splintered area of the law. I believe it
overlooks two critical aspects of the
preemption analysis: the presumption against
preemption and congressional intent. Because
both these factors weigh against a finding of
preemption, I would resolve the close
question of whether the PMA process
constitutes a device-specific federal
requirement in the negative and find that the
Riegel's tort claims are not preempted.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
. . . The legislative history of the MDA
provides no indication that Congress
considered the preemption of state tort
liability or even that Congress had any
concern about litigation hampering the
development of useful medical devices. See
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490-91 (plurality opinion).
Similarly, contemporaneous analyses of the
MDA are silent on the possibility of
preemption of state tort claims. Id. at 491 n.
13. If Congress actually intended to preempt
all state tort claims for defective devices, it
seems unlikely that such a dramatic change
from existing law would go entirely
unmentioned, particularly considering the
well-known, ongoing litigation over such
devices as the Dalkon Shield. Id. at 491. The
only discussion of the preemption provision
that I have found indicates that it was
primarily focused on preventing state
regulatory schemes, which some states had
adopted in the absence of federal regulation
on the topic. H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 45-46.
State tort remedies are not mentioned.
. . . Furthermore, the idea that all state tort
claims are unambiguously preempted is
"particularly dubious" considering it appears
that until relatively recently neither the
industry nor the FDA thought such claims
were preempted. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at
1801. It was over fifteen years after the MDA
was enacted before the industry began to
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assert preemption based on FDA approval as
a defense to state tort suits. See Goodlin v.
Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1381 (11th
Cir. 1999) (noting that Slater v. Optical
Radiation Coip., 756 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ill.
1991), affd, 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992),
was one of the earliest cases in which this
argument was raised). As recently as 1997,
the FDA took the position that common law
duties would be preempted only when the
FDA has expressly imposed through
regulation or order a specific substantive
requirement applicable to a particular medical
device and the state common law would
impose a different or additional requirement
on the same device.
Traditionally, state tort claims for negligent
design or labeling have provided
compensation to consumers when the
manufacturer knew or should have known
that the design of its product posed an
unreasonable risk of harm, and the
manufacturer fails to improve the design or
warn the consumer about the risk. In addition,
strict product liability has generally placed the
burden of compensating injured users on
manufacturers because they are in a better
position to insure against the risk and spread
that cost among those who benefit from the
product....
Despite the majority's emphasis on the large
number of hours spent reviewing each PMA
application, the agency's track record
indicates these concerns are far from
academic. A May 1993 Report from a
subcommittee of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce contained several case
studies in which the FDA had awarded PMA
to unsafe devices, and attributed these failures
to an unwillingness or inability on the part of
the FDA to compel manufacturers to provide
sufficient data and to critically evaluate the
data provided.
If Congress's goal in passing the MDA was to
protect consumers, as it seems clear it was,
then it is unlikely that it intended to preempt
all state tort claims for design or labeling
defects whenever a device has gone through
the PMA process. Thus, I believe we must
recognize a particularly strong presumption
against preemption in this case.
II.
With these principles in mind, I turn to
whether the particular state tort claims in this
case are expressly preempted by Section
360k(a). To make this determination, the
Supreme Court has instructed that we conduct
"a careful comparison between the allegedly
pre-empting federal requirement and the
allegedly pre-empted state requirement to
determine whether they fall within the
intended pre-emptive scope of the statute and
regulations." Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500. Because
the lack of any device-specific federal
requirement makes it impossible to make such
a "careful comparison" with the state tort
claims in this case, I would find the Riegels'
claims have not been preempted.
I agree with the majority that Lohr requires us
first to determine whether the PMA process
imposes a device-specific federal requirement
on the Evergreen Balloon Catheter. ...
Despite the fact that the PMA process focuses
on safety and effectiveness while the 510(k)
process focuses only on substantial
equivalence, whatever requirements, if any,
the PMA process imposes on a device are no
more specific than those imposed by the
5 10(k) process. ...
The FDA's approval constitutes no more than
a finding that the manufacturer has met the
FDA's minimum requirements to show a
device's safety and effectiveness. It does not
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represent a reasoned consideration and
rejection by the agency of possible
alternative, safer designs. If the facts showed
that the FDA had actually rejected the design
improvement advocated by the Riegels'
through their tort claims, this might be a
different case. However, here the FDA simply
issued a generic approval letter. Indeed, if the
FDA were to determine that a particular
device should be subject to substantive
requirements, then it has the power to
promulgate performance standards to that
effect. Such performance standards, unlike
PMA, would obviously constitute specific
federal requirements with preemptive effect.
. . . For the same reasons, the majority's
attempt to distinguish the limitation on
changes after Section 510(k) approval, which
was found not to create a requirement in Lohr,
is unpersuasive. The fact that, after PMA,
FDA approval is required for any change
affecting the safety or effectiveness of the
device, rather than only for a significant
change, does not make the federal
requirement any more specific nor does it
mean the manufacturer is required not to
make changes to improve the safety of the
device.
III.
Because I would find the PMA process does
not impose any federal device-specific
requirement, there is no need for me to reach
the question of whether state tort claims
would be preempted by such a requirement.
The majority finds the Riegels' claims for
negligent design, strict product liability,
breach of implied warranty, and loss of
consortium have been preempted because
PMA requires Medtronic not to alter the
design, manufacturing, or labeling of the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter. Despite the
purpose of the MDA to protect consumers, I
agree with the majority that at least some state
tort claims could be preempted because they
can impose "requirements" that are different
from or in addition to the federal
requirements. Nevertheless, because there is
no specific federal requirement to compare to
these state claims, and nothing prevents
Medtronic from improving the design,
manufacturing, or labeling of the Balloon
Catheter, I would not find these claims have
been preempted.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
dissent from the majority's finding of
preemption. I do agree, however, that
summary judgment was properly granted as to
the Riegels' negligent manufacturing claim
and concur in that portion of the judgment.
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"Supreme Court to Weigh Limits on Cases
Involving Medical Devices"
The New York Times
June 26, 2007
Stephen Labaton
WASHINGTON-Setting the stage for a
confrontation between the states and
manufacturers, the Supreme Court said on
Monday that it would hear an appeal raising
the issue of whether the makers of medical
equipment approved by the federal
government may be sued under state law by
patients injured by those devices.
Although the appeal will most likely turn on
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
1976 medical devices amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the case is
part of a broader debate in Washington over
the extent to which the Bush administration
and Congress may preclude the states from
imposing consumer regulations that are
more stringent than the federal
government's.
Federal agencies under the control of Bush
administration appointees have sought to
adopt regulations covering matters as
diverse as auto safety and medicine labeling
to preclude active state prosecutors and trial
lawyers from bringing lawsuits that would
impose higher safety standards.
An array of agencies, including the Food
and Drug Administration, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and
the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
have proposed or adopted rules that would
make it more difficult for consumers to
bring lawsuits under state laws that are more
favorable to victims than are federal
regulations.
Critics of the Bush administration say that
the approach strips consumers of valuable
state protections. Supporters say the federal
effort to pre-empt the states sets uniform
national standards and discourages
overzealous state prosecutors.
In the case before the Supreme Court, both
the Bush administration and the defendant
company, Medtronic, had urged the justices
to reject the appeal of a patient who was
injured when a balloon catheter it made
ruptured during an angioplasty in 1996.
The patient, Charles R. Riegel, and his wife,
Donna, sued Medtronic for a variety of state
tort law violations, including negligent
design and breach of warranty. The
company maintained that Mr. Riegel's
surgeon should not have used the balloon
catheter because of Mr. Riegel's condition
and that the surgeon used the device in a
manner inconsistent with its labeling.
Both a Federal District Court and a Federal
Appeals Court in New York dismissed most
of the Riegels' claims. Those courts
concluded that because the F.D.A. had
approved the balloon catheter after a
rigorous review and before it went to
market, injured patients could not file claims
against Medtronic under state law. The
medical devices amendment forbids a state
from adopting any requirement "which is
different from. or in addition to, any
requirement" in federal law.
Federal courts around the nation have taken
different views of whether that provision
bars state law damage claims against
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medical devices approved by the F.D.A. The
issue has so confounded the courts that three
appeals courts reviewing the same medical
device made by the same company have
reached two different conclusions about
whether patients could bring a lawsuit.
Lawyers involved in the Medtronic case say
they expect the court to hear from
manufacturers and business groups in
support of Medtronic, as well as from states
and consumer organizations on behalf of the
patient who was injured. The case, Riegel v.
Medtronic, No. 06-179, is expected to be
heard by the court in the fall.
A group of similar cases involving drugs is
moving through the courts.
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"510(k) Premarket Clearance Could Land
Some Devicemakers in Court"
Device and Diagnostic Letter
October 30, 2006
The time and expense required to get an
FDA premarket approval (PMA) for a
device may be worth it, as some
devicemakers are finding themselves in
court after taking the more streamlined
510(k) approval route, compliance lawyers
say.
The Supreme Court in recent cases has ruled
that the standards required for 510(k)
approval aren't high enough to protect some
device manufacturers from lawsuits in state
courts.
"The suggestion inferred from the Supreme
Court is that the 510(k) process does not
bear out the safety of a device, whereas the
PMA process does," said John Powers, a
partner in Hancock & Estabrook. "You may
get 510(k) approval, but you don't get the
preemption from state tort law that you
would get from the PMA process."
The reason: PMA requires a higher burden
of proof of safety and effectiveness, while
section 51 0(k) clearance requires only that a
device be "substantially equivalent" to one
already on the market.
As a result, liability lawsuits in state courts
aren't preempted by federal law and
regulations in 510(k) cases. say product
litigation experts. Under the law of
preemption, federal regulations shield
manufacturers from lawsuits in state court
because the federal government has already
enacted laws to regulate an industry.
"When deciding whether or not to do a
510(k) application, device manufacturers
should carefully look forward to the
likeliness of the potential for product
liability claims, and factor this into their
cost/benefit analyses," Powers said.
To get their products to market faster, most
manufacturers in the current $220-billion-a-
year device market opt for 510(k) clearance,
Powers said. In the seven years following
the passage of the Medical Device
Amendment Act of 1976 allowing for
premarket clearance, 90 percent of all new
Class III medical devices-ones that present
a potential unreasonable risk of illness or
injury-were approved via this route, he
said.
PMA Process Longer
"In terms of PMA versus 510(k), PMA-
approved devices have a preemption defense
in state courts," said Michael Brown, partner
in law firm Reed Smith. "But approval is a
longer process, more costly and takes a fair
amount of time."
On average, Brown said, a device
manufacturer invests 1.200 hours in review,
clinical trials and providing documentation
in the PMA process, whereas 510(k)
premarket approval may take as little as 20
hours of review. "With 510(k), somebody
else has done all that legwork," Brown said.
Brown should know. He represented
Medtronic in Riegel v. Medtronic, a recent
case that courts are looking to as a
precedent. A federal appeals court rejected a
product liability action against the device
manufacturer. The court held, as six other
257
appeals courts have, that FDA approval of a
"breakthrough" device preempts private
plaintiffs' suits, meaning federal regulations
preclude state laws in such cases (Riegel v.
Medtronic, 451 F. 3d 104, 2d Cir. 2006)
[The Supreme Court will be hearing Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc. this fall].
In the Medtronic case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit joined a
"strong and convincing majority" of federal
appellate courts in upholding device
preemption for PMA devices, Brown said.
Tort Claims Preempted
The Riegel majority held "that tort claims
that allege liability as to a PMA-approved
medical device, notwithstanding that
device's adherence to the standards upon
which it obtained premarket approval from
the FDA, are preempted." The majority
explained that the PMA process involves
"interaction between the FDA and the
manufacturer," and approval means "the
applicant is required to comply with the
standards in the PMA approval order,"
Brown said.
The majority also concluded that state law
tort claims could be preempted where "the
liability creating premise" is "that the
[device] itself, in its present PMA-approved
form, is in some way defective and therefore
requires modification."
One judge did dissent, however. Thatjudge's analysis began by presuming that
Congress would not have intended
preemption of what it viewed as a basic state
health and safety issue.
"The dissent also viewed Congress' intent to
preempt state law tort claims to be unclear,
and found it improbable that Congress
meant to protect consumers by placing their
fate in the hands of the FDA, which it
viewed as less than competent," Brown said.
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"Court Clarifies Right of Pre-Emption
in Medical Device Case"
New York Law Journal
June 28, 2006
Martin Flumenbaum and Brad S. Karp
In this month's column, we report on a recent
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, clarifying the scope of the
preemption provision in §360k(a) of the 1976
Medical Device Amendments (MDA).
In Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., the panel
majority (Judges Robert A. Katzmann and
Barrington D. Parker) ruled that §360k(a)
preempts common-law tort claims regarding
medical devices that have entered the market
pursuant to the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) premarket approval
(PMA) process. Judge Rosemary S. Pooler
dissented, reflecting the circuit split regarding
the FDA's premarket medical device
regulatory approval process.
Legal Framework
Medtronic Inc. (Medtronic) produces the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter (the catheter), a
medical device used during an angioplasty, a
heart procedure that opens clogged blood
vessels. During an angioplasty, the catheter is
inserted into the clogged vessel and the
catheter is inflated like a balloon to open the
artery. Afterwards, the catheter is deflated and
removed. The FDA had approved
Medtronic's PMA application for the catheter.
The NMDA were added to the 1938 Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act "to provide for the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices." They
established a regulatory structure pursuant to
which the FDA would regulate medical
devices. Under the MDA. medical devices are
divided into three classes, based on the level
of risk to the user posed by the device. The
FDA requires that only Class III devices,
because they may present "a potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury," must
satisfy the PMA process in order to "provide
reasonable assurance" of the devices' "safety
and effectiveness."
PMA is the most onerous type of device
marketing application required by the FDA.
For example, the FDA spends approximately
1,200 hours reviewing a PMA application.
The applicant, usually a device manufacturer,
must receive FDA approval of its PMA
application prior to marketing the device. The
requirements to maintain PMA continue after
the FDA approves the device. For example,
post-approval reports must be submitted
annually. Additionally, any changes that the
PMA applicant believes could affect the
safety or effectiveness of the device must be
submitted to the FDA for approval.
Due to the onerous requirements of the PMA
process, the vast majority of Class III medical
devices reach the market without going
through the PMA process. Through a
"grandfathering" provision included in the
MDA, most medical devices instead go
through the "substantial equivalence" route to
market. This is known as the "§510(k)"
process, the section of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act from which it derived-or
"premarket notification." The §510(k) process
allows devices to stay on the market as long
as the manufacturer of the device can
demonstrate that the device is substantially
equivalent to: (1) a medical device legally in
commercial distribution in the United States
before May 28. 1976, or (2) a device that has
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been determined by FDA to be substantially
equivalent.
The §510(k) notification process is not
comparable to the PMA process. For
example, a §510(k) review is completed in an
average of only 20 hours. Moreover a
manufacturer of a product subject to §510(k)
review has broader latitude to make changes
on its own than does the manufacturer of a
PMA-approved device. In contrast to PMA-
approved devices, the FDA prohibits
manufacturers of devices that have reached
the market through the §510(k) process from
indicating that the FDA has actually approved
their device on the merits.
The MDA's pre-emption provision states:
[N]o State or political subdivision
of a State may establish.. .with
respect to a device intended for
human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in
addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the
device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter.
Since 1976, several courts have addressed the
scope of the MDA's pre-emption provision.
In Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., the
Second Circuit determined that the MDA
preempted state common-law claims. The
court held that plaintiff could not pursue state
tort claims because this would result in New
York common law impermissibly adding
requirements in areas reviewed in the
premarket approval process and thus would
impose standards on the medical device that
were different from those set forth in the
MDA.
Furthermore, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the
U.S. Supreme Court clarified whether pre-
emption existed under §510(k). The Court
unanimously agreed that design defect claims
as to §510(k)-cleared devices would not be
preempted by the MDA because the §510(k)
process simply meant that a new device was
substantially similar to a pre-existing device
and thus did not set forth any federal
requirements. Furthermore, a majority of the
Court decided that only device-specific FDA
requirements would give rise to preemption.
Therefore, general MDA requirements, such
as non-device-specific federal labeling and
manufacturing requirements, would not
preempt state requirements. Additionally, five
Justices ruled that a "state requirement," for
purposes of the MDA, could arise from state
common-law actions as well as from state
statutes or regulations. The Supreme Court,
though, did not specifically consider whether
the PMA process imposed federal-specific
requirements sufficient to preempt state law
requirements.
Since Lohr, the majority of circuits have
concluded that: (1) approval through the PMA
process amounts to a federal device-specific
requirement, and (2) common-law tort actions
that allege liability as to a PMA-approved
device, notwithstanding that device's
compliance with PMA-approved standards,
would conflict with that federal device-
specific requirement. Only the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that
the PMA process does not constitute a federal
device-specific requirement. ...
Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit began its legal analysis by
determining whether its Becker decision
remained good law following Lohr. First, the
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court analyzed whether a device, such as the
catheter, was subject to a federal device-
specific requirement. Second, the court
analyzed whether a conflict existed between
the device-specific requirement and any of the
liability-creating premises of the Riegels'
state-law tort suit.
The Second Circuit panel majority agreed
with the majority of circuit courts that PMA-
approved devices, in contrast to §510(k)
cleared devices, are subject to federal device-
specific requirements. Thus, the court found
that catheter, a PMA-approved device, was
subject to the federal device-specific
requirement of complying with the particular
standards set forth in its approved PMA
application.
The panel majority disagreed with the
Riegels' argument that the labeling of the
catheter was not a device-specific
requirement. First, the FDA had expressly
approved the labeling of the catheter through
the PMA process. Second, Medtronic had
submitted PMA supplements to revise the
catheter's label. Thus, preemption naturally
occurred because no evidence existed that
Medtronic made changes to the catheter s
label other than through the PMA process.
After determining that the catheter was
subject to the federal device-specific
requirement of complying with the standards
in its approved PMA application, the panel
majority determined that, if successful, the
Riegels' claims would result in state
"requirements" that differed from or added to
federal standards. Furthermore, the panel
majority found that "state requirements"
comprehend state common-law tort suits.
Thus, the court held that the PMA approval
process preempts state common-law tort
actions, and affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment to Medtronic on the
preemption issue.
Finally, the court evaluated the Riegels' non-
preempted negligent manufacturing claim and
affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. In so ruling, the court pointed to
the facts that Mr. Riegel's doctor had over-
inflated the balloon past the maximum-rated
burst pressure specified on the device label,
that Mr. Riegel's blood vessels were of such a
condition that the label on the catheter
indicated a contraindication for such blood
vessels, and that the expert engineer
supporting the Riegels' claims based his
position on "sheer surmise and conjecture
rather than on any scientific basis." . . .
Conclusion
Riegel has significance for both the medical
device manufacturer as well as parties
involved in medical device litigation in this
circuit. First, manufacturers will have to
weigh the difficulty of getting a device
approved through the PMA process. rather
than through the §510(k) process, against the
value of the MDA preemption right over state
tort claims. Second, defendants of a PMA-
approved device can secure preemption of
state tort law claims at summary judument; to
avoid dismissal at summary judgment,
plaintiffs in the future will need to assert other
causes of action, besides state tort common
law claims, when bringing suit against the
manufacturer of a PMA-approved device.
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Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta
(06-43)
Ruling Below: (In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litigation, 443 F.3d 987 (8th
Cir. 2006), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,743, 38 Communications Reg. (P&F) 208, cert. granted, 127
S.Ct. 1873, 167 L.Ed.2d 363, 75 USLW 3508, 75 USLW 3511, 75 USLW 3034).
In August 2000, Charter Communications, Inc. faced a year-end shortfall of their operating cash
flow of between $15 million and $20 million. John Pietri, Charter's Senior Vice President of
Engineering was asked by Charter's CEO and COO to approach Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
to purchase advertising, but both declined. Pietri was then instructed to propose sham
transactions, the sole purpose of which was to generate the appearance of operating cash flow for
the fourth quarter. Charter set up to purchase set-top boxes from the defendants and agreed to
pay an additional $20 per set-top box, and in exchange, the defendants would. use that $20 for
advertising time. The defendants agreed to the sham transactions despite knowledge that Charter
charged the defendants four or five times the market rate for the advertising time. The swap
increased Charter's operating cash flow by $17 million in the fourth quarter of 2000 to meet
market expectations. The investors allege there was a violation of Rule lOb-5.
Questions Presented: Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denvcr forecloses claims for deceptive conduct under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5(a) and (c), for transactions with a public corporation whose sole purpose was not
legitimate business other than inflate artificially the corporation's financial statements, but where
the respondents made no public statements about the transactions.
In re: Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litigation:
Stoneridge Investment Partners,
Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.; Motorola, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
Decided April 11, 2006
LOKEN, Chief Judge: November 8, 1999. and August 16, 2002.
Plaintiffs alleged that Charter-one of the
This is a securities fraud class action by nation's largest cable television providers-
Stoneridge Investment Partners on behalf of engaged in a "pervasive and continuous
those who purchased Charter fraudulent scheme intended to artificially
Communications, Inc., stock between boost the Company's reported financial
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results" by deliberately delaying the
disconnecting of customers no longer paying
their bills, improperly capitalizing labor
costs, and entering into sham transactions
with two equipment vendors that improperly
inflated Charter's reported operating
revenues and cash flow. Named as
defendants were Charter; ten Charter
executives during all or part of the class
period; Arthur Andersen, LLP, Charter's
independent auditor during the class period;
and the two equipment vendors, Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., and Motorola, Inc.
(collectively, "the Vendors").
Relying on Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994), the
district court granted the Vendors' motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and the SEC's
implementing regulation, Rule 1Ob-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The court then denied
plaintiffs' motions to reconsider the
dismissal and to grant leave to file an
amended complaint. Stoneridge appeals. We
have jurisdiction because the district court
entered a separate final judgment under Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. We affirm.
I.
1. The Standard of Review
Plaintiffs' sixty-eight-page complaint is
factually detailed. as it must be to satisfy the
heightened pleading requirements of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). Our de novo
review accepts the facts as alleged in the
complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of Stoneridge in deciding
whether the complaint satisfied these
pleading requirements. See In re Navarre
Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 740-48 (8th
Cir. 2002).
2. The Scheme Alleged
At the time in question, Charter delivered
cable services through set-top boxes
installed on customers' TV sets. Charter
purchased the set-top boxes from third-
parties, including the Vendors. In August
2000, although Charter had firm contracts
with the Vendors to purchase set-top boxes
at a set price sufficient for its present needs,
Charter agreed to pay the Vendors an
additional $20 per set-top box in exchange
for the Vendors returning the additional
payments to Charter in the form of
advertising fees.
Plaintiffs alleged that these were sham or
wash transactions with no economic
substance, contrived to inflate Charter's
operating cash flow by some $17,000,000 in
the fourth quarter of 2000 in order to meet
the revenue and operating cash flow
expectations of Wall Street analysts. Charter
accomplished the deception with fraudulent
accounting by improperly capitalizing the
increased equipment expenses while treating
the returned advertising fees as immediate
revenue. Plaintiffs alleged that the Vendors
entered into these sham transactions
knowing that Charter intended to account for
them improperly and that analysts would
rely on the inflated revenues and operating
cash flow in making stock
recommendations. Plaintiffs did not allege
that the Vendors played any role in
preparing or disseminating the fraudulent
financial statements and press releases
through which Charter published its
deception to analysts and investors.
3. The Governing Law
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful. directly or
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indirectly, "[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule lOb-5
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly . . .
(a) [t]o employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b)
[t]o make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading,
or (c) [t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any
person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court
confirmed that § 10(b) prohibits only
"manipulative or deceptive" devices or
contrivances, and that private plaintiffs
"may not bring a [Rule] 10b-5 suit against a
defendant for acts not prohibited by the text
of § 10(b)." 511 U.S. at 173, 114 S.Ct. 1439.
In earlier cases, the Court held that
"deceptive" conduct involves either a
misstatement or a failure to disclose by one
who has a duty to disclose. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462. 474-75
& n. 15. 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480
(1977); Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-
54, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972);
accord United States i. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642. 653-655, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d
724 (1997). "Manipulative," as used in the
securities context, is a "term of art" and
refers to illegal trading practices such as
"wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors
by artificially affecting market activity."
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476-77, 97 S.Ct. 1292,
citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 199 & n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d
668 (1976), and Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 43, 97 S.Ct. 926, 51
L.Ed.2d 124 (1977).
Based upon these earlier cases and the text
and legislative history of the 1934 Act, the
Court in Central Bank rejected the contrary
position of the SEC and held that Rule 1 Ob-5
does not reach those who only aid or abet a
violation of § 10(b):
As in earlier cases considering
conduct prohibited by § 10(b), we
again conclude that the statute
prohibits only the making of a
material misstatement (or
omission) or the commission of a
manipulative act. . . . The
proscription does not include
giving aid to a person who
commits a manipulative or
deceptive act.
511 U.S. at 177, 114 S.Ct. 1439.
However, the concluding section of the
Central Bank majority opinion added an
important caveat:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and
abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the
securities markets are always free
from liability under the securities
Acts. Any person or entity.
including a lawyer, accountant, or
bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material
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misstatement (or omission) on
which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a
primary violator under 1Ob-5,
assuming all of the requirements
for primary liability under Rule
1Ob-5 are met.
Id. at 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (emphasis in
original). This is one of many cases that
have tested the boundaries of that caveat.
4. The District Court's Decision
In a thorough Memorandum and Order, the
district court concluded that Central Bank,
as uniformly applied by a number of our
sister circuits. precludes plaintiffs' claims
against the Vendors as nothing more than
claims they aided and abetted Charter in
committing § 10(b) violations:
The Court concludes plaintiffs'
claims against [the Vendors] are
claims for aiding and abetting.
Plaintiffs do not assert that [the
Vendors] made any statement,
omission or action at issue or that
plaintiffs relied on any statement,
omission or action made by either
of them. Plaintiffs also do not
allege that [the Vendors] were
responsible for, or were involved
with the preparation of Charter-s
allegedly false or misleading
financial statements; Charter's
allegedly improper internal
accounting practices; or the
allegedly false or misleading
public statements made by Charter
and its former executives.
Plaintiffs also do not allege that
any of the allegedly misleading
statements listed in the amended
complaint were made. seen, or
reviewed by [the Vendors].
Instead, plaintiffs contend that [the
Vendors] are liable to Charter's
investors on the basis that they
engaged in a business transaction
that Charter purportedly
improperly accounted for.
Nor can [the Vendors] be held
liable for any purported omissions
as plaintiffs have not alleged that
[the Vendors] had any duty to
Charter's investors.. . . The Court
can find no precedent for the
conclusion that business partners,
such as [the Vendors], made false
and misleading statements by
virtue of engaging in a business
enterprise with a company such as
Charter, the entity purported to
have made the statements at issue.
Plaintiffs then filed motions for
reconsideration and for leave to amend their
complaint, citing additional cases and
pleading additional facts. The district court
denied both motions, concluding that the
additional citations were unpersuasive and
the proposed amendment would be futile
because it merely reiterated the prior
allegations with additional particularity.
II.
On appeal. Stoneridge argues that plaintiffs
properly alleged a primary violation of the
securities laws within the meaning of
Central Bank because the Vendors violated
Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) by participating in a
"scheme or artifice to defraud" and by
engaging in a "course of business which
operates . as a fraud or deceit." The
argument emphasizes that Rule I Ob-5(a) and
(c) are broadly worded and, unlike Rule
1Ob-5(b), do not require proof of a
fraudulent misrepresentation or failure to
disclose. The argument depends on the
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assertion that Central Bank's analysis did
not affect the scope of primary liability
under subparts (a) and (c), relying primarily
on a recent district court decision, In re
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F.Supp.2d 472,
492-503 (S.D.N.Y.2005).
Like the district court, we reject
Stoneridge's narrow interpretation of
Central Bank. We conclude that Central
Bank and the earlier cases on which it relied
stand for three governing principles: (1) The
Court's categorical declaration that a private
plaintiff "may not bring a 10b-5 suit against
a defendant for acts not prohibited by the
text of § 10(b)," 511 U.S. at 173, 114 S.Ct.
1439, included claims under Rule lOb-5(a)
and (c), as well as Rule 10b-5(b). (2) A
device or contrivance is not "deceptive,"
within the meaning of § 10(b), absent some
misstatement or a failure to disclose by one
who has a duty to disclose. See Santa Fe,
430 U.S. at 474-75, 97 S.Ct. 1292. (3) The
term "manipulative" in § 10(b) has the
limited contextual meaning ascribed in
Santa Fe, id. at 476-77. 97 S.Ct. 1292.
Thus, any defendant who does not make or
affirmatively cause to be made a fraudulent
misstatement or omission, or who does not
directly engage in manipulative securities
trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding
and abetting and cannot be held liable under
§ 10(b) or any subpart of Rule lOb-5.
Accord Fidel i. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 235
(6th Cir. 2004); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l,
Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1204-06 (11th Cir.
2001); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152
F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1104, 119 S.Ct. 870, 142 L.Ed.2d
772 (1999); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod.
Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225-27 (10th Cir.
1996); In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec.
Litig.. 50 F.3d 615. 628 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1994);
In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 339 F.Supp.2d
804, 914-16 (S.D.Tex. 2004); In re
Honestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252
F.Supp.2d 1018, 1040-41 (C.D.Cal.2003).
In this case, the focus of plaintiffs' § 10(b)
and Rule 1 Ob-5 claims was deception-they
alleged a "continuous course of conduct" in
which Charter allegedly "made and/or failed
to correct public representations which were
or had become materially false and
misleading regarding Charter's financial
results and operations." Indeed, eighteen
pages of the amended complaint alleged in
fifty detailed paragraphs the fraudulent
financial reports and press releases
published by Charter during the class period.
However, neither Motorola nor Scientific-
Atlanta was alleged to have engaged in any
such deceptive act. They did not issue any
misstatement relied upon by the investing
public, nor were they under a duty to
Charter investors and analysts to disclose
information useful in evaluating Charter's
true financial condition. None of the alleged
financial misrepresentations by Charter was
made by or even with the approval of the
Vendors. Accordingly, the district court
properly dismissed the claims against the
Vendors as nothing more than claims, barred
by Central Bank, that the Vendors
knowingly aided and abetted the Charter
defendants in deceiving the investor
plaintiffs.
Like the district court and the court in In re
Homestore.conz. 252 F.Supp.2d at 1041, we
are aware of no case imposing § 10(b) or
Rule l0b-5 liability on a business that
entered into an arm's length non-securities
transaction with an entity that then used the
transaction to publish false and misleading
statements to its investors and analysts. The
point is significant. To impose liability for
securities fraud on one party to an anm's
length business transaction in goods or
services other than securities because that
party knew or should have known that the
other party would use the transaction to
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mislead investors in its stock would
introduce potentially far-reaching duties and
uncertainties for those engaged in day-to-
day business dealings. Decisions of this
magnitude should be made by Congress.
III.
Finally, Stoneridge argues that the district
court abused its discretion in denying
plaintiffs' post-dismissal motions to
reconsider the dismissal order and to grant
plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. A
district court has broad discretion to
reconsider an order granting dismissal or
summary judgment, but "[a] motion to alter
or amend judgment cannot be used to raise
arguments which could have been raised
prior to the issuance of judgment."
Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp. 839 F.2d
407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 820, 109 S.Ct. 63, 102 L.Ed.2d 40
(1988). Here, plaintiffs argued that the
district court overlooked or misapplied prior
decisions from district courts in other
circuits. The district court briefly reviewed
those cases and concluded it "is not inclined
to reach a different result." Denial of the
motion to reconsider on this ground was not
an abuse of discretion. Indeed, we agree
with the court's analysis of those non-
controlling cases.
The district court denied the post-dismissal
motion to amend because the proposed
pleading would be futile-the additional
allegations as to the Vendors' role and
knowledge set forth in the proposed
amended complaint did not cure the flaws in
plaintiffs' § 10(b) theory. Denial of a motion
to amend on this ground, particularly a
motion filed after the district court's final
ruling, is not an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d
568, 575 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1054, 122 S.Ct. 1910, 152 L.Ed.2d 820
(2002).
The final judgment of the district court dated
February 15, 2005, is AFFIRMED.
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"Court to Consider 'Scheme Liability' in Stoneridge
Suit Against Motorola, Scientific-Atlanta"
Associated Press
March 26, 2007
Christopher S. Rugaber
WASHINGTON (AP)-The Supreme Court
said Monday it will consider whether
shareholders of companies that commit
securities fraud should be able to sue
investment banks, lawyers and others that
allegedly participated in the fraud.
Wall Street and law firms around the
country are closely watching the case, which
won't be argued until the court's next term
beginning in October. Federal appeals courts
so far have split on whether such "secondary
actors" can be held liable.
"This is probably the most important legal
issue for the securities industry in a
generation," said Robert Giuffra, an attorney
at Sullivan & Cromwell who has defended
corporations in securities cases.
Last week, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled against a class-action lawsuit
brought by former Enron shareholders
against several investment banks, including
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. and Credit Suisse
Group, over their alleged role in Enron's
collapse. The Houston-based oil services
firm went bankrupt in 2001 after a
widespread accounting scandal was
uncovered. Several executives pleaded
guilty or were convicted of fraud, and
investors and former employees lost
millions in the debacle.
The 5th Circuit found that the banks may
have knowingly "aided and abetted" Enron's
fraud, but under a 1994 Supreme Court
ruling, companies are generally protected
from shareholder lawsuits even if they aid
and abet fraud. However, the Securities and
Exchange Commission can pursue civil
actions in such cases.
The case the justices agreed to hear stems
from an episode of alleged securities fraud
by cable television provider Charter
Communications Inc. in 2000. A Charter
investor, StoneRidge Investment Partners
LLC, sued Motorola Inc. and Scientific-
Atlanta Inc., which is now owned by Cisco
Systems Inc. StoneRidge alleged that the
companies participated in sham transactions
with Charter.
Legal experts refer to the notion of
expanding liability to investment banks,
lawyers and other involved parties as
"scheme liability."
James C. Dugan, an attorney at Willkie, Farr
& Gallagher, said the StoneRidge case was
one of the first opportunities for the justices
to consider a scheme liability case. Their
action "suggests that they think this is a very
important issue that needs to be clarified,"
he said.
Critics argue that it is an effort by plaintiffs'
lawyers to seek "deep pockets" to sue by
evading legal standards on aiding and
abetting. especially in cases such as Enron,
which became worthless in the aftermath of
its bankruptcy.
Barbara Roper, director of investor
protection at the Consumer Federation of
America, disagreed. "One way or the other,
people who help commit the fraud ought to
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be held liable," she said.
In the Charter case, StoneRidge accused
Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta of
participating in a "scheme to defraud"
investors.
In a court filing, StoneRidge alleged that
Charter overpaid Motorola and Scientific-
Atlanta for set-top boxes that Charter
customers used to receive cable
programming. Motorola and Scientific-
Atlanta then in effect returned the
overpayment by purchasing advertising from
Charter, StoneRidge charged. The
transactions allowed Charter to inflate
revenue by $17 million, the amount needed
to meet certain Wall Street analysts'
expectations, StoneRidge said.
Charter eventually restated financial
statements from 2000 to 2002, reducing
revenue during that period by $292 million.
Four executives also pleaded guilty to felony
counts of conspiracy to defraud.
A federal district court and the 8th Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed StoneRidge's
claims. however, finding that the two
companies may have aided and abetted the
fraud but were not active participants.
A company or individual must make a
fraudulent statement or omit information, or
engage in manipulative securities trading
practices to be held liable for securities
fraud, the 8th Circuit said.
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
ruled in a separate case later that a
secondary actor, such as a bank or law firm,
can be held liable in some circumstances-
specifically, if its conduct had "the principal
purpose and effect of creating a false
appearance of fact."
That ruling set up a federal appeals court
conflict, which can sometimes spur the
Supreme Court to weigh in.
The case is Stoneridge Investment v.
Scientific-Atlanta (06-43). Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Stephen Breyer
recused themselves from the decision to
consider the case. According to mandatory
financial disclosure forms filed last year,
Roberts owned Scientific-Atlanta stock and
Breyer owned Cisco stock in 2005. Cisco
acquired Scientific-Atlanta in 2006.
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"U.S. Lets Pass Deadline to Back
Holders in High Court Case"
Dow Jones Newswires
12 June 2007
Siobhan Hughes
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)-The U.S.
Justice Department on Monday let pass a
deadline for supporting investors in a case
before the Supreme Court, exposing
disagreement within the government over
how the court should rule in a case that may
have implications for investors in Enron
Corp. (ENE).
U.S. Solicitor General Paul Clement
refrained from filing an amicus brief by a
midnight deadline even though he had been
asked to do so by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The SEC had voted
3-2 to recommend that the solicitor general
advocate on behalf of investors in a case
about whether third parties can be sued
under federal securities laws for allegedly
playing a role in another company's
accounting fraud.
A Justice Department spokesman would not
say whether or when a brief would be filed.
The case has become a flashpoint in a larger
debate over the Bush administration and its
policies towards businesses. SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox, a Republican who while in
Congress sponsored legislation that
restricted the ability of investors to sue for
securities fraud, was subject to intense
lobbying by plaintiffs' attorney William
Lerach. Cox ultimately broke ranks with
fellow Republicans and voted to weigh in on
behalf of investors.
Business groups, such as the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, have warned that allowing
investors to sue third parties will make
foreign companies think twice before doing
business in the U.S.
The case involves a lawsuit against suppliers
to Charter Communications Inc. (CHTR)
over transactions in which the cable
company allegedly inflated its revenue. The
scheme involved paying Scientific Atlanta
Inc., now a unit of Cisco Systems Inc.
(CSCO), and Motorola Inc. (MOT) extra
money for cable boxes if the companies
purchased advertising from the cable
company, allegedly generating $17 million
in improper revenue.
A U.S. trial judge dismissed the lawsuit
against the suppliers in a ruling that said
Supreme Court precedent limited such suits
to primary violators of federal securities
laws. An appeals court later affirmed the
trial court's ruling.
The Supreme Court precedent at issue came
in 1994, when the court ruled that third
parties that do business with public
companies can't be sued by shareholders for
"aiding and abetting" a fraud. The question
is whether those outside parties may be sued
as a "primary violator."
The court's ruling may have implications for
private lawsuits against investment banks,
law firms, and other outside parties doing
business with a company that engages in
fraud. One such case involves a federal
appeals court ruling against Enron investors
that said securities laws limit the ability to
sue banks and investment firms that were
doing business with the company.
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Enron shareholders earlier this year asked
the Supreme Court to review the decision.
The court hasn't said whether it will take up
the case. Enron filed for bankruptcy
protection in 2001 after a massive
accounting scandal.
Lerach's law firm lashed
government's decision to let
pass without submitting a brief.
out at the
the deadline
regulatory agency represents an
unprecedented imposition of politics into the
judiciary-extraordinary even for this over-
politicized Justice department," said Dan
Newman, a spokesman for the law firm
Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman &
Robbins LLP.
The case is Stoneridge Investment Partners
v. Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, 06-43.
"Vetoing the reasoned opinion of the lead
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"Supreme Court Appears Set to Finally Clarify Concept of
Primary Liability in Private Securities Fraud Actions"
Orange County Business Journal
April 23, 2007
Todd Gordinier and Damian Moos
The Supreme Court's recent decision to
review Stoneridge Investment Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. may finally
clarify an important question in private
securities fraud actions: the circumstances
under which market participants who are not
themselves selling securities or making
statements to investors, such as attorneys,
accountants, investment banks, or others
involved in the capital markets, may be held
liable for violating the federal securities
laws. In 1994, in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., the Court held that secondary actors
cannot be held liable in private securities
actions for aiding and abetting another's
fraudulent conduct. While limiting the scope
of liability under § 10(b) of the securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 1Ob-5 in the
case before it, the Court observed toward the
end of that opinion:
The absence of § 1 0(b) aiding and
abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the
securities markets are always free
from liability. . . . Any person or
entity . . who employs a
manipulative device or makes a
material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be
liable as a primary violator under
lOb-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary
liability . . . are met."
The Court left a more precise definition of
"primary violator" or "primary liability"
open to be addressed at a later time. It seems
that time has arrived. Grappling to define
that "open" question has divided lower
courts ever since. The notion of "scheme
liability," a legal theory by which plaintiffs
have sought with some success to limit the
scope of the Central Bank decision, has
crystallized a conflict on this issue which the
Court now seems likely to resolve. Such a
theory holds that secondary actors commit a
primary violation where they and (usually)
the company whose securities were affected
by the alleged fraud, were part of a
"scheme" to defraud investors. This theory
has been employed to assert claims against
numerous participants in the capital markets,
including attorneys, accountants, banks,
business partners, and even vendors who
worked with a company affected by an
alleged scheme.
Two conflicting approaches to the notion of
"scheme liability" have developed. One,
adopted by virtually all of the lower courts
who have considered the question and most
recently by the Eighth Circuit, is a bright
line rule about what is required for a primary
violation. The other approach, adopted by
the Ninth Circuit, conflicts with that
approach and results in a much less definite
rule.
Bright Line Approach to Primary
Liability
In Stoneridge. the Eighth Circuit followed
what is clearly a majority view in adopting a
bright line definition of "primary violation"
by affirming the lower court's decision in In
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re: Charter Communications, Inc. Securities
Litigation. In Charter, investors in a
company asserted § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
claims, using a scheme liability theory,
against a vendor of the company in which
they invested. Specifically, they alleged that
the vendor entered into sham transactions
with the company-the company overpaid
for equipment and the vendor returned the
surplus payments as "advertising fees"-and
that the vendor knew the company was
using these transactions to improperly
inflate its revenue on its financial
statements. In dismissing the claims against
the vendor, the court concluded that
secondary actors are only liable as primary
violators if they "make or affirmatively
cause to be made a fraudulent misstatement
or omission" or "directly engage in
manipulative securities trading practices."
Since the vendor did not play any role in
preparing or disseminating the fraudulent
financial statements, the court held that it
could not be held liable.
Flexible Approach to Primary Liability
Alone among those circuit courts who have
considered this question, in Simpson v. AOL
Time Warner Inc., the Ninth Circuit applied
a flexible rule as to what constitutes a
primary violation. In Simpson, investors
asserted scheme liability claims against
business partners of a company whose
securities were affected by the alleged
scheme. Like the Charter plaintiffs, the
investors claimed that the partners engaged
in sham transactions with the company
knowing that the company was using those
transactions to fraudulently inflate its
revenue on its financial statements.
Although the court dismissed the investors'
claims, it adopted a different definition of
primary violation. It held that secondary
actors are primary violators if their "conduct
or role in an illegitimate transaction has the
principal purpose and effect of creating a
false appearance of fact in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud."
It seems clear that the time for the Supreme
Court to address the question it left open in
Central Bank has arrived. Hopefully, the
decision in this case will resolve the conflict
in the lower courts. Everyone who plays a
role in the capital markets will benefit from
a bright line definition of what constitutes a
primary violation of the securities laws.
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"The Stoneridge Showdown-Securities Lawsuits"
The Economist
June 16, 2007
It is, by general consent, the most important
securities-litigation clash for a generation. A
case now before the Supreme Court,
Stoneridge i. Scientific-Atlanta, is shaping
up to be a key test of attitudes towards
shareholder class actions. A decision in
favour of aggrieved investors would greatly
increase the number of companies on which
trial lawyers could train their sights. A
ruling the other way would be a crushing
defeat for the plaintiffs bar. Adding to the
suspense, the government bodies with an
interest in the case cannot agree on a
common position.
The case involves a cable company, Charter
Communications, which used a transaction
with two suppliers of set-top boxes to inflate
its revenues. Shareholders sued not only the
company but the vendors too, claiming that
they participated in the fraud, even though
they may not have been aware of the
misreporting. Led by the legendary Bill
Lerach, plaintiff lawyers have lobbied
ferociously for the principle of going after
third parties. known as "scheme liability".
The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) is backing Mr. Lerach's lot, thanks to
a change of heart by its Republican
chairman. Christopher Cox, traditionally no
friend of the plaintiffs bar. Mr. Cox urged
the Department of Justice to fall in behind it,
but this week it declined to do so. It has a
month to decide whether to support the
defendants or offer no opinion.
The Treasury is at odds with the SEC, too,
fearing that a ruling in favour of investors
would further damage American
competitiveness. Many foreign firms that
choose to list their shares elsewhere point to
America's "litigation lottery" as the
principal reason. Although filings of
securities class actions have been falling
since 2005, the overall value of settlements
has continued to rise.
Bankers and accountants are watching just
as closely as cable-box makers. In a similar
case, Mr. Lerach's firm sued Enron's
financial advisers on behalf of shareholders,
claiming that they facilitated the book-
keeping shenanigans at the now-defunct
energy trader. He lost-though not before
collecting billions from banks that settled
early. He has lodged an appeal with the
Supreme Court and wants the case joined
with Stoneridge.
What will the court do? Business is
encouraged by its track record: a steady
pruning of plaintiffs' rights since the 1970s.
(Congress, too, has made it harder to bring
class actions.) A number of its justices are
thought to sympathise with the view that
scheme liability is best left to the SEC,
which has the power to pursue aiders and
abettors under its Rule 1Ob-5.
Some lawyers in Washington even suggest
that Mr. Cox only sided with investors
because he was convinced that they had
almost no chance of support from the
Supreme Court. "He's been accused of
being too close to business and this is a
convenient way to dispel that notion without
really changing anything," says one.
But with numerous fine legal points at issue,
the outcome is uncertain. An unfavourable
ruling would send a chill through
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boardrooms, and not only in America.
If suppliers and advisers can be dragged into
class actions, it would no longer even be
necessary to issue shares in the United
States to incur securities liability, points out
Peter Wallison of the American Enterprise
Institute, a think-tank. Any firm, anywhere,
doing business with American companies
would have to live with the risk that the
transaction could later be portrayed as
fraudulent or deceptive. And painting such
pictures is what trial lawyers do best.
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"Scientific-Atlanta Gets Securities Win"
The Fulton County Daily Report (Atlanta)
April 19, 2006
Alyson M. Palmer
Securities litigators at Atlanta's Alston &
Bird office recently persuaded a federal
appeals court to rule in favor of their client,
Scientific-Atlanta, on what they call a hot
topic in securities litigation.
On April 11, a panel of the 8th Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals said that shareholders of
cable company Charter Communications
cannot recover from Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola based on allegations that the
technology manufacturers sold Charter cable
boxes through "sham" transactions that
Charter used to mislead its investors.
The 8th Circuit decision appears to be the first
to rule on the argument raised by the
plaintiffs, although corporate defenders
contend that plaintiffs' attorneys simply are
trying to put a new gloss on an argument
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court over a
decade ago.
Plaintiff shareholders of the cable company
filed suit in federal court in St. Louis in
August 2002. They named Charter and ten of
its executives, its auditor Arthur Andersen,
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola as
defendants.
On behalf of investors who purchased Charter
stock between Nov. 8, 1999 and Aug. 16,
2002, Stoneridge Investment Partners alleged
that Charter had defrauded investors by
artificially inflating the company's financial
results by, among other things. deliberately
delaying the disconnection of customers no
longer paying their bills.
Charter experienced a precipitous decline in
its stock price beginning in September 2001,
when the price was around $20 a share. Now
with a stock price of only a dollar and change
and a market capitalization of around $469
million, the company lags behind the industry
leaders.
Among the tactics that plaintiffs said Charter
employed involved Charter's purchase of
cable boxes from Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola. The plaintiffs alleged that in
August 2000, Charter agreed to pay the cable
box vendors an additional $20 a box over a
previously set price in exchange for the
vendors returning the additional payments to
Charter in the form of advertising fees.
Charter used these transactions to inflate its
cash flow by about $17 million to meet the
fourth quarter 2000 expectations of Wall
Street analysts, contend the plaintiffs.
According to the plaintiffs' allegations,
Charter improperly treated the increased
equipment "expenses" as capital while
treating the returned ad fees as revenue.
The plaintiffs did not allege that Scientific-
Atlanta or Motorola played any role in
disseminating false information to analysts or
investors. However, the plaintiffs contended
that these third party vendors were liable to
them under securities laws because they knew
Charter would account for the transactions
improperly and deceptively.
No Liability
Last year, U.S. District Judge Charles A.
Shaw said that allegation, even if proven,
could not support liability under the securities
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laws. The plaintiffs appealed, and Alston
attorney Oscar N. Persons argued Scientific-
Atlanta's defense before the appeals panel.
In a decision written by Chief U.S. Judge
James B. Loken and joined by U.S. Circuit
Judges Roger L. Wollman and William Jay
Riley, the 8th Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'
attempts to distinguish a 1994 Supreme Court
decision, Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
In the 5-4 decision, the high court found that
an indenture trustee for a bond issue could not
be subject to "aiding and abetting" liability
even though it let pass suggestions that a real
estate developer was issuing false reports on
the bond issue. Writing for the majority,
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934's
proscription on material false statements or
omissions did not create liability for "giving
aid to a person who commits a manipulative
or deceptive act."
Charter shareholders argued before the 8th
Circuit that Central Bank did not foreclose
their suit against Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola because they had alleged not just
that the vendors had aided Charter in
committing a fraudulent misrepresentation or
failure to disclose as forbidden by the
securities laws but that the vendors
themselves had violated broader proscriptions
on participating in a "scheme or artifice to
defraud" and engaging in a "course of
business which operates as a fraud or deceit."
The 8th Circuit panel rejected that argument,
saying that under Central Bank and other
cases "any defendant who does not make or
affirmatively cause to be made a fraudulent
misstatement or omission, or who does not
directly engage in manipulative securities
trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding
and abetting and cannot be held liable under B
10(b) or any subpart of Rule 1Ob-5."
May Go to High Court
Counsel for both Scientific-Atlanta and the
plaintiffs shareholders say that the Supreme
Court ultimately may take up the issue,
depending on how other circuits rule. An
appeal in an unrelated case on the issue is
pending in the 9th Circuit, and district courts
have ruled different ways.
For now, however, Persons, who represented
Scientific-Atlanta with Susan E. Hund, also
an Alston partner, will take the win for his
client. "It's been a hot topic, and we're glad to
see some closure come to it."
Persons said that his client "did not know that
any of our transactions were going to be used
in an improper way" but that even if it had, it
should not be subject to liability. "It's not
right to make a vendor responsible for
accounting over which the vendor has no
control," said Persons.
Plaintiffs' counsel Mark I. Gross of
Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman & Gross
in New York said that his clients were
"actively considering seeking further review"
of the 8th Circuit panel's decision, most likely
through a petition for consideration by the
Supreme Court.
"From our standpoint we believe that in
instances where there is a significant showing
that a third party vendor was aware that it was
directly contributing to a fraud upon investors
that it should be held accountable for the
impact of such misconduct." said Gross in an
interview.
Meanwhile, at about the same time that the
plaintiffs filed their 8th Circuit appeal of the
dismissal of the claims against the vendors,
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the plaintiffs settled with Charter and Arthur
Andersen. The settlement provides for the
payment of $64 million in cash by Charter,
$2.25 million in cash by Arthur Andersen,
$40 million in Charter common stock and $40
million of Charter warrants, according to
Shaw's June 2005 order approving the
settlement.
Institutional Shareholder Services currently
ranks the settlement the 26th largest final
settlement of a private securities class action
filed since 1996.
The case is Stoneridge Investment Partners
v. Scientific-Atlanta, No. 05-1974 (8th Cir.
April 11, 2006).
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"Is 'Deceptive Conduct Only Misstatements
or Omissions?"
The New York Law Journal
May 8, 2007
Jeff G. Hammel and Robert J. Malionek
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 US 164,
180 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
§10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 "prohibits only the making of a material
misstatement (or omission) or the commission
of a manipulative act. . . ."
The proscription does not include "giving aid
to a person who commits a manipulative or
deceptive act." As the Court further held,
secondary actors in the securities markets still
may face liability under §10(b), and Rule
10b-5 issued thereunder, for making a
material misstatement or omission or
employing a manipulative device "on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies."
In recent years, plaintiffs in securities fraud
litigation have attempted to extend the reach
of primary liability beyond those who actually
make statements or remain silent in the face
of a duty to speak (the scenario covered by
Rule 10b-5(b)) by alleging that the defendant
committed "deceptive conduct" under Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) merely by participating in an
alleged scheme to defraud.
Whether Central Bank forecloses such
claims-a question that has received uneven
treatment by lower courts-will be resolved
by the Supreme Court next term. See In re
Charter Communications, 443 F3d 987 (8th
Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub nom. Stoneridge
Investment v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 75
USLW 3511 (U.S. March 26, 2007) (No. 06-
43). The Stoneridge case should be watched
closely. as the decision will have the potential
to reshape securities fraud litigation for years
to come.
Liability/Aiding, Abetting
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful, directly or
indirectly, "[t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ...
any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." 15
USC §78j(b). SEC Rule 1Ob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly . . . (a) [t]o
employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make
any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c)
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person in
connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. 17 CFR §240.10b-
5.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court clarified
that any private claim brought pursuant to
Rule 1Gb-5 must satisfy Section 10(b)'s
requirement that it be either "manipulative"
(i.e.. related to illegal trading practices, which
is a "term of art" defined by earlier Supreme
Court precedent) or "deceptive" (i.e.,
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involving a misstatement or omission by one
who has a duty to disclose). This ruled out
liability for mere assistance in such conduct
as a basis for liability. Because the plaintiffs
in -Central Bank alleged only an "aiding and
abetting" claim, the Court had no occasion in
that case to consider the requirements for
stating claims under Rule 1Ob-5(b), regarding
misstatements and omissions, as opposed to
claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), for other
fraudulent acts and devices.
Nonetheless. the Court offered some guidance
regarding the extent to which §10(b) reaches
actors other than an alleged primary violator:
The absence of §10(b) aiding and
abetting liability does not mean that
secondary actors in the securities
markets are always free from
liability under the securities Acts.
Any person or entity, including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be
liable as a primary violator under
10b-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability
under Rule 1 0b-5 are met.
This guidance in Central Bank has caused a
split of authority among lower courts.
Misstatements and Omissions
Some courts have struggled with whether an
actor's "substantial participation" in an
alleged misstatement (or omission) made by
another actor is sufficient to state a claim
under §10(b) and Rule lOb-5(b). whereas
other courts ha-ve held that an actor may face
liability only for actually making the alleged
misstatement (or remaining silent when
obligated to speak). Nowhere has this split
been more evident than within the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Shortly
after Central Bank was decided, the Second
Circuit held that a secondary actor's mere
assistance in another's alleged fraudulent
statement-such as an accountant's review of
its client's financial statements, without
issuing an audit opinion or other public
statement-is insufficient to impose liability
in a private action under §10(b). See Shapiro
v. Cantor, 123 F3d 717, 721 (2d Cir. 1997);
see also Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152
F3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
Some district courts within the Second
Circuit, however, subsequently held that
plaintiffs may state a claim against a
secondary actor where the level of
participation by that actor in an alleged
fraudulent misstatement (or omission) was
significant enough to itself be considered
fraudulent. See, e.g., In re Global Crossing
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F.Supp.2d 319, 333
(SDNY 2004) (defendant may be liable for
another's misstatement if defendant's role is
"substantial enough that s/he may be deemed
to have made the statement"); In re Van Der
Moolen Holding N. V. Sec. Litig., 405
F.Supp.2d 388, 402 (SDNY 2005) (subsidiary
may be primarily liable for statements made
by its parent where statements clearly identify
the subsidiary as the source of the information
disclosed).
Earlier this year, the Second Circuit rejected
such a basis for primary liability by adopting
a bright-line rule that an actor may bear
responsibility for a statement only when the
statement is publicly attributed to the actor. In
Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d
147, 156 (2d Cir. 2007), Chief Judge Dennis
Jacobs (and a panel including Retired Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor) squarely held that an
auditor may not be liable under § 1 0(b) for
helping to compile and reviewing-but not
auditing-its client's interim financial
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statements included in Form 10-Q, when the
issuer attributed no statement made in the
Form 10-Q to the auditor.
Where courts have taken the approach
currently adopted by the Second Circuit, the
linchpin has been that, based upon the
guidance provided in Central Bank, a plaintiff
cannot rely-without some additional duty of
the secondary actor to speak-upon unstated
assistance in another's misstatement.
Other Contrivances
Where the basis for the securities fraud claim
against the secondary actor is not mere
participation in another's statement (or
omission), but instead some other fraudulent
device, however, the law is growing less
clear. In In re Parmalat Securities Litigation,
376 F.Supp.2d 472, 504 (SDNY 2005), Judge
Lewis Kaplan held that a claim under §10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 may be stated where "a
defendant directly or indirectly used or
employed a manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance," and that under Rule lOb-5(a)
and (c), no misstatement or omission by that
defendant is required, so long as the
defendant deliberately engaged in a fraudulent
scheme.
On the facts before him, Judge Kaplan held
that a bank's securitization of "worthless"
invoices, for which the issuer accounted
improperly on its financial statements, was a
sufficiently "deceptive" device or contrivance
by the bank for purposes of § 10(b). See also
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d
1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[T]o be liable as
a primary violator of §10(b) for participation
in a 'scheme to defraud,' the defendant must
have engaged in conduct that had the
principal purpose and effect of creating a false
appearance of fact in furtherance of the
scheme.").
RPecently the T.S Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit took the opposite view. The
court reversed class certification of Enron
shareholders against three investment banks
alleged to have violated §10(b) by engaging
in various business transactions with Enron
that enabled Enron improperly to account for
certain liabilities and revenues. See Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA) Inc., No. 06-20856, 2007 WL 816518,
at *9 (5th Cir. March 19, 2007). The Fifth
Circuit held that an act cannot be "deceptive"
under §10(b), even pursuant to Rule lOb-5(a)
or (c), where "the actor has no duty to
disclose." The court reasoned that,
"[p]resuming plaintiffs' allegations to be true,
Enron committed fraud by misstating its
accounts, but the banks only aided [and]
abetted that fraud by engaging in transactions
to make it more plausible; they owed no duty
to Enron's shareholders."
The Stoneridge Case
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Stoneridge in order to resolve this question:
Whether this Court's decision in Central
Bank forecloses claims for deceptive conduct
under §10(b) and Rule lOb-5(a) and (c),
where respondents engaged in transactions
with a public corporation with no legitimate
business or economic purpose except to
inflate artificially the public corporation's
financial statements, but where respondents
themselves made no public statements
concerning those transactions.
In that case, a public company's shareholders
alleged that the company's vendors were
primarily liable under §10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-
5(a) and (c) for engaging in transactions with
the company. knowing that the company
intended to account for the transactions
improperly. The district court dismissed these
claims as "claims for aiding and abetting."
Because "[p]laintiffs do not assert that [the
vendors] made any statement, omission or
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action at issue or that plaintiffs relied on any
statement, omission or action made by either
of them."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed, holding that Central Bank
and prior Supreme Court precedent stand for
three principles dictating that conclusion:
(1) The Court's categorical
declaration that a private plaintiff
"may not bring a 1Ob-5 suit against
a defendant for acts not prohibited
by the text of §10(b)" included
claims under Rule 1 Ob-5(a) and (c),
as well as Rule lOb-5(b).
(2) A device or contrivance is not
'deceptive,' within the meaning of
§10(b), absent some misstatement
or a failure to disclose by one who
has a duty to disclose.
(3) The term 'manipulative' in§10(b) has the limited contextual
meaning ascribed in Santa Fe (i.e.,
specific illegal trading practices
such as price-rigging).
The Eighth Circuit read the shareholders'
complaint as focusing on allegations of
"deception," i.e., that the company engaged in
a scheme to publish materially misstated
financial statements based on transactions
with its vendors. The shareholders did not
allege that the vendors made any
misstatement upon which the shareholders
relied, nor that the vendors were under a duty
to speak to the shareholders, and thus, the
court held, the vendors did not commit any
deceptive act. At most, the court held, the
shareholders alleged that the vendors
deliberately aided and abetted the company's
deception.
Conclusion
If the Supreme Court rejects the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning and conclusion, and
instead holds that §10(b) liability for
"deceptive" practices under Rule 1 Ob-5(a) and
(c) extends to those who say nothing and have
no duty to speak, the impact will be
enormous.
First, it could undercut dramatically the
import of Central Bank's rejection of aiding
and abetting liability. Second, the dividing
line for liability in securities fraud litigation
could move from a question of whether a
"secondary actor" did or did not make a
misstatement or omission to the more
nebulous question of the extent of its
relationship, level of business dealings and
familiarity with the underlying "primary"
actor.
Would an auditor be liable under §10(b) for
reviewing-but issuing no opinion on-its
client's interim financial statements? Or
would an underwriter be liable for statements
in an offering document which explicitly
indicates that the statements are those of the
issuer alone? If the Supreme Court were to
hold that such actions constitute securities
fraud, it could represent a dramatic change for
all secondary actors whose business touches
the securities markets.
As the Eighth Circuit noted, "[d]ecisions of
this magnitude should be made by Congress."
Indeed. Stoneridge presents the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to reaffirm and
clarify Central Bank by holding that by law
and by common sense, an act is not
"deceptive" under §10(b) unless it involves a
false representation or an omission by
someone who owes a duty to speak, i.e., acts
upon which another person reasonably may
rely.
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"§10(b) Secondary Actor Liability:
High Court to Resolve"
The New York Law Journal
April 11, 2007
Sarah S. Gold and Richard L. Spinogatti
Since the U.S. Supreme Court abolished
private aiding and abetting actions under
§10(b) in Central Bank, the federal courts
have struggled to define the boundaries of
primary liability for secondary actors,
persons doing business with issuers such as
lawyers, accountants, bankers and suppliers.
Now, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in a case that may define the
standards for imposing §10(b) primary
liability on secondary actors engaging in
transactions that allegedly constitute
deceptive devices, acts or schemes under
Rule 10 b-5. In re Charter Coinnunications
Inc. Securities Litigation, 443 F3d 987 (8th
Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub nom.
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 2007 WL 879583
(March 26, 2007). The three appellate courts
to address the issue have created a split of
authority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and, most recently, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Credit Suisse
First Boston (USA), Inc., 2007 WL 816518
(5th Cir. March 19, 2007), have barred
liability unless the secondary actor made
misrepresentations, had a duty to disclose, or
engaged in market manipulation. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted a broad scheme liability standard in
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F3d
1040 (9th Cir. 2006). Both the Supreme
Court and Congress have recognized it is
essential to have a uniform and decisive
liability standard.
Background
In abolishing aiding and abetting claims by
private litigants under §10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Central
Bank held that "the statute prohibits only the
making of a material misstatement (or
omission) or the commission of a
manipulative act. . . . The proscription does
not include giving aid to a person who
commits a manipulative or deceptive act." A
secondary actor may only be subject to
liability if that party "employs a
manipulative device or makes a material
misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies ... ,
assuming all of the requirements for primary
liability under Rule 1 Ob-5 are met."
Private plaintiffs have since pressed creative
arguments couching claims against
secondary actors as primary liability, often
alleging deceptive devices, schemes, or acts
under Rules 1Ob-5(a) or (c), rather than
material misrepresentations or omissions
under Rule lOb-5(b). Courts have
formulated conflicting tests for primary
liability under those rules, seeking to define
what it means to "indirectly" employ a
"deceptive device" under §10(b).
The Circuits' Conflicting Standards
The Eighth and Fifth circuits have rejected
§ 10(b) claims asserted against, respectively,
vendors and banks that allegedly engaged in
sham transactions allowing the issuer to
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misstate its financial condition. Both courts
held, in the words of the Eighth Circuit, that
the defendant must "make or affirmatively
cause to be made a fraudulent misstatement
or omission, or . . . directly engage in
manipulative securities trading practices ...
[to] be held liable under §10(b) or any
subpart of Rule 10b-5." In re Charter
Communications, 443 F3d at 992. As the
Eighth Circuit explained, "[t]o impose
liability for securities fraud on one party to
an arm's-length business transaction in
goods or services other than securities
because that party knew or should have
known that the other party would use the
transaction to mislead investors in its stock
would introduce potentially far-reaching
duties and uncertainties for those engaged in
day-to-day business dealings. Decisions of
this magnitude should be made by
Congress." Id. at 992-93.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recently issued a
decision in which the majority rejected
§10(b) liability for banks alleged to have
engaged in "irrational" transactions with
Enron to inflate Enron's revenues. Agreeing
with the Eighth Circuit. the majority
concluded that primary liability exists only
where a party engaged in "deceptive"
conduct, requiring either a misstatement or a
failure to disclose by one with a duty to
disclose or manipulation, a "term of art"
requiring that a defendant directly engage in
manipulative securities trading practices.
Regents qf Univ. of Calif, 2007 WL 816518
at *10, 12, 13. Since the banks made no
misstatements, primary liability could attach
only if the banks owed a duty of disclosuare
to the public (which they did not), since an
act cannot be "deceptive" under 1 0(b)
where the actor has no duty to disclose. Id.
at *8. 9.
In contrast. the Ninth Circuit and other
federal judges have struggled to establish a
"deceptive device" standard not demanding
either a misstatement or omission by the
defendant which could be used to allege a
broad "scheme to defraud." Simpson, 452
F3d at 1049-50. In Simpson, as in Charter,
the secondary actors were vendors engaging
in allegedly sham transactions allowing
Homestore.com to overstate revenues. Id. at
1042-43. The SEC advocated defining a
deceptive act broadly: "engaging in a
transaction whose principal purpose and
effect is to create a false appearance of
revenues." Id. at 1048. The Ninth Circuit
adopted a variant of that test: "to be liable as
a primary violator of § 10(b) for participation
in a 'scheme to defraud,' the defendant must
have engaged in conduct that had the
principal purpose and effect of creating a
false appearance of fact in furtherance of the
scheme." The Court emphasized "[i]t is not
enough that a transaction . .. had a deceptive
purpose and effect; the defendant's own
conduct contributing to the transaction or
overall scheme must have had a deceptive
purpose and effect." Id. What types of
secondary actor conduct might meet that test
(which would obviously necessitate a fact-
intensive inquiry) remains unclear, as the
complaint was found not to state a claim
under this standard? Id. at 1054.
The Fifth Circuit in Regents specifically
rejected the Ninth Circuit's theory of
"scheme" liability as contrary to Supreme
Court precedents establishing that "a device,
such as a scheme. is not 'deceptive' unless it
involves- breach of some duty of candid
disclosure." 2007 WL 816518 at *12 &
n.30. Judge James L. Dennis, concurring,
found the Court's narrow interpretation
"neither compaed nor justified b- Supreme
Court precedent." Observing that the Court's
test "immunizes a broad array of undeniably
fraudulent conduct . . . effectively Living
secondary actors license to scheme with
impunity, as long as they keep quiet," he
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favored the broad scheme liability standard
of the Ninth Circuit, the SEC, and District
Judge Lewis Kaplan in In re Parmalat
Securities Litigation, 376 FSupp2d 472
(SDNY 2005). Id. at *21, 22.
Crafting a Proper Standard
Although some courts have been concerned
that participants in sham transactions
entered into with scienter and a deceptive
"purpose and effect" not escape §10(b)
liability, the Supreme Court in Central Bank
made clear that, regardless of policy
arguments, the language of the statute
controls. 511 US at 173-75, 188. Given the
statutory language, the only way to craft a
standard of primary liability for those who
have not themselves made a misstatement
and who have no duty to speak would be to
posit that the "directly or indirectly"
language of §10(b) allows liability for those
who "indirectly" employ a "deceptive
device." However, that argument is no more
effective for primary claims than it was
when raised in support of aiding and
abetting liability. Central Bank rejected that
very argument because for a secondary actor
to have primary liability, that party must
engage in the proscribed acts (at least
indirectly) but aiding and abetting liability
"extends beyond persons who engage, even
indirectly, in a proscribed activity; [it]
reaches persons who do not engage in the
proscribed activity at all, but who give a
degree of aid to those who do." 511 US at
176. And, it would allow liability without
the requisite reliance upon the secondary
actor's own statements or actions. Id. at 180.
The same analysis is equally true for the
allegedly sham business transactions at issue
in these secondary actor cases.
Consequently, scheme liability seems to run
afoul of the Central Bank principles, as it
would allow liability against third parties
who did not engage in the proscribed
activity of making a material
misrepresentation or actionable omission
and the investing public could not have
relied on any statements or omissions of
those parties. The only sure way to follow
Central Bank is the bright-line rule of the
Fifth and Eighth circuits-that a defendant
cannot be liable in a private action under
§10(b) without making a misstatement or
actionable omission.
Supreme Court Resolution
The question of secondary actor liability
under §10(b) is now squarely (once again)
before the Supreme Court in Charter. The
question presented is whether Central Bank
forecloses claims of deceptive conduct
where, although the vendors made no public
statements, they engaged in transactions
with no legitimate business or economic
purpose except to inflate artificially
Charter s financial statements. The answer
will be dispositive of the Ninth and Fifth
circuit cases as well, as the secondary actor
defendants in each of those cases also did
not participate in making the misstatement
constituting the alleged violation, did not
owe any duty to the investing public, and
engaged in nonsecurities transactions with
issuers that made the statements constituting
the violation....
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"Government Wants Securities
Liability Limited"
SCOTUSBiog.com
June 23, 2007
Lyle Denniston
Switching sides in a major fight over
securities law, the Bush Administration on
Wednesday told the Supreme Court that the
government generally opposes liability for
third parties in fraud lawsuits if there is no
proof that they directly deceived investors
who were counting on them for solid
information. The liability issue involves
entities such as investment bankers who act
as business partners to a firm that directly
engages in deception or manipulation of
securities. . . . The government thus
abandoned a substantial part of a position it
had held in prior cases in support of
investors; the brief also contradicted the
majority of the present members of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the chairmen of leading financial and other
committees in Congress. Clement resisted a
strenuous lobbying effort by lawmakers to
stay on the sidelines if he could not support
investors.
The brief that finally emerged from weeks
of maneuvering and lobbying had some of
the characteristics of a compromise, but
ultimately employed language that
suggested that third-party liability should be
difficult to prove, absent clear evidence of
reliance by investors on any misconduct by
such other parties.
Filed in Stoneridge Investment i. Scientific-
Atlanta (06-43), a case scheduled for oral
argument on Oct. 9 in the new Term, the
brief urged the Court to uphold a ruling by
the Eighth Circuit Court that broadly
insulated third parties from liability for
securities deception or manipulation.
Clement, however, argued that the Eighth
Circuit had gone too far in its curb on third
party liability. The decision nevertheless
should be upheld, the Solicitor General
argued, because there was no proof that any
deception in the Stoneridge case by third
parties was relied upon by investors. The
Circuit Court was wrong, the brief said, in
concluding that a third party that had some
role in a deceptive scheme can never be held
liable for someone else's fraud if the third
party did not make a misstatement or an
omission that it had a duty to disclose or did
not directly engage in manipulating trading.
Deception can occur by means short of that,
the brief said.
The dispute turns, at least in part, on the
meaning of a 1994 Supreme Court ruling, in
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank; there,
the Court barred private securities fraud
claims based on assertions of aiding and
abetting fraud by others. Making third
parties liable for a role in someone else's
fraud, absent proof that investors relied on
third party conduct, the Solicitor General
contended, would be "the functional
equivalent" of aider-abbettor liability in
suits filed by private investors.
Seeking to build on the 1994 precedent,
Clement's new brief argued that "it would
greatly expand the inferred private right of
action under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 if
Isecondary actors' could be held primarily
liable whenever they engage in allegedly
deceptive conduct, even if investors do not
rely on (and are not even aware of) that
conduct. Such a rule would expose not only
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accountants and lawyers who advise issuers
of securities, but also vendors (such as
respondents) and other firms that simply do
business with issuers, to potentially billions
of dollars in liability when those issuers
make misrepresentations to the market. Such
a rule would thereby considerably widen the
pool of deep-pocketed defendants that could
be sued for the misrepresentations of issuers,
increasing the likelihood that the private
right of action will be 'employed abusively
to impose substantial costs on companies
and individuals whose conduct confirms to
the law.'"'
Although Clement refused to put the current
SEC majority's opposing view before the
Court, as the commissioners had asked him
to do, their views have been offered to the
Court in filings by members of Congress,
who have asked permission to join in the
Stoneridge case.
The filing of the brief ended weeks of public
and private dispute over what role, if any,
the government would be playing in the
Stoneridge case, and in another case, raising
the same issue, that the Supreme Court has
yet to act upon-the case of California
Regents v. Merrill Lynch, et al. (docket 06-
1341), which involves billions of dollars in
potential liabilty for major investment
banking houses in a part of the Enron
scandal. The Fifth Circuit, like the Eighth,
rejected "scheme liability" for third parties.
Clement had declined in June when asked
by the SEC to file a brief supporting
Stoneridge. Since then, the lingering
question was whether the government would
stay out of the case entirely, or side with
third parties-as President Bush and
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson have
been pressing Clement to do.
Clement's brief made a slight bow to the
value of investor lawsuits, saying that
"meritorious private actions are an essential
supplement to criminal prosecutions and
civil enforcement actions brought by the
government."
But, he went on, "private securties actions
can be abused in ways that impose
substantial costs on companies that have
fully complied with the applicable laws. The
United States . . . has responsibility, through
. . . the federal banking agencies, for
ensuring that entities providing services to
publicly traded companies are not subject to
inappropriate secondary liability."
The brief's challenge to the scope of the
Eighth Circuit ruling against "scheme
liability" focused on the lower court's
exclusion of broad categories of third-party
conduct from securities fraud liability. The
Solicitor General went so far as to say that,
since the Circuit Court was wrong about
that, it may well be true that the third parties
in the Stoneridge case actually did engage in
deception in violation of the law against
securities manipulation. If a third party itself
engages in deceptive conduct, that could
lead to liability.
"Contrary to the view seemingly expressed
by the court of appeals," the brief argued,
"Section l0(b)'s prohibition against
deception is not limited to actual
misstatements or omissions, but
encompasses non-verbal deceptive conduct
as well."
The Solicitor General went on, however, to
say that investors claiming a third party
shared in "scheme liability" should have to
show, in addition to deception, that investors
or others had actually relied upon the third
parties' acts of deception. In the Stoneridge
case, Clement said, the investors do not
allege that they were even aware of the
transactions that the third parties engaged in
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along with the alleged primary violator.
He added: "Allowing liability for a primary
violation under the circumstances presented
here would constitute a sweeping expansion
of the judicially inferred private right of
action in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5....
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Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City ofNew York
(06-1265)
Ruling Below: (Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of New York, 464 F.3d 255
(2nd Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S.Ct. 2431, 75 U.S.L.W. 3621, 75 U.S.L.W. 3513, 75 U.S.L.W.
3617 [2007]).
The New York Futures Exchange's Committee for the Pacific Stock Exchange Technology Index
Futures Contract & Options was responsible for calculating the price of P-Tech contracts to
calculate margin requirements. Norman Eisler, Chairman of the NYFE and member of the NYFE's
Settlement Committee, allegedly manipulated the settlement prices of P-Tech contracts to benefits
his own security. Klein, in response to those manipulations, miscalculated the margin requirements
for the First West Trading account to be $700,000, of which Eisler was the principal. First West
was unable to cover the margin and the resulting illiquidity of the P-Tech contracts caused Klein to
request the NYFE Board to halt trading in P-Tech contracts, which NYFE declined to do. Eisler
was then removed from the Committee, the settlement prices were recalculated, and First West's
requirement increased to $4.5 million. First West could not meet the requirement, resulting in Klein
taking a charge against their net capital, which put Klein below the minimum required net capital
for the New York Clearing Corporation and the New York Mercantile Exchange. Both
organizations suspended Klein's membership, which caused Klein to collapse. Klein sued on
grounds that the NYFE failed to enforce its rules and other state law claims. The New York Board
of Trade and Eisler moved to dismiss for lack of standing, which the district court granted and
Second Circuit affirmed.
Questions Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that futures commission
merchants lack statutory standing to bring suit because the court found they were not involved in
the transactions in question.
KLEIN & CO. FUTURES, INC.
Petitioner
V.
BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.
Respondent
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided September 18, 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
B.D. PARKER. JR.. Circuit Judge: commission merchant ("FCM") and a clearing
member of New York Clearing Corporation
Klein & Co. Futures Inc. is a futures ("NYCC"). Klein appeals the dismissal by the
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United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Daniels, J.) for lack of
standing to bring claims against Defendant-
Appellees the Board of Trade of the City of
New York ("NYBOT"), New York Clearing
Corporation ("NYCC"), Norman Eisler, and
others (collectively "NYBOT Defendants")
under Sections 22(a) and (b) of the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. §
25. After dismissing Klein's claims under the
CEA, the district court declined to exercise
jurisdiction over its supplemental state law
claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
The NYBOT defendants cross-appeal that
dismissal. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm. Except as noted, the facts are drawn
from the complaint.
As a FCM, Klein facilitated the trading and
fulfilled certain obligations of its customers
who traded through the NYBOT. Prior to
May 2000, Defendant Norman Eisler, whose
conduct is the focus of Klein's complaint, was
the Chairman of the New York Futures
Exchange ("NYFE"). The NYFE is a futures
and options exchange designated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") as a contract market for the trading
of commodities futures and options, including
P-Tech Futures and Options ("P-Tech
contracts"). Eisler was also a member of the
NYFE's Settlement Committee for the Pacific
Stock Exchange Technology Index Futures
Contract & Options (the "Committee"). The
Committee s primary responsibility was to
calculate the price of P-Tech contracts for the
purposes, among other things. of calculating
margin requirements in customers' accounts.
Eisler was also a customer of Klein and the
principal of First West Trading Inc. ("First
West"). another Klein customer. Eisler traded
in P-Tech contracts for the account of First
West. The trades were unsolicited and were
made without input or advice from Klein.
Allegedly. Eisler, in his capacity as a member
of the Committee, secretly manipulated the
settlement prices of P-Tech contracts. This
manipulation benefited Eisler's P-Tech
positions but, at the same time, caused Klein
to miscalculate the margin requirements for
the First West account. Around March 2000,
the NYBOT began receiving complaints
regarding the P-Tech settlement prices but
failed to make proper inquiries or to place
Klein or other members of the industry or
public on notice of potential irregularities.
In early May 2000, Klein, based on the
incorrect settlement prices, computed the
required margin in First West's account at
S700,000, but Eisler was unable to post that
amount. Klein then contacted the NYBOT
and expressed concerns regarding the
illiquidity of the P-Tech contracts, Eisler's
inability to meet First West's margin call, and
his inability to liquidate First West's
contracts. Klein reported that the First West
margin deficit, if not covered, would impair
Klein's net capital and cause Eisler significant
losses. Klein requested that the NYFE Board
halt trading in P-Tech contracts, but no such
action occurred.
At that point, the scheme began to unravel. In
mid-May, Eisler's NYBOT membership
privileges were suspended and he was
dropped from the Committee. Once this
occurred. the remaining Committee members
recalculated the settlement prices and First
West's margin deficit ballooned to $4.5
million, an obligation it could not meet. As a
result, Klein was required to take an
immediate charge against its net capital,
forcing it below the minimum required for
clearing members of the NYCC and the New
York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"). Its
membership privileges were suspended and
Klein collapsed.
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Klein then sued on various claims. Klein s
first claim alleged that NYFE violated § 5b of
the CEA by failing to enforce its rules. and
sought a declaration that NYFE should be
suspended as a contract market. Klein further
alleged that the NYBOT Defendants violated
the anti-fraud provisions in CEA § 4b and 17
C.F.R §§ 33.9 and 33. 10, and the insider
provisions of CEA § 9. In addition, the
complaint alleged a variety of state law
claims.
The NYBOT Defendants moved to dismiss
principally on the ground that Klein was not a
purchaser or seller of futures contracts or
options and, therefore, lacked standing under
§ 22 of the CEA. They also moved to dismiss
Klein's state law claims with prejudice on the
ground that they were preempted by the CEA.
The district court agreed and dismissed
Klein's claims under the CEA for lack of
standing. Specifically, the district court
concluded:
Plaintiff Klein lacks standing under
Section 22 to bring this suit. Klein
does not alleue that it was either a
purchaser or a seller of P-Tech
Futures and Options. Furthermore,
Klein does not claim that it traded
for its own account. Rather, it is
undisputed that First West, not
Klein, traded in P-Tech Futures and
Options. Indeed. Klein claims that
these trades were effected "without
input, counsel, advice or any type of
recommendation whatsoever from
Klein & Co." Klein further alleces
that it "had no equity or financial
interest in the First WAest account
nor did Klein & Co. exercise
control over the trade in said
account."
Klein & Co.Futures. v. Bd. of Trade, No. 00-
CV-5563-GBD, 2005 WL 427713. at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2005 (internal citations
omitted)).
The court further reasoned that § 22 precluded
an action by a plaintiff that "did not suffer its
damages in the course of its trading activities
on a contract market." Id. Without addressing
preemption. the district court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims and dismissed them without
prejudice. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court's
dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See
Kaliski v. Bacot (In re Bank of .Y. Deriv.
Litig.), 320 F.3d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 2003). We
review the court's decision to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims for abuse of discretion. See Valencia
ex rel Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 304 (2d
Cir. 2003).
A. Standing under § 22 of the CEA
CEA § 22 enumerates the only circumstances
under which a private litigant may assert a
private right of action for violations of the
CEA. Section 22 includes two types of
claims. Section 22(a) relates to claims against
persons other than registered entities and
registered futures associations. 7 U.S.C. §
25(a). Section 22(b) deals with claims against
those entities and their officers directors,
governors, committee members and
employees. The text of the two subdivisions
requires that a putative plaintiff fall within
one of the four required relationships set forth
in § 22(a)(1)(A-D).
The common thread of these four
subdivisions is that they limit claims to those
of a plaintiff who actually traded in the
commodities market. Specifically, the
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remedies afforded by CEA § 22(b) are
available only to a private litigant "who
engaged in ... transaction[s] on or subject to
the rules of' a contract market. Id. § 25(b)(1)-
(3). The section contains another important
limitation. Subsection 22(b)(5) provides that
the private rights of action against the
exchanges enumerated in § 22(b) "shall be the
exclusive remedy . . . available to any person
who sustains a loss as a result of' a violation
of the CEA or an exchange rule by a contract
market or one of its officers or employees. Id.
§ 25(b)(5) (emphasis added).
Klein does not fall within any of the required
subdivisions of § 22(a)(1)(A)-(D). To fit
under one of the four, Klein must essentially
either have (1) received trading advice from
Eisler or First West for a fee; (2) traded
through Eisler or First West or deposited
money in connection with a trade; (3)
purchased from or sold to Eisler or First West
or placed an order for the purchase or sale
through them; or (4) engaged in certain
market manipulation activities in connection
with the purchase or sale of a commodity
contract.
Here, Klein was a FCM and a clearing
member of the NYCC that cleared First
West's trades through NYCC. Klein does not
contend that it purchased or sold P-Tech
contracts. Klein was not a trader of P-Tech
contracts; nor did it own the P-Tech contracts
at issue. To the contrary, Klein's complaint
admits that it had no financial interest in the
First West account and that all the trades in
question were unsolicited by First West.
Klein's losses were not the result of its
purchases or sales in the commodities market.
Klein functioned merely as a broker or agent
that earned commissions for handling its
customers trades. As a clearing member,
Klein cleared their trades and was obligated to
post margins for them as required. Under
NYCC Rules governing clearing members,
Klein was liable for its own failure to post the
required margin on its customers' positions,
whether or not Klein collected that margin
from defaulting customers such as First West.
In view of the provisions of sections 22(a)
and (b) expressly limiting the categories of
persons that can seek remedies under the
statute we conclude, as did the court below,
that a plaintiff such as Klein who falls outside
those categories lacks standing. See Water
Transp. Ass'n v. ICC, 722 F.2d 1025, 1028-29
& n. 2 (2d Cir. 1983). ...
Klein's main response to this reading of the
statute is that the remedies of § 22 are not
limited to those who actually traded and that
it has standing because, as the legislative
history demonstrates, Congress intended to
protect those such as itself who were injured
in the course of trading on a contract market.
According to Klein, the legislative history
shows that Congress's main concern in
drafting § 22 was to protect "market
participants" who suffered actual losses
arising from a transaction on the futures
market. Klein contends that Congress
intended the restrictions on standing to
prevent suits on speculative damages to assets
subj ect to price fluctuations on the
commodities markets but which are not the
subject of transactions. Affording standing to
a FCM, such as Klein, is consistent with these
purposes because a FCM that has experienced
catastrophic losses, that were caused by a
customer who had engaged in manipulation,
has suffered what Congress had in mind:
actual, non-speculative damages resulting
directly from transactions on a commodities
exchange.
This argument founders on the clear text of
the statute. Section 22(b)'s remedies are
expressly available only to a private litigant
who "engaged in any transaction on or subject
to the rules" of contract markets or other
registered entities. As noted, Klein was not an
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owner of P-Tech contracts traded by First
West. To the contrary, Klein was required by
NYCC Rules to keep the options in a
segregated First West account and not to co-
mingle assets. Klein did not fall within any of
-the categories enumerated in § 22(a)(1)(A-D).
Because we conclude the statute is clear, we
decline Klein's invitation to parse the
legislative history. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a); Lee
v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d
Cir. 1999)("It is axiomatic that the plain
meaning of a statute controls its interpretation
and that judicial review must end at the
statute's unambiguous terms." (internal
citations omitted)).
In the alternative, Klein contends that it has
standing under CEA to challenge the NYBOT
Defendants as a "forced" purchaser and seller
of securities. Klein contends that the Supreme
Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44
L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), after confirming that the
federal securities laws confer an implied
private right of action, granted standing under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 to
securities brokers as "forced" purchasers or
sellers, in situations where they, as clearing
members, suffered damages arising from
obligations to guarantee their customers'
trades. Klein argues that as a FCM and
clearing member. it was subject to federal
statutes as well as the rules and by-laws of
NYBOT, NYFE, and NYCC that required
Klein to maintain funds guaranteeing its
customers' transactions on the contract
market. In his brief on appeal, Klein asserts
that it assumed "a very real investment risk
that the commodity contracts its customers
traded would maintain or increase in value. a
risk that is identical to that taken by any
purchaser or seller of a commodity contract
who is granted standing under the CEA." In
sum, Klein argues that it has standing because
it faced essentially the same risks as a
purchaser or seller of commodities contracts.
We disagree.
It is undisputed that Klein was not a trader of
P-Tech contracts. Moreover, Klein did not
own the P-Tech contracts at issue. Rather,
First West, not Klein, traded in P-Tech
contracts. Indeed, as the district court
recognized, Klein stated in its complaint that
it had no financial interest in the First West
trading activity and had nothing to do with its
trading decisions. Consequently, regardless of
whether the First West trading position rose
or declined in value, Klein had no interest in
any of the resulting profits or investments
losses. As the district court observed, "Klein
suffered damages because of its customer
First West's inability to cover its margin call.
. . ." Klein, 2005 WL 427713, at *4. Thus,
Klein's loss was a credit loss, not a trading
loss.
Because § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) are
implied causes of action, their "boundaries are
left to judicial inference." Grace v.
Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 2000).
The securities laws discussed in Blue Chip
Stamps-§ 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934
and Rule 10(b)(5)-contain no corollary to
the express limitations on standing expressly
imposed by CEA § 22(b). Section 22 was
enacted as part of the Futures Trading Act of
1982 in response to Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 102 S.Ct. 1825. 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982).
where the Supreme Court recognized an
implied right of action under the CEA. In
response, Congress enacted CEA § 22 but
enumerated the only circumstances under
which a civil litigant could assert a private
right of action for a violation of the CEA or
CFTA regulations. See H.R.Rep. No. 565, Pt.
I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3906. Congress
went on to emphasize that the private right of
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action in CEA § 22 "shall be the exclusive
remedy . . . available to any person who
sustains a loss as a result of' a violation of the
CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(5). Enforcing the
statute that Congress wrote, we conclude
Klein lacks standing because it was not
"engaged in any transaction on or subject to
the rules" of a contract market and did not
suffer any "actual losses that resulted from
such transaction" as required by § 22 of the
CEA.
B. State Law Claims
After dismissing the claims under the CEA
for lack of standing, the district court
dismissed the supplemental state law claims
without prejudice. The NYBOT Defendants,
who had argued that the state law claims were
preempted by the CEA, cross-appeal on the
grounds that the district court should have
dismissed Klein's state law claims with
prejudice on preemption grounds. We review
this dismissal for abuse of discretion. See
Valencia, 316 F.3d at 304.
It is well settled that where, as here, the
federal claims are eliminated in the early
stages of litigation, courts should generally
decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
remaining state law claims. See Kolari v. New
York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122
(2d Cir. 2006)("'in the usual case in which all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,
the balance of factors . . . will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.'")(quoting
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill 484 U.S.
343, 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720
(1988)); Castellano v. Bd. of Trs., 937 F.2d
752. 758 (2d Cir. 1991). In deciding whether
to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental
state-law claims, district courts should
balance the values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity-the
"Cohill factors." See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350,
108 S.Ct. 614. The NYBOT Defendants
contend that the district court should have
retained jurisdiction to decide the important,
quintessentially federal question of whether
the state law claims are preempted by the
CEA. See Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d
658, 665 (2d Cir. 1988)( "One factor that may
sometimes favor retaining pendent
jurisdiction is when a state claim is closely
tied to questions of federal policy and where
the federal doctrine of preemption may be
implicated.").
Because the decision to retain jurisdiction is
discretionary and not a litigant's right, a court
is not required either to accept or decline
supplemental jurisdiction when a state law
claim raises federal preemption issues. See
Kolari, 455 F.3d at 122; Valencia, 316 F.3d at
305 ("In providing that a district court 'may'
decline to exercise such jurisdiction, [42
U.S.C. § 1367(c)] is permissive rather than
mandatory."); Baylis, 843 F.2d at 665
(concluding that the Cohill factors
outweighed the federal preemption factor, and
that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction). Following
consideration of the Cohill factors, the proper
course is left to the court's discretion. See,
e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d
39, 56 (2d Cir. 2004). Our concern, therefore,
is solely whether that discretion was abused
and we find it was not.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
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"Court to Consider Commodities
Futures Trading Question"
SCOTUS Blog
May 21, 2007
Kevin Russell
Today the Court granted cert. in Klein & Co.
Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of
New York, No. 06-1265, a case involving the
commodities futures trading market. In a prior
post, we discussed the petition as an example
of what practioners can do when their case
does not directly implicate a circuit split. The
now-granted petition poses the following
question : "Whether the court of appeals erred
in concluding that futures commission
merchants lack statutory standing to invoke
that right of action because, in the court's
view, they do not engage in such transactions,
despite the statutory requirement that the
merchants enter into and execute their
transactions on, and subject to the rules of, a
board of trade and the fact of the merchants'
financial liability for the transactions."
For those unfamiliar with commodities
futures markets, a little background may be
helpful. A commodities future is a contract to
sell a particular commodity (say, frozen
concentrated orange juice, as in the movie
"Trading Places") at a price set in the
contract. The seller of the contract becomes
obligated to provide the buyer with the
promised amount of the commodity at the
promised price on a set date in the future (say,
15,000 pounds of frozen concentrated orange
juice for $1,500 on July 1, 2007). Someone
who believes that the market price for frozen
concentrated orange juice will be $2,000 per
15.000 pounds might buy this hypothetical
futures contract for $250, since if the guess
about the future price turns out to be correct,
the contract will save the purchaser $500 off
the market price. Even people who don't
really want 15,000 pounds of frozen orange
juice might buy such a contract, because they
can then turn around and sell the money-
saving contract to someone who actually does
want it, and make a profit. The futures market
is thus a place where some people buy futures
contracts as a way of making money based on
their bets about the future prices of
commodities, and others buy contracts in
order to protect themselves against
fluctuations in the prices of commodities they
need to run their businesses.
Futures contracts are sold in commodity
exchanges, which are operated by a board of
trade such as the respondent in this case, the
Board of Trade of the City of New York.
Much like the stock market, actual trades on
the commodity exchanges are conducted
through intermediaries, in this case, a
commodity futures merchant. The merchant,
like a stock broker, takes orders from
customers and purchases or sells futures
contracts on its customers' behalf.
This whole process is governed by the rules
of the relevant board of trade, which is
required by the Commodities Exchange Act
to promulgate and enforce rules governing
exchanges on its market. The Act also
provides a cause of action for violations of the
Act, including suits against the boards
themselves for failing to enforce their rules.
Among other things, the boards enact rules
governing the sale of futures contracts "on
margin." As in the stock market, merchants
can allow customers to buy futures contracts
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while giving the merchant only a small
percentage of the full cost of the transaction.
If the market price changes too much during
the life of the contract, the customer may be
subject to a "margin call" and required to pay
the merchant more money in order to reduce
the risk that the customer will not have
enough money to pay any possible loss on the
contract when it becomes due. If the margin
call is not met, the merchant may immediately
liquidate the customer's holdings.
Whether or not a margin call is required is
determined by the daily "settlement price" for
the commodity. The settlement price
approximates the market price for that day
and is set by the board of trade. Because some
commodities are infrequently traded, it is not
always possible to simply look at the price for
the commodity in that day's trading in
calculating the settlement price. Accordingly,
some degree of judgment and expertise is
required, a process that is subject to
manipulation, which leads us to the facts of
this case.
The lawsuit in this case arose from the alleged
manipulation of the futures market process by
an official of the respondent Board of Trade
of the City of New York. According to the
plaintiffs, the chairman of one of the board's
divisions owned a company that had
purchased a lot of a specific futures contract
through petitioner Klein & Co. Futures, a
futures merchant on the Board of Trade of the
City of New York. It turns out that this was a
bad investment. When it looked like his
company was going to be required to come up
with substantial "margin call" payments or
risk having their contracts liquidated at a loss,
the chairman manipulated the daily settlement
price for the futures. This worked for a while,
but the scheme eventually fell apart, the
settlement price readjusted to accurately
reflect market conditions, and a $700,000
margin call was issued. The chairman's
company didn't have the money to make the
margin call, so Klein was forced to sell the
futures, at a huge loss which Klein was
required to absorb, leading to the collapse of
that company as well.
Klein subsequently brought suit against the
Board of Trade for failing to enforce its rules
that should have prevented the chairman from
manipulating the daily settlement price.
The issue before the Supreme Court is
whether the Commodities Exchange Act
permits a merchant (as opposed to its
customers) from suing a board of trade for
failing to enforce its rules. Section 25(b)(1) of
the Act provides that "a licensed board of
trade that fails to enforce any bylaw, rule,
regulation, or resolution that it is required to
enforce by the Commission, . . . by a person
who engaged in any transaction on or subject
to the rules of such registered entity to the
extent of such person's actual losses that
resulted from such transaction and were
caused by such failure to enforce or
enforcement of such bylaws, rules,
regulations, or resolutions." The court of
appeals held that merchants cannot sue under
this provision because they do not "engage[]
in any transaction" on the exchange; only
their customers do, the court concluded. Klein
contests this proposition. arguing that
merchants in fact engage directly in
exchanges in commodities markets on behalf
of their customers and that Congress intended
the Act to extend to both customers and their
brokers. The Board of Trade has argued that
Congress carefully worded the statute to limit
the scope of the private right of action in a
way that excludes merchants.
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"NYMEX Sues NYBOT Over
Handling of Firm's Woes"
The Wall Street Journal
May 18, 2000
Peter A. McKay
NEW YORK-The financial default of a
futures brokerage this week has now spurred
a lawsuit pitting this city's two major
commodity exchanges against one another.
The New York Mercantile Exchange and 15
of its members sued the New York Board of
Trade over NYBOT's handling of Klein &
Co. Futures Inc.'s drop below minimum
margin requirements.
The NYBOT, parent of both the New York
Cotton Exchange and the Coffee, Sugar &
Cocoa Exchange, shuttered its cotton and
orange-juice trading for two hours Tuesday
after announcing that Klein no longer had
the $2 million on deposit required to
guarantee the trades of floor members who
held accounts with the firm.
But NYMEX traders also held accounts at
Klein, and now that oil-and-metals exchange
is claiming the NYBOT knew of the
brokerage's problems earlier than it let on.
The NYMEX is also accusing its neighbor
of improperly using NYMEX members'
money to cover the loss of a NYBOT trader.
The lawsuit means Klein's woes have now
quickly turned what was a quiet rivalry into
a loud showdown between two markets
located just few minutes' walk apart on
either side of the World Trade Center's twin
towers.
"I think this takes a lot of nerve, given how
quickly and expeditiously we've handled
this situation," NYBOT President and Chief
Executive Officer Mark D. Fichtel said of
the lawsuit.
In its suit, [Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v.
Board of Trade of the City of New York,]
filed in U.S. district court in Manhattan,
NYMEX and its members seek a temporary
order forbidding the NYBOT to use
"innocent" Klein customer funds to satisfy
the debts of the unnamed trader whose
losses set off the turmoil.
Both sides agree those losses happened on
NYBOT's cotton-exchange division. But
when they took place, who knew first, and
what notification was given have become
contentious questions.
"We believe strongly in the sanctity of the
obligations of the clearing house to its
customers," NYMEX President R. Patrick
Thompson said, referring to NYBOT's
obligations. "That's the message we're
trying to send here."
Neither exchange had precisely calculated
the pivotal Klein account holder's losses,
although Mr. Thompson estimated them to
be about $6 million. He estimated that about
56 members on NYMEX's two divisions,
including the Comex market where the
nation's benchmark gold futures trade, had
accounts at Klein. He said most of the firm's
other 150 or so clients were at the NYBOT,
which is the country's major tropical-
commodity exchange.
An unidentified man who answered the
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phone at Klein refused to comment.
The NYBOT announced it would form a
fund to compensate innocent members of
both exchanges as soon as possible, a move
Mr. Fichtel said demonstrates how
unnecessary it was for NYMEX to file suit.
"We're just waiting on the accounting to
figure out who the innocent parties are and
how much each should receive,' Mr. Fichtel
said. "The irony is that we need to get the
accounting information from NYMEX."
Both he and Mr. Thompson agreed it isn't
uncommon for a clearing corporation to
have to use other customers' pooled money
to cover extreme losses by an individual
trader. But Mr. Thompson said the NYMEX
believes the NYBOT had sufficient advance
notice as a marketplace that both collects
trading information and has its own internal
clearing division. Using that information,
NYMEX's suit alleges that NYBOT and its
directors are acting in their own "self-
interest" instead of the interests of Klein's
account holders. . ..
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"Klein Sues NYBOT for $100 Million, Blaming
Exchange for Firm's Collapse"
The Wall Street Journal
July 31, 2000
Peter A. McKay and Enza Tedesco
NEW YORK-A famous never-say-die New
Yorker once said it ain't over until it's over.
And for the New York Board of Trade these
days, it never seems to be over.
"It," in this case, is the fallout from the May
collapse of a NYBOT trade-processing firm,
Klein & Co.
Early last week, NYBOT settled a lawsuit
with the neighboring New York Mercantile
Exchange to ensure that NYMEX members
who also were Klein account holders would
be reimbursed fully.
But now Klein itself has checked in with a
$100 million lawsuit of its own against the
NYBOT, blaming the exchange and its
executives for Klein's collapse.
According to the suit[, Klein & Co. Futures
v. Board of Trade of the Cty of New York],
filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan,
Klein's losses originated with a NYBOT
division chairman who had maintained
artificially low margins with Klein, partly by
helping to falsify market quotations.
When those quotes were corrected, it led to a
catastrophic margin call that shut Klein down
and halted some NYBOT trading pits-but
only after what the brokerage firm describes
in the suit as a lackadaisical crisis response by
exchange senior management.
Fundamentally, the accusations are similar to
the ones that NYMEX levied, but with the
bite of increased detail. Klein has essentially
lent names. dates and dollar totals to the
perception that NYBOT was truly to blame.
"The acts and omissions of the defendants
consisted of a complete failure of market
surveillance, failure in bad faith to take
required action, a complete failure to maintain
an orderly market, and bad-faith attempts to
support a collapsed, illiquid, contrived,
marketplace," Klein says in the lawsuit filed
by attorney Mark J. Alonso.
A spokesman for the NYBOT, which owns
the Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange and the
New York Cotton Exchange, declined to
comment on the complaint.
Mr. Alonso said in an interview that Klein is
seeking $75 million in punitive damages and
$25 million in compensation from NYBOT.
He couldn't estimate how long the suit could
take to play out.
At the heart of Klein's accusations is Norman
Eisler, a former customer who served as
chairman of the New York Futures Exchange
division of the cotton exchange.
According to the lawsuit, Mr. Eisler and
members of a committee responsible for
posting daily settlement prices kept those
quotes artificially low for contracts on the
Pacific Exchange's technology index in the
days leading into the default.
Mr. Eisler couldn't be reached for comment
last week.
Klein officials claim in the suit that they
contacted NYBOT Executive Vice President
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Joseph O'Neill about the "P-tech'" index's
trading problems and the likelihood that Mr.
Eisler's firm wouldn't be able to meet coming
margin calls.
"Despite Klein's request and in spite of the
pending circumstances, no one at NYBOT ...
requested that the NYFE board convene to
review the circumstances," the suit says.
At that point, though, Mr. Eisler ceased to
participate in calculating the "P-tech's"
settlement, and it was finally corrected on
May 15, the lawsuit adds.
That, however, also triggered a recalculation
of Mr. Eisler's margin requirements at Klein,
leaving his firm $4.5 million in debt the same
day, according to the suit. Klein, which. as a
clearer, guarantees the viability of its clients'
trades, then had to use $2.65 million of its
own funds to cover the deficit, leaving it
below the exchange's $2 million margin
requirement.
On May 16, the NYBOT publicly announced
Klein's meltdown. The exchange also shut
down trading on the entire cotton exchange
division while Klein's other clients scrambled
to find other clearing members to take their
accounts....
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Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Assn.
(06-457)
Ruling Below: (Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n., 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006),
cert. granted, _ S.Ct. _, 2007 WL 1802122 (U.S.), 75 USLW 3694, 75 USLW 3689).
The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA") states that "a State
may not enact or enforce a law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier," or of
any air carrier, with respect to the transportation of property. 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c)(1) &
41713(b)(4)(A). The FAAAA, and these sections in particular, were intended to create uniform
regulations across states by preempting any state law. In the current case, Maine's Tobacco
Delivery Law was created in response to increasing tobacco sales over the internet, which can be
shipped through the mail or by commercial carriers. Maine's law is an attempt to make sure that
tobacco is not sold to minors over the internet. The First Circuit ruled that the FAAAA
preempted Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law to the extent that the Maine law determined how a
carrier must deliver packages with tobacco.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of
1994 ("FAAAA"), 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1) and 41713(b)(4)(A), preempts states from exercising
their historic public health police powers to regulate carriers that deliver contraband such as
tobacco and other dangerous substances to children; (2) Whether the FAAAA preempts states
from exercising their historic public health police powers to require shippers of contraband such
as tobacco and other dangerous substances to utilize a carrier that provides age verification and
signature services to ensure that such substances are not delivered to children.
NEW HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSPORT ASS'N
Plaintiffs, Appellees
V.
G. Stephen ROWE, as Attorney General for the State of Maine
Defendant, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
Decided May 19, 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. products purchased via the internet or other
electronic means. Several trade associations,
In 2003, Maine enacted a law to restrict and representing air and motor carriers of
regulate the sale and delivery of tobacco property, brought this action against the
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Maine Attorney General alleging that certain
provisions of this law are preempted by the
Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The
district court granted summary judgment for
the associations and enjoined Maine's
Attorney General from enforcing the law.
We affirm in all respects but one.
I.
A. The FAAAA
There are two FAAAA preemption
provisions at issue in this case. See Pub. L.
No. 103-305, § 601; 108 Stat. 1569. The
first provides that a "State . . . may not enact
or enforce a law . . related to a price, route,
or service of any motor carrier . . . with
respect to the transportation of property." 49
U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The second states that
a "State may not enact or enforce a law ...
related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier or carrier affiliated with a direct air
carrier through common controlling
ownership when such carrier is transporting
property by aircraft or by motor
vehicle. . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A).
These provisions combine to bar states
(subject to certain exceptions discussed
later) from enacting laws related to prices,
routes. or services of air or motor carriers of
property. They are "intended to function in
the exact same manner with respect to
[their] preemptive effects." H.R. Conf. Rep.
103-677 at 85, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1757.
B. The Maine Tobacco Delivery Law
In 2003, the Maine Legislature adopted "An
Act to Regulate the Sale of Tobacco
Products and to Prevent the Sale of
Cigarettes to Minors." See L.D. 1236 (121st
Maine Leg.)(codified at 22 M.R.S.A. §§
1551, 1555-C & 1555-D)(Tobacco Delivery
Law). The Tobacco Delivery Law was
prompted by the recent increase in internet
tobacco sales which are consummated by
direct delivery to consumers through the
mail or by commercial carriers. See
Testimony of Representative Glen
Cummings Before the Joint Standing
Committee on Health & Human Services
(Apr. 29, 2003). This phenomenon has
complicated Maine's efforts to regulate "the
sale of tobacco products to minors" and
caused it to lose "tremendous tax revenues
as a result of tax free sales by unlicensed
companies." Id. The associations persuaded
the district court that §§ 1555-C(3)(C) &
1555-D are preempted by the FAAAA.
1. § 1555-C(3)(C)
Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law permits a
licensed tobacco retailer to sell tobacco
products directly to consumers via the
internet or other electronic means so long as
the retailer takes specified steps to ensure
that sales are not made to minors. See id. §§
1555-C(2) & (3). One such step requires the
retailer to use a carrier that will ensure that:
(1) the purchaser of the tobacco products is
the same person as the addressee of the
package; (2) the addressee is of legal age to
purchase tobacco products and sign for the
package; and (3) if the addressee is under 27
years of age, that she show a valid
government-issued identification verifying
that she is old enough to purchase tobacco
products. Id. § 1555-C(3)(C). Penalties are
imposed only against the retailer for
violations of this provision. See id. §§ 1555-
C(3)(E)&(F).
2. § 1555-D
Section 1555-D makes it illegal for any
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person to knowingly deliver tobacco
products to a Maine consumer if the
products were purchased from an unlicensed
retailer. The section also states that a person
delivering a package "is deemed to know"
that the package contains tobacco products if
it (1) so indicates on any side other than the
side directly opposite the label, see Code of
Me. R. ch. 203, § 11, or (2) was shipped by
a person listed by the Attorney General as an
unlicensed tobacco retailer.
C. The Effect of the Tobacco Delivery Law
on United Parcel Service (UPS)
As discussed in further detail below, one
way for the associations to prove that the
challenged provisions of the Tobacco
Delivery Law are preempted by the FAAAA
is to demonstrate that they have a forbidden
significant effect on carrier services. See
infra at 25. The associations have attempted
to make this showing by highlighting the
effect of the challenged provisions on UPS.
a motor/air carrier of property operating in
Maine.
UPS, which delivers approximately 65,000
packages per day in Maine, offers door-to-
door delivery service of packages and
delivery of packages on an express basis. Its
delivery operations function as an integrated
system, requiring extensive planning and
coordination among its operating facilities
and ground and air fleet. Delays and
disruptions in the sorting and delivery of
packages can affect the timely delivery of
thousands of packages within the UPS
system.
Prior to the enactment of § 1555-C(3)(C),
UPS did not require that its drivers deliver a
package only to the addressee, and it did not
require a signature from the recipient of the
package unless the shipper paid a premium
for this additional service. UPS determined
that it would not be feasible to alter its
delivery operations to provide these new
services in Maine, so it stopped delivering
all tobacco products to Maine consumers.
To make deliveries of tobacco products to
licensed retailers and distributors in Maine
as permitted by § 1555-D, UPS now has
modified its uniform package delivery
procedures to identify packages that contain
tobacco products. UPS requires that its pre-
loaders in Maine (the employees who place
the packages on the trucks for delivery)
specially examine each package to
determine if it is marked as containing
tobacco or if the name of the addressee or
shipper indicates that the package likely
contains tobacco. Packages identified as
likely containing tobacco products are then
segregated so that UPS employees can
research whether the package is destined for
a licensed tobacco retailer or distributor. If
UPS determines that the addressee is not a
licensed tobacco retailer or distributor. it
arranges to return the package to the shipper
or otherwise to dispose of the package.
D. The District Court Decision
Proceeding from the premise that the
FAAAA preempts a state law if it "expressly
references" a carrier's prices, routes, or
services or has a "forbidden significant
effect" on the same, the district court
concluded that the challenged provisions of
the Tobacco Delivery Law are preempted by
the FAAAA. See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass 'n
v. Rowe, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197, 210 (D. Me.
2005)(citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v
Flores-Galarza. 318 F.3d 323, 334-35 (1st
Cir. 2003)(UPS I )). The court determined
that, while § 1555-C(3)(C) did not expressly
reference carrier services because that
section is directed only at retailers of
tobacco products, it has a forbidden
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significant effect on UPS because, for the
carrier to accept packages containing
tobacco for delivery in Maine, it would have
to adopt procedures that would "alter [its]
delivery practices" for these packages. Id. at
216.
The court also ruled that § 1555-D both
expressly references and has a forbidden
significant effect on carrier services. It
concluded that the provision expressly
references services because it prohibits
carriers from delivering a certain class of
tobacco products, i.e., tobacco products
purchased by Maine consumers from
unlicensed retailers. See id. at 211-12. It also
concluded that the provision also has a
forbidden significant effect because it forced
UPS to depart from "its nationally uniform
procedure" by inspecting each package to
identify the contents. Id. at 212. The
Attorney General timely appealed from this
ruling.
II.
A. Jurisdiction
Before reaching the merits of the Attorney
General's appeal, we consider two threshold
jurisdictional issues. The Attorney General
asserts that the associations lack standing
and that the action is moot in light of events
occurring subsequent to the noticing of the
appeal.
1. Standing
The associations invoke the representational
standing doctrine recognized by the
Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Adier. Comm 'n. 432 U.S. 333, 343.
97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977).
Under this doctrine, "an association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when: (a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of
individualized members in the lawsuit." Id.
The Attorney General focuses his argument
on the third Hunt factor. He contends that
evidence concerning the effect that the
challenged provisions of the Tobacco
Delivery Law have on UPS suffices only to
justify preemption of the challenged
provisions as to UPS. Preemption against
other carriers should occur only to the extent
that the other carriers individually prove that
the challenged provisions have a forbidden
significant effect on their prices, routes, or
services.
The district court rejected this argument,
observing that "[a]ssociational standing
is . . . granted in casesg seeking injunctive
relief rather than damages, because
individualized proof is not necessary and the
relief usually inures to the benefit of all
members injured." N.H. Motor Transp.
Ass'n v. Rowe, 324 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236 (D.
Me. 2004). Because the associations only
sought an injunction and a declaratory
judgment against the challenged provisions,
the court ruled that the third Hunt factor was
satisfied. See id. at 236 (citing Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of P.R.,
906 F.2d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 1990)).
After the district court issued this ruling, we
clarified the requirements for establishing
the third Hunt factor. In so doing, we
acknowledged that "there is no well
developed test in this circuit as to how the
third prong of the Hunt test . . . applies in
cases where injunctive relief is sought."
Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Ass 'n v. Rowe,
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429 F.3d 294, 313-14 (1st Cir. 2005). But
we did not embrace the proposition that,
under Playboy Enters. the third Hunt factor
is always satisfied where an association
seeks injunctive relief on behalf of all of its
members. See Rowe, 429 F.3d at 314
("Playboy is not an open door for
association standing in all injunction cases
where member circumstances differ and
proof of them is important."). We concluded
that representational standing is
inappropriate if adjudicating the merits of an
association's claim requires the court to
engage in a "fact-intensive-individual
inquiry." Id. (quoting Penn. Psychiatric Soc.
v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280
F.3d 278, 287 (3d Cir. 2002)). We therefore
turn to whether the associations' preemption
claim requires a sufficiently fact-intensive
inquiry to preclude representational
standing.
The FAAAA provides that a state law is
preempted if it relates to the prices, routes,
or services of "any motor carrier" or "an air
carrier." 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c) &
41713(b)(4)(A) (emphases supplied). "Any"
means "one . . . of whatever kind," and "an"
means "one." Merriam Webster 's
Collegiate Dictionary at 40, 53 (10th ed.
2001). The language of the FAAAA
accordingly suggests that, if a state law is
preempted as to one carrier, it is preempted
as to all carriers. See N.H. Motor Transp.
Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 219. Such a
reading accords with one of the FAAAA's
central purposes: to establish a "level
playing field" among carriers. H.R. Conf.
Rep. 103-677 at 85, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1757; see Californians for
Safe Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca. 152
F.3d 1184. 1187 (9th Cir. 1998). If
preemption were judged on a carrier-specific
basis, the result would be a "patchwork" of
state laws applying to some carriers and not
to others, depending on which carriers
proceeded to litigation. H.R. Conf. Rep.
103-677 at 87 reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1759. Such a result would
undermine Congress' goal of encouraging
uniformity in carrier regulation. Thus, the
associations can prevail by establishing that
the challenged provisions of the Tobacco
Delivery Law have a forbidden significant
effect on one carrier. The district court
correctly ruled that the associations have
standing to press their preemption claim.
See Rowe, 429 F.3d at 314.
2. Mootness
After the district court granted summary
judgment, UPS settled an enforcement
action brought by the New York Attorney
General under a New York law restricting
the ability of carriers to deliver cigarettes to
consumers. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law §
1399 11(2) (McKinney 2001). In that
settlement, UPS promised to stop "shipping
cigarettes to individual consumers in the
United States while still penmitting lawful
shipments of cigarettes to licensed tobacco
businesses." To fulfill this promise, UPS
agreed (1) to identify all shippers that may
be cigarette retailers and advise them that
UPS will not accept cigarettes for delivery
to consumers; (2) to discipline shippers that
violate UPS's non-delivery policy; (3) to
impose measures to ensure that employees
"actively" look for indications that a
package contains cigarettes; and (4) to
instruct drivers not to deliver cigarette
packages to consumers.
The Attorney General argues that, as a result
of the settlement, this appeal has become
moot, the judgment should be vacated and
the case should be dismissed. See Duke
Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S.
259, 267, 57 S. Ct. 202, 81 L. Ed. 178
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(1936)(stating that where a case becomes
moot while on appeal, the appellate court
must set aside the judgment and remand the
case with instructions that it be dismissed).
He contends that, by agreeing not to deliver
cigarettes directly to consumers throughout
the United States and directing employees
actively to look for cigarettes, UPS is no
longer affected by the Tobacco Delivery
Law.
Article III considerations require that an
actual case or controversy exist between the
parties throughout the course of litigation.
See Ramirez v. Sanchez Ramos, 438 F.3d
92. 100 (1st Cir. 2006). A case must be
dismissed as moot "if. at some time after the
institution of the action, the parties no longer
have a legally cognizable stake in the
outcome." Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc., 436 F.3d
44, 46 (1st Cir. 2006). This rule applies even
where the case becomes moot while pending
on appeal. See Great Western Sugar Co. v.
Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 93, 99 S. Ct. 2149, 60
L. Ed. 2d 735 (1979)(per curiam). But "[t]he
burden of establishing mootness rests
squarely on the party raising it, and the
burden is a heavy one." Mangual v. Rotger-
Sabat. 317 F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). To establish mootness,
the party raising it must show that the court
cannot grant any "effectual relief whatever"
to its opponent. Church of Scientology of
Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9. 12, 113 S.
Ct. 447. 121 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1992).
The Attorney General has not met this heavy
burden. The New York settlement
agreement applies only to the delivery of
cigarettes, but the Tobacco Delivery Law
applies to "any form of tobacco and any
material or device used in the smoking,
chewing or other form of tobacco
consumption." 22 M.R.S.A. § 1551-3. UPS
could therefore adhere to the terms of the
settlement agreement and nevertheless
violate the Tobacco Delivery Law by
unlawfully delivering non-cigarette tobacco
products. Because enjoining the challenged
provisions would permit UPS to deliver all
tobacco products, effectual relief remains
available.
B. Preemption
We turn now to the merits of the district
court's preemption ruling. We review the
ruling de novo, considering the record and
all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the Attorney General. See
Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 698
(1st Cir. 1999). We may affirm on any
ground revealed by the record. See Houlton
Citizens' Coalition v. Houlton, 175 F.3d
178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1999).
The Attorney General presents two
arguments for reversal. First, he contends
that the FAAAA does not preempt state laws
enacted pursuant to a state's police power to
protect the health and welfare of its citizens.
The Attorney General asserts that the
FAAAA preempts only state laws that
impose traditional economic regulation on
carriers-e.g. entry and commodity controls,
tariff filing requirements, and price ceilings.
Because the Tobacco Delivery Law does not
impose such traditional economic
restrictions, the Attorney General argues that
the FAAAA does not apply. Alternatively,
the Attorney General contends that, even if
the Act applies, neither challenged provision
is "related to" carrier services within the
meaning of the FAAAA.
1. Applicability of the FAAAA to a State's
Police-Power Enactments
A fundamental tenet of our federalist system
is that constitutionally enacted federal law is
supreme to state law. See U.S. Const. Art.
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VI. cl. 2. As a result, federal law sometimes
preempts state law either expressly or by
implication. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S. Ct.
2374, 120 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1992). "Express
preemption occurs when Congress has
unmistakably . . . ordained that its
enactments alone are to regulate a subject
and state laws regulating that subject must
fall." Mass. Ass'n of Health Maintenance
Organizations v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176,
179 (1st Cir. 1999)(citation omitted). In
every preemption case, "the purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone."
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485,
116 S. Ct. 2240, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1996).
The primary focus is on the "plain wording"
of the statute because the text "contains the
best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive
intent." Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537
U.S. 51, 62, 123 S. Ct. 518, 154 L. Ed. 2d
466 (2002). But "[a]lso relevant is the
structure and purpose of the statute as a
whole as revealed . . . through the reviewing
court's reasoned understanding of the way in
which Congress intended the statute and its
surrounding regulatory scheme to affect
business, consumers and the law."
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
We begin with the text. As mentioned
above, the FAAAA prohibits states from
enacting laws "related to a price, route. or
service" of a carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)
& 41713(b)(4)(A). This language was
patterned after the preemption provision of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. See
H.R. Conf. Rep. 103-677 at 85. reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1757, 1759; Mendonca.
152 F.3d at 1184: Desardouin v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc.. 285 F. Supp. 2d 153. 162
(D. Conn. 2003). Therefore. in addition to
cases interpreting the FAAAA. we look to
cases interpreting the Airline Deregulation
Act. UPS I, 318 F.3d at 335-36; Mastercraft
Interiors, Ltd. v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 284
F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (D. Md. 2003).
The seminal case is Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S. Ct. 2031,
119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992). Like the FAAAA,
the version of the Airline Deregulation Act
considered in Morales preempted state laws
"relating to rates, routes or services of any
air carrier." The Court identified "relating
to" as the key phrase in determining the
breadth of the preemption provision and
concluded that the "words . . . express a
broad pre-emptive purpose." Id. at 383. It
relied on several cases in which the Court
had interpreted a similarly-worded provision
of the Employment Retirement Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) preempting all state laws
that "relate to" an employee benefit plan. Id.
at 384. The Morales Court emphasized that
this language had an "expansive sweep" and
that it was "conspicuous for its breadth." Id.
In light of Congress' use of similarly broad
language, the Court concluded that Congress
intended the Airline Deregulation Act to
preempt any state law that has "a connection
with or reference to airline rates. routes, or
services." Id.
The FAAAA's drafters were familiar with
Morales and approved of its reasoning. The
Conference Committee Report explains that
"the conferees [did] not intend to alter the
broad preemption interpretation adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in
Morales. . . ." H.R. Conf. Rep. 103-677 at
83. reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1755.
The sweep of the FAAAA's text and the
drafters' expressed intent to use Morales as
a roadmap are strong evidence that the
FAAK4 was not intended to preempt only a
narrow class of economic regulations while
excluding the many laws enacted by the
states under their police powers. If Congress
had such a limited purpose in mind, it likely
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would have employed narrower language in
fashioning the FAAAA preemption
provisions. Cf Botz v. Omni Air Int'l. 286
F.3d 488. 493-94 (8th Cir. 2002)("Although
Congress could easily have selected more
restrictive terminology to describ& the type
of . . . enactment the [Airline *Deregulation
Act] pre-empts, the provision as written is
without language that would produce a more
limited pre-emptive effect.").
The Attorney General argues that we should
disregard Morales because, post-Morales,
the Supreme Court has narrowed its
understanding of ERISA's "relat[ing] to"
language. We previously rejected this
identical argument:
The Secretary argues that the
broad preemption standard
adopted in Morales has been
overruled by a number of Supreme
Court cases narrowing the
preemptive effect of [ERISA].
While the Morales Court
undoubtedly took its interpretive
cues from the ERISA preemption
jurisprudence then in existence. it
does not follow that any change in
the ERISA law necessitates a
parallel change in the law
affecting . . . carriers. As Judge
Easterbrook has put it: "[I]f
developments in pension law have
under-cut holdings in air-
transportation law, it is for the
Supreme Court itself to make the
adjustments. Our marching orders
are clear: follow decisions until
the Supreme Court overrules
them."
UPS I, 318 F.3d at 335 n.19 (quoting United
Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219
F.3d 605. 608 (7th Cir. 2000)). Absent
extraordinary circumstances not present
here, we are not at liberty to disregard this
ruling. See United States v. Wogan. 938
F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir. 1991) ("We have
held, time and again, that in a multi-panel
circuit, prior panel decisions are binding
upon newly constituted panels in the
absence of supervening authority sufficient
to warrant disregard of established
precedent.").
We look also to the FAAAA's structure and
legislative history. The FAAAA includes a
series of exceptions to the general
preemption rule. The excepted areas are:
the safety regulatory authority of a
State with respect to motor
vehicles, the authority of a State to
impose highway route controls or
limitations based on the size or
weight of the motor vehicle or the
hazardous nature of the cargo, or
the authority of a State to regulate
motor carriers with regard to
minimum amounts of financial
responsibility relating to insurance
requirements and self-insurance
authorization.
49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c)(2) &
41713(b)(4)(B)(i). The Attorney General
acknowledges that the challenged provisions
of the Tobacco Delivery Law do not fall
within any of these exceptions. He contends,
however, that these statutory exceptions
suggest broader congressional purpose to
permit states to regulate carriers to protect
citizen health and safety. The Attorney
General points to a passage from the
FAAAA's legislative history indicating that
the enumerated exceptions were "not
intended to be all inclusive," H.R. Conf.
Rep. 103-677 at 84. reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1756, to argue that we may
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establish an additional exception to FAAAA
preemption for laws enacted pursuant to a
state's police power to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens.
We have cautioned that an overly broad
interpretation of the FAAAA exceptions
"would swallow the rule of preemption."
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza,
385 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2004)(UPS II). An
exclusion from preemption for police-power
enactments would surely "swallow the rule
of preemption," as most state laws are
enacted pursuant to this authority. Id. The
exceptions preserving the states' authority to
regulate motor vehicles do not support the
Attorney General's argument. See id.
(rejecting an argument that the FAAAA
preemption exceptions indicate a
congressional intent to preserve state
authority over safety issues generally).
While the statute's structure does not
support the Attorney General's police-power
argument, there is some support in the
legislative history for his view that the
FAAAA preempts only state economic
regulation. The Conference Committee
Report observed that "[s]tate economic
regulation of motor carriers . . . is a huge
problem for national and regional carriers
attempting to conduct a standard way of
doing business." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-
677 at 85. reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1757. The conferees identified "typical
forms" of harmful regulation to include
"entry controls, tariff filing, price
regulation," and regulation of the "types of
commodities carried." Id. at 1758. This
history led the Supreme Court to remark that
"the problem to which the [FAAAA]
congressional conferees attended was state
economic regulation." Colunbus v. Ours
Garage & Wrecker Serv.. 536 U.S. 424,
440, 122 S. Ct. 2226, 153 L. Ed. 2d 430
(2002). This history, however, does not
indicate that preempting economic
regulation was the FAAAA's only purpose.
And, in any event, the legislative history
cannot trump the statute's text. See
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 521, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407
(1992)(declining to adopt a limited
interpretation of a preemption provision
suggested by legislative history because "the
language of the [cigarette labeling] Act
plainly reaches" further); Morales, 504 U.S.
at 385 n.2 (The "legislative history need not
confirm the details of changes in the law
effected by statutory language before we
will interpret that language according to its
natural meaning."). Congress often acts to
address a specific problem but ultimately
settles on a broader remedy. See Penn. Dep't
of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213. 118
S. Ct. 1952, 141 L. Ed. 2d 215
(1998)("[T]he fact that a statute can be
applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.").
In addition, the legislative history reveals a
second goal for FAAAA preemption which
is inconsistent with the Attorney's General
argument: "to create a completely level
playing field between air carriers . . on the
one hand and motor carriers on the other."
H.R. Conf. Rep. 103-677 at 85. reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1757. In other words,
the conferees intended the scope of FAAAA
and Airline Deregulation Act preemption to
be coterminous. See Ace Auto Body &
Towing Ltd. v. City of New York, 171 F.3d
765. 772 (2d Cir. 1999); Mendonca, 152
F.3d at 1187.
In the Airline Deregulation Act context, the
Supreme Court has focused on the effect
that a state law has on carrier operations, not
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on the state's purpose for enacting the law.
In Morales, the Court found that the Airline
Deregulation Act preempted a directive
promulgated by several state attorneys
general informing airlines that certain
advertising practices would be considered to
violate state consumer-protection laws. 504
U.S. at 379. And, in American Airlines, Inc.
v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219. 227-28, 115 S. Ct.
817, 130 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1995), the Court
held that the Airline Deregulation Act
preempted a cause of action under the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act concerning the
redemption of frequent-flier miles. In both
cases, the Court's preemption analysis
centered on the impact that the challenged
state laws had on airline services and rates
and not on the fact that the preempted laws
were enacted pursuant to the states' police
power to combat consumer fraud. See Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132. 150, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248
(1973)(describing the traditional state
authority to pass laws to combat consumer
fraud). The Court reached these conclusions
over dissents by Justice Stevens arguing
(similarly to the Attorney General here) that
the state laws at issue should not be
preempted because there was insufficient
evidence of congressional intent to preempt
state police-power enactments. See Am.
Airlines, 513 U.S. at 235-31 (Steven, J.
dissenting in part); Morales, 504 U.S. at
419-27 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
Morales and American Airlines thus teach
that, under the Airline Deregulation Act, the
focus should be on the effect that the state
law has on airline operations. Accepting the
Attorney General's argument would shift the
analysis under the FAAAA away from that
state law's effect and towards the state's
pwpose for enacting the law. A purpose-
related limitation on FAAAA preemption
would thus inevitably create a gap between
the scope of FAAAA and Airline
Deregulation Act preemption-a gap which
the FAAAA drafters sought to avoid.
In the end, the Attorney General's argument
founders because it cannot be reconciled
with the FAAAA's text. The Act's drafters
chose to express the preemptive scope of the
FAAAA in words that they understood to be
exceedingly broad. In the preemption
context, we are to give effect to the ordinary
meaning of a congressional enactment
"unless there is good reason to believe that
Congress intended the language to have
some more restrictive meaning." Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 521. We do not find a
sufficiently compelling basis in either the
structure or history of the FAAAA to
interpret the Act contrary to its "deliberately
expansive text." Morales, 504 U.S. at 384.
We therefore conclude that the FAAAA
preempts state police-power enactments to
the extent that they are "related to" a
carrier's prices. routes, or services.
2. FAAAA Preemption of the Tobacco
Delivery Law
We turn now to whether the challenged
provisions of the Tobacco Delivery Law are
preempted because they are "related to"
carrier services. The parties do not contest
that carriers provide the service of delivering
"packages on an express or time-guaranteed
basis." See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 377
F. Supp. 2d at 209 (quoting UPS I. 318 F.3d
at 336). But they disagree over whether the
challenged provisions are "related to" this
service.
We have previously interpreted the phrase
"related to" as used in the FAAAA:
The phrase "related to" has a
broad meaning in ordinary usage:
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to stand in some relation; to have
bearing or concern; to pertain;
refer; to bring in association or
connection with. When used in a
preemption provision, such as [in
the FAAAA], it has a similarly
broad reach. State laws and
regulations having a connection
with or reference to a . . . carrier's
... services are preempted under
the [FAAAA]. A sufficient nexus
exists if the law expressly
references the . . . carriers' .
services or has a forbidden
significant effect on the same.
UPS 1, 318 F.3d at 335. We therefore
consider whether the district court correctly
concluded that the challenged provisions of
the Tobacco Delivery Law either expressly
reference carrier services or have a
forbidden significant effect on UPS'
services.
We begin with § 1555-C(3)(C). As set forth
above, this statute requires tobacco retailers
seeking to ship tobacco products directly to
Maine consumers to use only carriers that
deliver the package directly to the
addressee/purchaser, require a signature
from the addressee/purchaser, and conduct
age verification if the addressee/purchaser is
under 27 years of age. Another section
penalizes retailers that use carriers that do
not provide these services. 22 M.R.S.A. §§
1 555-C(3 )(E)&(F).
Section 1555-C(3)(C) expressly references a
carrier's service of providing the timely
delivery of packages. The statute prescribes
the method by which a carrier operating in
Maine must deliver packages containing
tobacco products in a way that would affect
the ability of the carrier to meet package-
delivery deadlines. Delays in searching for
the purchaser, making multiple delivery
attempts if the purchaser cannot be located,
obtaining the purchaser's signature, and
verifying the purchaser's age all could affect
timely deliveries. See UPS 1, 318 F.3d at
336 (finding that the FAAAA preempted a
state law that "affect[ed] the timeliness and
effectiveness" of a carrier's service).
The Attorney General responds that there is
no FAAAA preemption because § 1555-
C(3)(C) regulates retailers of tobacco
products and not carriers. He also argues
that we should decline to find preemption
because any carrier can avoid the
requirements of § 1555-C(3)(C) by
declining to provide tobacco-product
deliveries to Maine consumers.
The Attorney General's first argument
amounts to a claim that there can be no
FAAAA preemption unless the state law
imposes a direct regulation on carriers. This
argument cannot be squared with the
FAAAA's text because it reads the broad
phrase "related to" out of the statute and
replaces it with the narrower term
"regulates." See Morales, 504 U.S. at 385
(rejecting an argument that would have read
''relating to" out of the Airline Deregulation
Act and replaced it with "regulate"); UPS I,
318 F.3d at 335 (rejecting an argument for
narrowing scope of the FAAAA that "would
read 'the related to language' out of the
statute").
Moreover. limiting preemption to direct
regulation of carriers is inconsistent with the
FAAAA's purpose to bar states from
policing carrier operations. See Am. Airlines,
513 U.S. at 228. A state may use its coercive
power to cause carriers to conform to state-
imposed rules in at least two ways: it may
directly regulate carriers or it may limit
retailers to hiring only those carriers that
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comply with the state-imposed mandates.
Either way the state is employing its
coercive power to police the method by
which carriers provide services in the state.
In short, the Attorney General's argument
would lead to the untenable result of
permitting states to regulate carrier services
indirectly by regulating shippers. Cf
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S.
203, 230, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844
(1963)(declining to adopt an interpretation
that would permit states to do indirectly
what they cannot do directly).
The Attorney General's alternative
argument-that there is no preemption
because a carrier can forgo certain tobacco-
product deliveries in Maine-also fails.
Declining to find preemption simply
because a carrier can limit its in-state
business to avoid a particular requirement
would undermine the FAAAA's goal of
creating an environment in which "[s]ervice
options will be dictated by the marketplace,"
and not by state regulatory regimes. H.R.
Conf. Rep. 103-677 at 88, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1760. The district court
correctly concluded that the FAAAA
preempts § 1555-C(3)(C).
We turn finally to whether the FAAAA
preempts § 1555-D. In considering this
question. we are mindful that courts should
"not nullify more of a legislature's work
than is necessary, for . . . a ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of
the elected representative of the people."
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
England, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967, 163 L. Ed. 2d
812 (2006)(internal citation omitted). The
first part of § 1555-D makes it unlawful for
any person knowingly to deliver to Maine
consumers certain contraband tobacco
products-i.e., those tobacco products
purchased by consumers from unlicensed
retailers. The second part of § 1555-D
charges a carrier with knowledge that a
package contains tobacco products if the
package is so marked or if the shipper
appears on the Attorney General's lisr of
unlicensed tobacco retailers.
Under Maine law, tobacco products
purchased by a consumer from an
unlicensed retailer are contraband. See 22
M.R.S.A. § 1555-C(7). The first part of §
1555-D is a corollary to § 1555-C(7) in that
it makes the knowing delivery of contraband
tobacco products illegal. Thus, the question
we face is whether a generally applicable
law barring any person from knowingly
delivering contraband tobacco is preempted
by the FAAAA insofar as the law pertains to
carriers.
While the FAAAA's preemptive effect is
broad, see UPS I, 318 F.3d at 335, it is not
unlimited, see Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1188.
State laws that only have a "tenuous,
remote, or peripheral" relation to services
are beyond the FAAAA's reach. Morales,
504 U.S. at 390; Mendonca, 152 F.3d at
1188. In describing this limitation on
preemption in the Airline Deregulation Act
context, the Supreme Court explained that
its broad interpretation of the statute's
preemption provision did not place it "on a
road that leads to pre-emption of gambling
and prostitution as applied to airlines."
Morales, 504 U.S. at 390. We understand
the Morales Court to have meant that states
may continue to enjoy the power to ban
primary conduct. and that the ADA and
FAAAA do not preempt laws applying these
prohibitions to airlines and carriers.
Accordingly, Morales suggests that § 1555-
D's ban on the knowing delivery of
contraband tobacco products is not
preempted by the FAAAA-even only
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insofar as it pertains to carrier services.
Section 1555-D requires that carriers do not
act as knowing accomplices in the illegal
sale of tobacco products. It does not,
however, require that carriers mo.dify their
delivery methods other than by' declining to
transport a product that Maine has
legitimately banned. We think that this
effect on services is "too tenuous" to
warrant preemption. Mendonca, 152 F.3d at
1189 (stating that a state law is too tenuous
to be preempted by the FAAAA where the
law does not frustrate the FAAAA's
deregulatory purposes).
If the rule were otherwise, states would be
unable to bar a primary method by which
contraband crosses state lines. We do not
believe that this was Congress' intent in
enacting the FAAAA. Other courts applying
the FAAAA to prohibitions on the delivery
of contraband tobacco have reached similar
conclusions. See Robertson v. Liquor
Control Bd., 102 Wn. App. 848, 10 P.3d
1079, 1084-85 (Wash. App. Ct. 2000)
(concluding that the FAAAA did not
preempt a state law banning the transport of
contraband cigarettes because otherwise "a
motor carrier would be exempt from
forfeiture for transporting a
methamphetamine lab or poached game");
see also N.Y. State Motor Truck Ass'n v.
Pataki, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25519, No.
03-CV-2386 (GBD), 2004 WL 2937803, at
*6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004)(concluding
that the FAAAA did not preempt a state law
making it unlawful for carriers to deliver
cigarettes directly to New York consumers
because "the mere fact that a statute
concerns the transportation .of a particular
cargo by . . . carriers . . . does not render
it . . unconstitutional on preemption
grounds"); Ward v. New York. 291 F. Supp.
2d 188, 210-211 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (similar).
But, while Maine may ban a carrier from
knowingly transporting contraband tobacco
products, it may not dictate the procedures
that a carrier should employ to locate these
products in its delivery chain. See UPS I,
318 F.3d at 336 (concluding that the
FAAAA preempted a Puerto Rico revenue-
collection scheme that mandated procedures
that carriers had to follow to deliver certain
packages). The second part of § 1555-D
violates this principle.
As noted, § 1555-D imposes upon a carrier
constructive knowledge that it has delivered
a tobacco product if the package containing
the product is marked as containing tobacco
or if the seller's name appears on the
Attorney General's list. As UPS' experience
demonstrates, a carrier seeking to comply
with § 1555-D must specially inspect every
package destined for delivery in Maine.
Once the carrier has finished this inspection,
it must segregate the packages that contain
tobacco and research whether the addressee
is a Maine-licensed retailer or distributor
who can receive the package. While the
second part of § 1555-D does not expressly
reference carrier services, it "impernissibly
affect[s] . . . services . . . because it
requir[es] UPS to identify the contents of the
packages (a deviation from standard
procedures used in deliveries elsewhere in
the United States). . . ." UPS II, 385 F.2d at
14 (parenthesis in original). UPS can only
provide timely package delivery if it follows
uniform procedures that allow for "an
orderly flow of packages." UPS I, 318 F.3d
at 336. Because the second part of § 1555-D
has the effect of forcing UPS to change its
uniform package-processing procedures, the
district court correctly found it to be
preempted.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize
that there is a potential tension between
saying that, on the one hand. Maine is free
to punish the knowing delivery of material
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that it has classified as contraband, while, on
the other hand, ruling that it may not dictate
or interfere with a carrier's delivery
procedures. What we are saying here,
however, is that Maine cannot use the
mechanisms outlined in the statute to impute
knowledge based on a failure to read labels
or consult lists-an imputation which would
amount to prescribing how carriers must
operate.
If, however, Maine could prove that a carrier
employee had actual knowledge that a
package being delivered was contraband
tobacco, then it might have a colorable
enforcement case-although such
circumstances, as a practical matter, may be
difficult to prove. True, the "related to"
language could stretch to such a case but it
could also stretch to the knowing delivery of
hard drugs-and Congress cannot have
intended such a result.
III.
"[T]obacco use, particularly among children
and adolescents, poses perhaps the single
most significant public health problem in the
United States." FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161, 120 S.
Ct. 1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000). There
is no question that Maine has sought to
achieve a worthy objective by passing the
Tobacco Delivery Law to combat this
pernicious problem. See N.H. Motor Transp.
Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 219. But the
FAAAA focuses on the effect that a state's
law has on carriers, and not on the state's
objective in passing the law. To the extent
that Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law requires
(or has the effect of requiring) carriers to
implement state-mandated procedures in the
processing and delivery of packages, it is
preempted by the FAAAA. But to the extent
that the Tobacco Delivery Law merely bars
all persons (including carriers) from
knowingly transporting contraband tobacco
into Maine, the FAAAA is not implicated.
We AFFIRM the judgment as it pertains to
22 M.R.S.A. § 1555-C(3)(C) and the second
part of 22 M.R.S.A. § 1555-D but
REVERSE the judgment as it pertains to
the first part of § 1555-D. We REMAND
the case to the district court with instructions
to AMEND the judgment consistent with
this opinion. No costs are awarded.
So ordered.
314
"Court to Hear Web Cigarette Sales Fight"
The Associated Press
June 25, 2007
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court on
Monday agreed to consider reinstating
Maine's law aimed at regulating Internet
sales of cigarettes to keep them out of the
hands of minors.
Trade associations for delivery companies
successfully argued in an appeals court that
a federal statute supporting the free flow of
interstate commerce pre-empted the Maine
law.
The Maine attorney general, who asked the
Supreme Court to hear the case, argues that
states should be allowed to exercise their
historic public health police powers to stop
delivery of tobacco to children.
To comply with the state law, carriers must
specially inspect every package containing
tobacco and destined for delivery in Maine.
The 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found
that carriers had to change their uniform
package-processing procedures to comply
with Maine's law. That, said the appeals
court, conflicts with the requirements of the
Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act. It says states may not
enact a law related to a service of any
shipper.
The 2003 state law makes it illegal to
knowingly deliver tobacco products to a
Maine consumer if the product was
purchased from an unlicensed retailer.
Retailers must use only commercial carriers
who ensure that the buyer is at least 18.
The appeals court decision in the trade
association's favor "leaves delivery sales of
tobacco to children unregulated by any
government, a result nowhere suggested by
Congress or supported by common sense,"
the Maine attorney general's office said in
asking the Supreme Court to take the case.
The state law was prompted by an increase
in Internet tobacco sales carried out by
direct delivery to consumers through the
mail or by commercial carriers. The
phenomenon has complicated Maine's
efforts to regulate the sale of tobacco to
minors and also caused it to lose tax revenue
because of tax-free sales by unlicensed
companies.
The Bush administration sided with the trade
associations, urging the justices to reject the
appeal.
The case is Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transport, 06-457.
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"U.S. Supreme Court to Hear State's Appeal
in Internet-Tobacco Sales Case"
U.S. States News
June 25, 2007
The Maine Attorney General issued the
following news release:
Today, the United States Supreme
Court announced that it has agreed
to review the case Rowe v. New
Hampshire Motor Transport, 06-
457 filed against the State of
Maine by motor transport
associations in Massachusetts,
New Hampshire and Vermont.
The associations challenged the
2003 Maine law that requires that
internet tobacco retailers utilize
carriers who take specific actions
to ensure that packages containing
tobacco products are not delivered
to minors.
Attorney General Steve Rowe stated "We
are pleased that the Supreme Court has
agreed to hear this important case. States
have the right and the duty to protect the
health and safety of children. This state law
does just that by preventing youth access to
tobacco products."
In the brief petitioning the Supreme Court to
take the case, the Attorney General had
criticized the lower court decision by stating
that it "leaves delivery sales of tobacco to
children unregulated by any government, a
result nowhere suggested by Congress or
supported by common sense."
Rowe also noted: "The state law also levels
the playing field between "bricks and
mortar" retail stores in Maine and internet
and mail order retailers when it comes to age
verification."
Attorney General Rowe said that his office
will likely file the State's brief in August
and that the Supreme Court will likely hear
the oral argument in the case in December.
Background
In 2003, the Maine Legislature found that
internet and telephone sales of tobacco
products had become a serious problem and
that, by means of delivery services,
enterprising retailers were seeking to avoid
over-the-counter age verification
requirements by selling the tobacco products
to minors and delivering them not over-the-
counter, but rather through third-party
carriers such as UPS. In response to this
dangerous practice, the Legislature enacted
"An Act To Regulate the Delivery and Sales
of Tobacco Products and To Prevent the
Sale of Tobacco Products to Minors," Me.
Pub. L. 2003, c. 444.
One section of the Act requires retailers who
ship tobacco products to use a delivery
service that requires the purchaser to be the
addressee, the addressee to be of legal age to
purchase tobacco products and sign for the
package, and, if the addressee is under 27
years old, to present a valid identification
showing proof of age.
The Act also requires retailers who ship
tobacco products to clearly indicate on the
package that it contains tobacco products,
and carriers must check packages to
determine whether they bear such markings.
On October 10, 2003, three trade
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associations whose members include such
companies as UPS, Federal Express and
DHL filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the District of Maine and
claimed that the state Act is preempted by
the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994.
On May 27, 2005, the District Court held
that the state law was preempted by the
federal law and ruled in favor of the trade
associations. The Attorney General appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit. On May 19, 2006. the First
Circuit issued its decision effectively
affirming the lower court's decision. The
Attorney General then filed a petition asking
the United States Supreme Court to review
the matter.
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"Invitation Brief in No. 06-457, Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transport Association & Final (?) CVSG Tally"
SCOTUS Blog
Amy Howe
May 30, 2007
On Friday the SG's office filed this brief
recommending that the Court deny cert. in
No. 06-457, Rowe v. New Hampshire
Motor Transport Association. The SG's
brief in Rowe is also, in all likelihood, the
last invitation brief that will be filed this
Term; although we had previously
indicated that we expected a brief in No.
06-415, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care,
last Friday was-as we understand it-the
last day for the SG to file a brief and (if
the normal timelines are followed . . .) still
have the case considered before the
Court's summer recess, and the Court's
electronic docket does not indicate that
any such brief was filed.
If (as we now expect) the brief in Rowe is
indeed the last SG brief for the Term, the
final score is six recommended denials and
just one recommended grant (in No. 06-
856, LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg &
Associates . . . ). Although the Court
normally accords substantial weight to the
SG's recommendations-and it would
thus seem likely that this group of CVSG
cases would not be a significant source of
new cases for the Court's OT2007
docket-the Court's need for cases could
change the calculus considerably.
At issue in Rowe is whether the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act
(FAAAA, not to be confused with the FAA
(Federal Arbitration Act), which features
prominently in Hall Street Associates v.
Mattel, Inc., in which cert. was granted
yesterday) preempts provisions of a Maine
law that would require shippers which deliver
tobacco products to, among other things,
obtain the signature of the purchaser and, if he
or she is under the age of twenty-seven, verify
the purchaser's age. The SG's
recommendation that cert. be denied rests
primarily on its belief that the decision below
was correctly decided; the provisions at issue
impose precisely the kind of "burdens . . . on
interstate commerce and the free flow of
traffic" that Congress intended to eliminate
with the FAAA's preemption provisions. And
although the government hastens to emphasize
that it "shares the State's interest in combating
youth tobacco use," it explains that other
means are available-including under the
current Maine law-to do so. Finally, it
disputes petitioner s suggestion that the First
Circuit's decision conflicts with the holdings
of other courts.
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